Congo: Is Democratic Change Possible?

Congo: Is Democratic Change Possible?

Congo: Is Democratic Change Possible? Africa Report N°225 | 5 May 2015 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. i Recommendations .................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. The Permanent Political Crisis ......................................................................................... 2 A. A Tumultuous Start ................................................................................................... 2 B. In Search of Cohesion and the Promise of Reform ................................................... 3 C. A Reformed but Non-consensual CENI .................................................................... 4 D. Increasing Authoritarianism ..................................................................................... 7 E. The Security Forces: A Pillar of the Regime .............................................................. 8 III. Elections in a Fragmented Political Landscape ............................................................... 10 A. January 2015: A Mini Electoral Crisis ....................................................................... 11 B. A Majority Only in Name? ......................................................................................... 12 C. The Opposition: Divided we Stand ............................................................................ 14 1. Political parties ..................................................................................................... 14 2. The religious factor .............................................................................................. 15 3. A quest for unity? ................................................................................................. 15 IV. Electoral Preparations: Problems and Uncertainties ...................................................... 17 A. Decentralisation in Times of Elections ...................................................................... 17 B. The Politics of Technical Preparations ...................................................................... 18 1. The voter roll ........................................................................................................ 19 2. Fears for the timing of the legislative elections ................................................... 20 3. Uncertain funding ................................................................................................ 20 4. Technical and logistical support .......................................................................... 21 C. The Impossible Local Elections ................................................................................. 21 V. Avoiding a Negative-sum Game ....................................................................................... 23 A. Lifting the Clouds on 2016 ........................................................................................ 23 B. Enhancing International Engagement ...................................................................... 23 C. Restoring Confidence in the CENI and Speeding up Preparations .......................... 24 1. Organising political consultations on the electoral calendar and the decentralisation process ....................................................................................... 24 2. The voter roll ........................................................................................................ 25 3. Improving communication between the institutional stakeholders ................... 25 D. A Conflict Prevention, Security and Dispute Resolution Strategy for the Local Elections ........................................................................................................... 25 E. Educating the Voters ................................................................................................. 26 VI. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 28 APPENDICES A. Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo ...................................................................... 29 B. Glossary ........................................................................................................................... 30 C. Electoral Dates ................................................................................................................. 32 D. Decentralisation in DRC .................................................................................................. 33 E. About the International Crisis Group .............................................................................. 34 F. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Africa since 2012 ................................................ 36 G. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................ 38 International Crisis Group Africa Report N°225 5 May 2015 Executive Summary The presidential and legislative polls scheduled for 2016 are a potential watershed for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); they could be the first elections held with- out an incumbent protecting his position. The prospect of these elections is testing nerves on all sides of the Congolese political spectrum and has already caused deadly violence. There is an urgent need for President Joseph Kabila to commit to the two- term limit contained within the constitution and ready himself to leave power. Con- sensus is also needed on key electoral decisions, in particular regarding the calendar and the voter roll. This will require high-level donor and international engagement. Absent agreement and clarity on the election process, or should there be significant delays, international partners should review their support to the government. The fragmented governing majority is running out of options to avoid the 2016 deadline. The government’s attempts to amend both the constitution to allow Joseph Kabila to run for a third term and election laws face strong, including internal, opposi- tion, as was evident in the January 2015 mini-political crisis over proposed changes to the electoral law. This mini-crisis, which triggered deadly violence and repression against pro-democracy activists, gave a first hint of what could be in store for 2016. In this tense domestic context, engagement by international actors is met with an increas- ing insistence on national sovereignty that affects in particular the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Local and provincial polls planned for 2015, despite a technically insufficient and non-consensual voter list, could undermine credible national elections in 2016. In addition to an overly ambitious and costly electoral calendar, the government is hastily pushing through an under-resourced and ill-prepared decentralisation process, includ- ing the division of eleven provinces into 26 as provided for in the 2006 constitution. It aims to finalise in six months what was not achieved during nine years. Trying to pursue decentralisation while implementing the electoral calendar could aggravate local tensions, trigger security troubles ahead of next year’s polls and make the coun- try highly unstable. For the government, buying time by capitalising on potential delays seems to be the highest attainable objective it can presently agree on. The disjointed opposition is inca- pable of forming a united front, but there is a broad agreement to oppose any political manoeuvring to extend President Kabila’s rule beyond 2016. In addition to President Kabila’s ambiguous signals about whether he will respect his two-term limit, prob- lems experienced during the 2011 elections remain; they include a lack of confidence in the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and a disputed voter list. The democratisation process launched a decade ago is reaching its moment of truth, as the excessive hopes raised by the 2006 elections have not materialised. These were the first, and so far only, reasonably free and fair democratic polls to take place since the country’s independence. In their wake, reform of the nature of politics and gov- ernment in DRC has been limited. However, at this stage, delaying the 2016 presiden- tial and legislative elections would be equivalent to an unconstitutional extension of the regime. The January 2015 violence in Kinshasa was a clear demonstration of the Congolese population’s aspirations for political change. If the electoral process is not Congo: Is Democratic Change Possible? Crisis Group Africa Report N°225, 5 May 2015 Page ii allowed to move forward unhindered, international actors, with a large UN mission in place, risk supporting a regime with even less legitimacy than is currently the case. All efforts have to focus on creating conditions for credible polls in 2016. To that end, Congolese political actors and the CENI should revise the electoral calendar and delay local elections until decentralisation has been fine-tuned, and provincial polls should be organised to closely coincide or be combined with the national elections. A serious conflict prevention

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