UNDERSTANDING MILITARY DOCTRINAL CHANGE DURING PEACETIME Andrew A. Gallo Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2018 © 2018 Andrew A. Gallo All rights reserved ABSTRACT Understanding Military Doctrinal Change During Peacetime Andrew A. Gallo This study examines processes of military doctrinal change during periods of peace. Given the conventional wisdom of hidebound bureaucratic military organizations, why do these organizations innovate doctrinally? Rather than conduct competitive hypothesis testing between two or more theories of military innovation or pursue a heretofore undiscovered monocausal theory, I develop and test a theoretical framework that synthesizes more than one approach to military doctrinal innovation. I use this framework to conduct a structured, focused, case-study comparison of two military organizations - the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps - from the post-World War II period until 2001. The study yields seven findings. First, the systemic causes of military doctrinal innovation are best described by balance of threat theory. Second, contrary to the existing literature, civilian intervention is not a necessary or sufficient cause of doctrinal innovation. Third, militaries consistently strive to establish a monopoly over warfare in a particular jurisdictional domain. Fourth, the frequency of military doctrinal change is a function of the complexity of the strategic problem that doctrine is designed to solve. Fifth, the complexity of the cases studied supports the argument that monocausal explanations fail to account for the interaction of multiple variables that affect doctrinal innovation. Sixth, military doctrinal innovation during peacetime is not anomalous because military organizations constantly revise their theories of victory as threats change in the external environment. Finally, the existence of doctrinal institutions creates a norm for a reliance on military doctrine. TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements vi Dedication vii Introduction 1 1. Understanding Military Doctrine and Doctrinal Innovation 28 1.1. What is Military Doctrine? 28 1.1.1. Defining Doctrine in the Political Science Literature 28 1.1.2. My Definition of Doctrine 39 1.2. Why do Military Organizations Innovate Doctrinally? 40 1.2.1. Categorizing the Literature on Military Doctrine 40 1.2.2. What is Innovation? 42 1.2.3. What is Military Innovation? 44 1.2.4. Why do Military Organizations Innovate Doctrinally? 46 1.3. Conclusion 72 2. Research Design 73 2.1. A New Framework for Assessing Military Doctrinal Innovation 73 2.1.1. Theory of Victory 74 2.1.2. What Causes Innovation? 77 2.1.3. What Determines the Character of Innovation? 81 2.1.3.1. Intraservice Rivalry 82 2.1.3.2. Interservice Rivalry 83 2.1.3.3. Organizational Culture 85 2.2. Case Study Selection 91 i 2.2.1. Methodology and Case Selection 92 2.2.2. Data Requirements for the Cases 97 2.2.3. Evidence of Doctrine 99 2.2.3.1. Keystone Doctrine - U.S. Army 99 2.2.3.2. Keystone Doctrine - U.S. Marine Corps 104 3. Doctrinal Change for Conventional Warfare in the U.S. Army 110 3.1. The Major Doctrines 111 3.1.1. The Pentomic Doctrine 111 3.1.1.1. The Post-World War II Period (1945-1950) 112 3.1.1.2. The Korean War (1950-1953) 116 3.1.1.3. The Pentomic Era (1953-1958) 118 1954 Field Service Regulations FM 100-5 120 Interservice Rivalry 121 The Pentomic Division and Its Doctrine 124 3.1.1.4. Understanding the Sources 132 3.1.1.5. Conclusion 137 3.1.2. Active Defense Doctrine 141 3.1.2.1. The Final Years of the Vietnam War (1973-1975) 142 The Establishment of the All-Volunteer Force 142 The Establishment of the Training and Doctrine Command 144 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War 146 Theory of Victory Prior to Active Defense 147 3.1.2.2. The Active Defense Doctrine 148 ii 3.1.2.3. Understanding the Sources 152 3.1.2.4. Conclusion 161 3.1.3. AirLand Battle Doctrine 166 3.1.3.1. From Active Defense to AirLand Battle (1976-1986) 167 The 1982 Field Manual 100-5 Operations 168 The 1986 Field Manual 100-5 Operations 171 3.1.3.2. Understanding the Sources 174 3.1.3.3. Conclusion 178 3.2. Chapter Conclusion 180 4. Doctrinal Change for Irregular Warfare in the U.S. Army 184 4.1. The Major Doctrines 186 4.1.1. Counterinsurgency Doctrine 186 4.1.1.1. Lead-up to U.S. Escalation in the Vietnam War 187 A New Organizational Construct – ROAD 187 A New Manual - 1962 FM 100-5 Operations 190 Unconventional Warfare Doctrine Before the War 191 4.1.1.2. Doctrine During the Vietnam War (1964-1972) 194 1968 Field Manual 100-5 Operations 199 4.1.1.3. The Post-Vietnam War Period 203 4.1.1.4. Understanding the Absence of Innovation 205 4.1.1.5. Conclusion 210 4.1.2. Full-Dimensional Operations and Full-Spectrum Operations 214 4.1.2.1. The Gulf War 215 iii 4.1.2.2. 