Virtue Ethics Virtue Ethics Dr. Clea F. Rees [email protected] Centre for Lifelong Learning Cardiff University Spring 2012 b Virtue le E sib th is ic Virtue Ethics m a er l P l M a r o o r a m l m Outline I I m l p a e c r i m h t i s e s n i b U l e V e i c The Visitors: An Extremely Short Play Introducing The Virtues and Vices A Better Way to do Ethics? Philippa Foot: Part I ‘Cardinal’ Virtues Sketching the Concept of a (Moral) Virtue Philippa Foot: Part II Are Moral Virtues Correctives? Are Moral Virtues Really Correctives? The Kantian Pull Philippa Foot: Part III Virtuous Villains Two Suggestions Virtues as Powers b The Visitors: An Extremely Short Play b Warning: this play was written to be performed by trained ethicists. Attempting to perform it without satisfactory ethical supervision may be extremely hazardous. Performers use the play at their own risk. The author accepts no responsibility for anything. ‘Anything’ includes, but is not limited to use, misuse and abuse of this play, whether in performance or reality. Note: all rights reserved. Also, all wrongs reserved. Both rights and wrongs are hereby declared to be the property of the author. Neither rights nor wrongs may be reproduced without the author’s permission, except as permitted by applicable laws. Please note the inclusion of wrongs, since the author recognises that these make up the majority of the play. b Virtue le E sib th is ic Virtue Ethics m a er l P l M a r o o r a m l m Introducing The Virtues and Vices I I m l p a e c r i m h t i s e s n i b U l e V e i c Introducing The Virtues and Vices I historically: concentration on character/virtues/vices ) concentration on theories of right action ) return of virtue ethics one motivation: I claim theories of right action dry/sterile/inapplicable; I ethics should be grounded, to at least some extent, in human moral psychology I what does it take to be a good person? I what kind(s) of character is (are) good? I what does it take to be a virtuous person? I what is a virtue? I what are the virtues? b Virtue le E sib th is ic Virtue Ethics m a er l P l M a r o o r a m l m Introducing The Virtues and Vices I I m l p a e c r i m h t i s e s n i b U l e V e i A Better Way to do Ethics? c Introducing The Virtues and Vices A Better Way to do Ethics? should ethics take the question, I “what kind of character is it good to have?”, as opposed to the question, I “what kinds of actions is it good to do?” as fundamental? I which should be regarded as more fundamental? I which should ethics start with? I does the answer to one question depend on the answer to the other and, if so, which way does the dependency go? I which should one be more/solely concerned with qua ethical theorist? I which should one be more/solely concerned with qua moral agent? b Virtue le E sib th is ic Virtue Ethics m a er l P l M a r o o r a m l m Philippa Foot: Part I I I m l p a e c r i m h t i s e s n i b U l e V e i ‘Cardinal’ Virtues c Philippa Foot: Part I ‘Cardinal’ Virtues natural temperament and/or 1. courage learnt 2. temperance 3. wisdom 3.1 knowing means to ends I given good ends. I accessibility 3.2 knowing value of ends I true values, correct judgements I more. must be learnt 4. justice b Virtue le E sib th is ic Virtue Ethics m a er l P l M a r o o r a m l m Philippa Foot: Part I I I m l p a e c r i m h t i s e s n i b U l e V e i Sketching the Concept of a (Moral) Virtue c Philippa Foot: Part I Sketching the Concept of a (Moral) Virtue The Concept of a (Moral) Virtue: A Sketch I disposition I character trait which disposes you to act in a certain way, so you tend to act that way I generally beneficial in two ways 1. benefit the person with the trait 2. benefit other people/beings/. I a good will I importance of intentions I heart, values b Virtue le E sib th is ic Virtue Ethics m a er l P l M a r o o r a m l m Philippa Foot: Part I I I m l p a e c r i m h t i s e s n i b U l e V e i Sketching the Concept of a (Moral) Virtue c Philippa Foot: Part I Sketching the Concept of a (Moral) Virtue When do attitudes — as well as actions and intentions — matter? b Virtue le E sib th is ic Virtue Ethics m a er l P l M a r o o r a m l m Philippa Foot: Part I I I m l p a e c r i m h t i s e s n i b U l e V e i Sketching the Concept of a (Moral) Virtue c Philippa Foot: Part I Sketching the Concept of a (Moral) Virtue Moral Excellence vs. Non-Moral Excellence . involuntary error preferable voluntary error preferable I capacity + engagement with will + ?? b Virtue le E sib th is ic Virtue Ethics m a er l P l M a r o o r a m l m Philippa Foot: Part II I I m l p a e c r i m h t i s e s n i b U l e V e i Are Moral Virtues Correctives? c Philippa Foot: Part II Are Moral Virtues Correctives? I resisting temptations I courage is a virtue b/c fear is a temptation: I we are tempted to flee, hide, escape, duck etc. even when we shouldn’t I temperance is a virtue b/c gluttony is a temptation: I desire to eat, drink, be merry to excess. I compensating for deficiencies I lack enough of something I insufficiently concerned about others’ rights I insufficiently concerned about others’ well-being etc. ) role of human nature b Virtue le E sib th is ic Virtue Ethics m a er l P l M a r o o r a m l m Philippa Foot: Part II I I m l p a e c r i m h t i s e s n i b U l e V e i Are Moral Virtues Really Correctives? c Philippa Foot: Part II Are Moral Virtues Really Correctives? I compare: I one who must resist miserly temptations in order to give I one who gives joyously w/o hesitation I is the first really more virtuous? I individual vs. general difficulty I different kinds of difficulty b Virtue le E sib th is ic Virtue Ethics m a er l P l M a r o o r a m l m Philippa Foot: Part II I I m l p a e c r i m h t i s e s n i b U l e V e i The Kantian Pull c Philippa Foot: Part II The Kantian Pull Recall: Kant on duty and a good will I what’s the pull of Kant’s approach? I some actions have moral worth because they are “in accordance w/ virtue” but don’t require virtue I what Kant would call “from duty” (NOTE DIFFERENCE IN TERMINOLOGY!!) b Virtue le E sib th is ic Virtue Ethics m a er l P l M a r o o r a m l m Philippa Foot: Part II I I m l p a e c r i m h t i s e s n i b U l e V e i The Kantian Pull c Philippa Foot: Part II The Kantian Pull But: Kant’s approach misses something important I what pushes us away from Kant’s approach? I some actions may have some moral worth because they are “in accordance” with virtue, but really require virtue for true/most moral worth I charity requires doing the right thing for the right reasons AND having one’s heart in the right place I need to respond appropriately at an emotional level b Virtue le E sib th is ic Virtue Ethics m a er l P l M a r o o r a m l m Philippa Foot: Part II I I m l p a e c r i m h t i s e s n i b U l e V e i The Kantian Pull c Philippa Foot: Part II The Kantian Pull I sometimes doing the right thing requires more than Kant thought I sometimes doing the right thing requires both more and less than Kant thought I the moral worth of some actions requires: I emotional engagement, commitment, virtuous attitude/motivation I ABSENCE of duty as a motive (“one thought too many”?) b Virtue le E sib th is ic Virtue Ethics m a er l P l M a r o o r a m l m Philippa Foot: Part III I I m l p a e c r i m h t i s e s n i b U l e V e i Virtuous Villains c Philippa Foot: Part III Virtuous Villains story so far: action has positive moral worth/value iff it: I is in accordance with virtue I i.e.