Ronald M. Smelser, Edward J. Davies II. The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi- Soviet War in American Popular Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. xii + 327 pp. $21.99, paper, ISBN 978-0-521-71231-6. Reviewed by Joseph Robert White Published on H-War (November, 2008) Commissioned by Janet G. Valentine (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College - Dept of Mil Hist) This book addresses an issue that professors damentally to Allied victory. In accentuating posi‐ of German military history often encounter: their tive U.S. coverage, however, they largely sidestep students’ tendency to differentiate “Nazi,” espe‐ how the American media overcame previous per‐ cially SS, behavior from that of Wehrmacht troops ceptions of Stalinist tyranny in favor of Soviet suf‐ on the Eastern Front (Ostfront). Historians Ronald fering at German hands. M. Smelser and Edward J. Davies II deconstruct Chapter 2, “The Cold War and the Emergence the myth of the “clean hands”--the idea that the of a Lost Cause Mythology,” traces the emergence Wehrmacht had nothing to do with genocidal of the Wehrmacht “lost cause” myth from Nurem‐ crimes in the German-Soviet War--in U.S. history berg through the early Cold War. The Internation‐ and popular culture and trace its spread after al Military Tribunal’s (IMT) prosecution of the World War II. The authors, both from the Univer‐ German General Staff and the Nuremberg Mili‐ sity of Utah, are well qualified for the task. tary Tribunals’ “High Command Case” forcefully Smelser is a widely published historian of Nazi argued the case for Wehrmacht complicity in Nazi Germany, while Davies, a self-confessed former war crimes. Yet, the prosecutors’ contentions adherent to the Ostfront myth, specializes in U.S. largely fell on deaf ears. Smelser and Davies trace history. this failure not only to the IMT’s refusal to con‐ In chapter 1, “Americans Experience the War demn the German General Staff as a criminal or‐ in Russia, 1941-1945,” the authors review U.S. me‐ ganization, but also specifically to the reframing dia coverage of the Soviet war, as well as eforts to of German military history by the German army’s aid the Soviet Union. Americans, the authors con‐ erstwhile chief of staff, Franz Halder, and his col‐ tend, had good reason to know that their Soviet leagues. As U.S. perceptions of the Soviets grew ally bore immense sacrifices and contributed fun‐ negative, American perceptions of Germans and H-Net Reviews the German army became increasingly positive. Pilot (1958), and Sven Hassel’s grunt novels. These Americans mistook Halder for a “resister,” giving books blinker the war on the Eastern Front, em‐ him entrée to rewrite German military history, phasizing operations and tactics over grand strat‐ while ignoring his personal role in the implemen‐ egy, occupation policy, and politics. In the wake of tation of Adolf Hitler’s criminal orders. Vietnam, U.S. military thinkers uncritically appro‐ priated this mythology. General Mellenthin was The next chapter, “The German Generals Talk, among their advisors and was a popular lecturer Write, and Network,” reviews Halder’s leadership at U.S. military bases. Searching for a new model as head of the Operational History (German) Sec‐ for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization tion within the U.S. Army’s Historical Division. Un‐ (NATO), American officers emphasized Germany’s surprisingly, Halder appointed like-minded offi‐ stalwart defense against the Red Army from 1942 cers to present the German version of the Ost‐ to 1945. front. With the Americans more concerned with tactical and operational issues, the German sec‐ “Winning Hearts and Minds: The Germans In‐ tion’s historical reports contained numerous anti- terpret the War for the United States Public,” Russian and racist stereotypes. These same gener‐ chapter 5, reveals the literary tropes that made als also networked within the new Federal Repub‐ Ostfront accounts so appealing to Americans, and lic of Germany, thus ensuring continuity in insti‐ documents Anglo-American complicity in the le‐ tutions and in historical interpretation between gitimization of these accounts. The analyzed the Bundeswehr and the Wehrmacht. The authors works, Gottlob Herbert Bidermann’s In Deadly hold the United States complicit in two “lost Combat (2001), Günter K. Koschorrek’s Blood Red cause” myths: the Reconstruction-era legend of Snow (2005), Armin Scheiderbauer’s Adventures the Confederacy’s noble fght during the U.S. Civil in My Youth (2003), and Hans von Luck’s Panzer War and the Cold War-era myth of Germany’s de‐ Commander (1989), emphasized love of family, fense of Western civilization against the Soviet professions of Christianity, charity toward the en‐ Union. One notable defect with this analogy is emy, and heroic self-sacrifice. Apart from thick de‐ that, in contrast to Halder’s close relationship scriptions of the Russian winter, they ignored with the U.S. Army, Confederate General Jubal mass murder, anti-partisan warfare (in 1942 de‐ Early, a notable proponent of the Confederate liberately mislabeled by the Nazi regime as “com‐ “lost cause,” never contributed to The War of the bating bandits,” or Bandenbekämpfung), property Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of confiscation, complicity in forced labor roundups, the Union and Confederate Armies (1880-1901). and wanton destruction.