1993 FM 100-5 and Full-Dimensional Operations 218 4.1.2.3. Force XXI and the Army After Next (AAN) 222 4.1.2.4. The Army in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) 225 4.1.2.5. 2001 FM 100-5 Operations and Full-Spectrum Operations 227 4.1.2.6. Understanding the Sources of FDO and FSO 229 4.1.2.7. Conclusion 236 4.2. Chapter Conclusion 240 5. Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Marine Corps 244 5.1 The Major Doctrines 245 5.1.1. The Vertical Envelopment Doctrine 245 5.1.1.1. The Post-World War II Period 246 5.1.1.2. Corps in the Atomic Era - Innovation and the Helicopter 248 5.1.1.3. The Battle Over Military Unification, 1946-1952 253 5.1.1.4. Vertical Envelopment Doctrine, Phib-31, and LFB-17 257 5.1.1.5. Understanding the Sources of Vertical Envelopment 263 5.1.1.6. Conclusion 268 5.1.2. Maneuver Warfare Doctrine 271 5.1.2.1. Post-Vietnam War Period 271 5.1.2.2. The Marine Corps in the 1970s 273 5.1.2.3. Northern Flank Mission and the Rapid Deployment Force 277 5.1.2.4. Maneuver Doctrine and Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 280 5.1.2.5. Understanding the Sources of Maneuver Warfare 287 5.1.2.6. Conclusion 292 iv 5.2 Chapter Conclusion 294 6. Conclusion 299 6.1. Major Findings 300 6.2. Recommendations for Future Research 310 Bibliography 314 v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS While writing a dissertation can be a solitary venture, I am grateful for the guidance and inspiration that I received from many people. First, I would like to thank my sponsor and primary advisor, Professor Dick Betts. Professor Betts was a constant source of wisdom throughout the dissertation process. He has a remarkable ability to zero in on the crux of an issue and to explain complexity in simple terms. I am grateful for his mentorship and counsel. I would also like to thank Professor Rob Jervis for his insightful feedback and unwavering support. Finally, I am thankful to Professors Michael Ting, Stuart Gottlieb, and Kimberly Marten for their feedback as members of my dissertation committee. It is not lost on me how fortunate I am to have such a group of titans in the field of political science advising me on my work. Second, I would like to thank the U.S. Army and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) for selecting me as a fellow in the Advanced Strategic Planning & Policy Program (ASP3). This first-of-its-kind program fully funded my graduate school attendance, while also preserving the opportunity for me to continue to lead Soldiers in the future. Specifically, I would like to thank Dr. Robert T. Davis II, the interim director of ASP3, for his mentorship and support. I am also thankful for my peers in ASP3 – specifically Keith Carter, Kevin Bradley, Brendan Gallagher, and Jaron Wharton – for inspiring me throughout the process. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Amanda, and children, Sienna and Maddox. Your support during this 3.5-year process, your patience during the challenging times, and your confidence in my abilities motivated me more than I can adequately express in words. Thank you for the example that you set every day. Given the sacrifices that we all made to complete this dissertation in such a compressed time period, this was truly a team effort. vi DEDICATION This study is dedicated to the men and women of the United States military, especially those who made the ultimate sacrifice. vii The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the doctoral candidate and, unless cited as an official record, do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. viii Introduction Like most large organizations, bureaus have a powerful tendency to continue doing today whatever they did yesterday. The main reason for this inertia is that established processes represent an enormous previous investment in time, effort, and money…Years of effort, thousands of decisions (including mistakes), and a wide variety of experiences underlie the behavior patterns a bureau now uses. Moreover, it took a significant investment to get the bureau’s many members and clients to accept and become habituated to its behavior patterns.1 …in few spheres of human activity are change and progress so constant and the need for accommodation and adjustment so unremitting as in the military; yet in few spheres, seemingly, are the ruling minds so rigidly resistant to change.2 The Puzzle Organizational theory emphasizes the rigidity of large organizations.