Durham E-Theses The epistemology of the sophists: Protagoras Zilioii, Ugo How to cite: Zilioii, Ugo (2002) The epistemology of the sophists: Protagoras, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4023/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk Ugo Zilioii THE EP8STEM0L0GY OF THE SOPHISTS: PROTAGORAS. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. A thesis submitted to The Department of Classics and Ancient History University of Durham In accordance with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2002 Declaration. I confirm that no part of the material offered has previously been submitted by me for a degree in this or in any other University. If material has been generated through joint work, my independent contribution has been clearly indicated. In all other cases material from the work of others has been acknowledged and quotations and paraphrases suitability indicated. Abstract. Ugo Zilioli, The epistemology of the Sophists: Protagoras, Ph.D 2002. My thesis is on the epistemology of the sophist Protagoras. Through the reading of Plato' Theaetetus and Protagoras, I have reconstructed (a) Protagorean theory of knowledge, according to which Protagoras is an inter-subjectivist (as far as perceptions are concerned) and a moral relativist (as far as ethical judgements are concerned). In Chapter 1,1 first try to reconstruct the development of Protagoras' life. I list then Protagoras' few (extant) fragments, offering their different interpretations. Lastly, I deal with modem and most recent scholarship on Protagoras, ending the chapter with some considerations about the scholarly legitimacy of my thesis. In chapters 2 and 3, I deal with the Protagorean section in Plato's Theaetetus. Through a detailed (and critical) analysis of Plato's exegesis of Protagoras' maxim "Man is the measure of all things", I first reconstruct the perceptual (and individualistic) side of Protagoras' epistemology and then the ethical (and collective) side of such an epistemology. At the end of chapter 3, Protagoras' theory of knowledge already reveals itself as a rather complete epistemology. Such a (complete) picture of Protagoras' epistemology is reinforced in chapter 4, which deals with the Great Speech (mainly the myth) of the Protagoras. Through a close analysis of the core of the Great Speech, I confirm the ethical and collective reading of Protagoras' maxim that I have given in chapter 3. I end the chapter by providing some (modem) suggestions for taking Protagoras as a more serious epistemologist than he is actually thought of. In the Conclusion, I sum up my whole reconstmction of the Platonic Protagoras and of his theory of knowledge, connecting it briefly with some features of fifth-century B.C Greek epistemology and, again, with some modem philosophical tenets. For my parents, and to Christopher Rowe, sine qui bus non CONTENTS. Preface i Note to the Reader v Life, fragments and scholarship 1 1.1 Life 1 1.2 Fragments 5 1.3 Scholarship on Protagoras 17 1.4 A ncient Interpreters of Protagoras 21 1.5 The plan of the present work 25 Protagoras in the Theaetetus I 27 2.1 The Maxim as a Protagorean Theory of Perception 28 2.2 Protagoras' Secret Doctrine: a Heraclitean Theory of Flux and a Platonic Theory of Perception 31 2.3 ^Perceptual Cohabitative Autonomy' 41 2.4 Protagoras' Defence 47 2.5 Personal Identity: a Digression 58 2.6 The Maxim as a Protagorean Theory of Society 64 2.7 The Defence and two Protagoras 'fragments: B6aDK AndBSbDK 70 Protagoras in the Theaetetus II 76 3.1 The New Formulation of Protagoras' Maxim 79 3.2 A first estimate of Protagoras' doctrine 87 3.3 The Maxim and the future 95 3.4 Democratic Knowledge 106 Protagoras in the Protagoras 116 4.1 The Great Speech 119 4.2 The myth: exposition of Protagoras' argument 123 4.3 The myth: interpretation of Protagoras' argument 131 4.4 Protagoras among moderns: Wittgensteinian fascinations 161 Conclusion 177 Bibliography \ 85 When a man sits with a pretty girl for an hour, it seems liice a minute. But let him sit on a hot stove for a minute- And it is longer than any hour. That is relativity. A. Einstein Preface. This thesis is the result of a three-year doctoral program undertaken at the Department of Classics and Ancient History of the University of Durham, under the supervision of Prof. C.J. Rowe. The present work is on the epistemology of one of the most influential Older Sophists, Protagoras. The original plan of my doctoral research was wider than the one I actually pursued, since I first intended to study the epistemology of Protagoras, Gorgias and the historian Thucydides. I intended to attempt that because I wished to reconstruct in a more definite way, for myself and for other students of Ancient Greek philosophy, the (epistemological) background against which Plato had mainly to fight. I had to give up the ambitious project, since Protagoras turned out to deserve much more attention than I originally thought. But in any case it has been an extremely rewarding experience to concentrate my philosophical capacities just on Protagoras' epistemology. Working on Protagoras has been hard work, but philosophically extremely challenging. The more I attempted to understand his fragments and the philosophical positions attributed to him, the more his philosophy, or at least his epistemology, turned out to be interesting, fascinatingly modem. In order to try to make sense of Protagoras' philosophical tenets, I needed to read a great deal of contemporEiry philosophy on relativism, subjectivism, personal identity. So much reading of current philosophy has opened me a wide field of philosophical interests that were unknown to me before. The study of Protagoras has—I hope—made me a stronger philosopher. As I have already said, I had the luck of having Christopher Rowe as my supervisor. British reserve does not let me say publicly what I really owe to Christopher. He himself would be embarrassed were I to speak too frankly of him. I have respect both for British reserve and (more, obviously) for him and so I shall keep to myself the various reasons for my gratitude and my affection for him. At any rate, I cannot avoid admitting that he has not been a standard supervisor. He has ever been an excellent philosophical stimulus for me, constantly showing appreciation for my work and making suggestions for improving it. Such excellent supervision has always gone along with his sincere concern for my benefit as a person. He has always done what he could do (and more) to put me in the condition of being a good student and a happy man. If I have to say what I (hope to) have learned most from Christopher, I shall say, without any doubt, intellectual courage, that is the capacity, the strength and the ability to defend one's own ideas, once one is convinced that they are reasonable. I have often seen him (or read him) arguing for his own philosophical ideas, when he was well aware that they were unpopular. But he was reasonably sure that those ideas were right and he did not mind being, at least for a short while, a lonely voice. I have often seen him changing his opinions as well, whenever he foimd that some arguments were better than his; indeed, he has always encouraged philosophical discussion, to have better ideas winning over less reasonable ones. If it is true that philosophy is not a set of doctrines (to be safeguarded), but an activity (for making life go best), that is high-value philosophy. I hope to have kept faith with what I have said before and that what I have just written will not make Christopher embarrassed. I do apologize but this time I caimot tone down what I have just said, without feeling at odds with myself. Let all this formality be done with, and let me say "Christopher, thanks for everything." Together with him, 1 wish to express my thanks to Beverlin Monique Hammett, who contributed to making my first year in Durham an unforgettable one. Her (our) friendship is one of the rare and precious things that one dare not think will happen in one's own life. Thanks also to Samantha Jane Newington, Maria Angelica Fierro and Elena Irrera, who have been close to me throughout my doctorate. Back home, I have to say special thanks to my best friend, Michela Paradiso, who has been, as always, the person who most supported what I was doing. Her continuous attempt to understand the (bizarre) reasons for my doing philosophy, and thus to imderstand me more fully, is always a proof of the great friendship that we have and feel for each other. I have to express then my gratitude to my sister Annalisa, for her own special support, both intellectual and emotive.