[1] Instead, as claimed in Paul Carell’s Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943 (1964), In chapter 4, “Memoirs, Novels, and Popular the German soldier fought bravely and well, lying Histories,” Smelser and Davies deconstruct popu‐ low in the Russian steppes, potato masher and ri‐ lar memoirs that contributed to the Ostfront fle at the ready. Smelser and Davies also address myth, most notably Erich von Manstein’s Lost Vic‐ how American and British historians and generals tories (1958) and Heinz Guderian’s Panzer Leader facilitated these books’ publication. Reviews, fore‐ (1952), by illuminating their omissions and out‐ words, and “blurbs” by noted authors, like Basil right lies. While Manstein was ambivalent toward H. Liddell Hart and Stephen Ambrose, lent au‐ the Nazis, Guderian was an early Nazi supporter, thority to these accounts. a fact forgotten after 1945. Other memoirs and novels that contributed to Ostfront mythmaking Chapter 6, “The Gurus,” discusses the “gurus,” include Panzer Battles (1956) by Friedrich Wil‐ the leading authors of tendentious accounts on helm von Mellenthin, Hans-Ulrich Rudel’s Stuka the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS, and the “ro‐ 2 H-Net Reviews mancers,” their readership. American romancers [1]. On Bandenbekämpfung, see the excellent provide a vast market for picture books about the book by Philip W. Blood, Hitler’s Bandit Hunters: German military, especially Waffen-SS uniforms The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe, fore‐ and equipment; in the romancers’ imagined past, word by Richard Holmes (Washington: Potomac Luftwaffe pilots and Waffen-SS tankers joust with Books, 2006). their foes. The gurus fetishize uniform, weapon, [2]. On Wehrmacht complicity in war crimes and equipment minutiae, which, Smelser and and crimes against humanity, accessible starting Davies admit, are generally accurate. The most places in English are Wolfram Wette, The important gurus are Mark Yerger, Richard Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality, trans. Debo‐ Landwehr, Franz Kurowski, and Antonio Munos. rah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge: Harvard Uni‐ The authors credit Munos with at least acknowl‐ versity Press, 2006); Geoffrey P. Megargee, War of edging Germany’s genocidal campaigns on the Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the East‐ Eastern Front, which, they note, is “usually a ern Front, 1941 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, taboo topic” (p. 186). 2006); Alexander Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland: Chapter 7, “Wargames, the Internet, and the Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity (Lawrence: Uni‐ Popular Culture of the Romancers,” surveys the versity Press of Kansas, 2003); and Raffael Scheck, Ostfront myth in U.S. popular culture. The notable Hitler’s African Victims: The German Army Mas‐ successes of Avalon Hill war games (like sacres of Black French Soldiers in 1940 (Cam‐ PanzerBlitz) and Simulations Publications Inc. bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). games (like War in the East: The Russo-German Conflict 1941-1945) enabled the romancer to imagine an antiseptic version of history in which Germany emerges victorious without legal or moral complications. In their concluding sentence, the authors con‐ cede that their effort may well be Sisyphean: “The ‘good German’ seems destined for an eternal life” (p. 259). This study should nevertheless provide food for thought in classroom discussions about the German army. Readers will have to search elsewhere, however, for broader treatment of German military complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity on the Eastern Front and elsewhere in World War II.[2] Indeed, the omis‐ sion of a chapter-length overview of Wehrmacht participation in war crimes (aside from analyzing the Nuremberg prosecutors’ case and generals’ memoirs) assumes a specialized readership that regrettably undermines the authors’ otherwise noble effort to challenge the Ostfront myth. Notes 3 H-Net Reviews If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-war Citation: Joseph Robert White. Review of Smelser, Ronald M.; Davies II, Edward J. The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture. H-War, H-Net Reviews. November, 2008. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=23036 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 4.