UNCLASSIFIED MINIMUM NUCLEAR DETERRENCE RESEARCH FINAL REPORT May 15, 2003 Prepared for: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office Contract No: DTRA01-00-D-0003, Delivery Order 0018 Prepared by: Team Lead – Gregory Giles Christine Cleary Michèle Ledgerwood This report represents the views of its authors, not necessarily those of its sponsor or any United States Government Agency SPONSOR: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Dr. Stephen Younger Director Advanced Systems and Concepts Office Richard Gullickson Director BACKGROUND: The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was founded in 1998 to integrate and focus the capabilities of the Department of Defense (DoD) that address the weapons of mass destruction threat. To assist the Agency in its primary mission, the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) develops and maintains an evolving analytical vision of necessary and sufficient capabilities to protect United States and Allied forces and citizens from WMD attack. ASCO is also charged by DoD and by the U.S. Government generally to identify gaps in these capabilities and initiate programs to fill them. It also provides support to the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC), and its Panels, with timely, high quality research. ASCO ANALYTICAL SUPPORT: Science Applications International Corporation has provided analytical support to DTRA since the latter's inception through a series of projects on chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons issues. This work was performed for DTRA under contract DTRA01-00-D-0003, Task 18. SUPERVISING PROJECT OFFICER: Dr. Jeffrey S. Milstein (703) 767-5716. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION: 1710 SAIC Drive, McLean, Virginia, 22102. Telephone: (703) 676-5550. Project Coordinator: Mr. Gregory Giles, Assistant Vice President & Manager, Advanced Concepts and Strategic Assessments Division, (703) 676-6408. REPORT: The publication of this document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of the sponsoring agency. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page KEY FINDINGS i SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION I-1 SIMILARITIES, DISSIMILARITIES, AND IMPLICATIONS I-4 SECTION TWO: THE UNITED KINGDOM II-1 I. Origins and Early Development of British Nuclear Strategy, Doctrine, and Force Posture II-4 II. The Evolution of British Nuclear Strategy, Doctrine, and Force Posture II-17 III. Target Selection II-24 IV. Communication of the Deterrent by the British II-28 V. Britain’s Perspectives on Stability of Deterrence at Low Levels of Nuclear Weapons II-30 Appendix: Britain’s Nuclear Force Posture II-34 FRANCE II-41 I. Origins and Early Development of French Nuclear Strategy, Doctrine, and Force Posture II-43 II. Changes in Assumptions, Threat Perceptions, and Technical Considerations Since the 1950’s II-51 III. Target Selection II-55 IV. Communication of the Deterrent by the French II-58 V. France’s Perspectives on Stability of Deterrence at Low Levels of Nuclear Weapons II-61 Appendix: France’s Nuclear Force Posture II-64 THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA II-74 I. Origins and Early Development of Chinese Nuclear Strategy, Doctrine, and Force Posture II-75 II. The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy, Doctrine, and Force Posture II-80 III. Target Selection II-89 IV. Communication of the Deterrent by the Chinese II-91 V. China’s Perspectives on Stability of Deterrence at Low Levels of Nuclear Weapons II-92 Appendix: China’s Nuclear Force Posture II-97 SECTION THREE: SUMMARY OF BRITISH AND FRENCH EXPERTS’ MEETING III-1 SUMMARY OF CHINA EXPERT’S MEETING III-20 KEY FINDINGS Throughout the Cold War, Britain, France, and China settled upon deterrence at much lower levels of nuclear weapons than the United States and the Soviet Union did largely due to the interplay of economic, technical, political, and strategic factors. The three countries could not invest more resources into nuclear weapons without sharply impairing their conventional force postures or national economies. In technical terms, the enormous destructive power of thermonuclear weapons enabled each country to hold at risk very sizeable percentages of their larger adversaries’ population and industry, with relatively few weapons. Strategically, each concluded that beyond a sufficient level of such assured destruction, fuzzy as those calculations were, more nuclear weapons were superfluous or, in the case of France, destabilizing. In short, each country made a virtue of its limitations. Rogue states, such as North Korea, can be expected to emulate at least some aspects of the British, French, and Chinese approach to deterrence at low levels of nuclear weapons. Particularly after the results of Operation Iraqi Freedom, rogues are likely to be drawn to nuclear weapons as perhaps the only viable means of deterring a larger power, specifically the United States. As in the case of Britain, France, and China, rogues can be expected to pursue and utilize nuclear weapons for broader political purposes beyond deterrence. For example, central to the debate over Pyongyang’s intentions is the extent to which its nuclear weapons program is really designed to extract political and economic concessions from the United States. Rogue states can also be expected to emulate and even amplify China’s approach to concealing the size, scope and reach of its nuclear forces, the better to maximize an adversary’s uncertainty and induce caution. Whether rogue states would differ from their predecessors and come to view nuclear weapons as warfighting tools is an open question. Rogue states may strive for and succeed in achieving nuclear deterrence at significantly lower levels than even Britain, France, and China. The perception is growing, for example among Chinese military planners, that the United States would not hazard the loss of even a single U.S. city to nuclear attack. This greatly lowers the scale of nuclear force building required of rogue states, not least because the design parameters of a nuclear “device” delivered by covert insertion are quite low and relatively affordable. In contrast to most of their predecessors, there appears to be no compelling rationale for rogue states to pursue thermonuclear weapons when in today’s environment, a handful of fission seems adequate for deterrence purposes. This makes the costs of playing the nuclear game more manageable for the rogue states. Given lingering security concerns about Russia and China, as well as emerging threats and future uncertainties, low level nuclear deterrence appears to have very limited applicability to the United States in the near- to mid-term, with three possible exceptions: 1. For varying yet significant periods throughout the Cold War, Britain, France, and China were able to conduct nuclear planning without publicly specifying an enemy. Their experience may prove useful in an era of capabilities-based planning and provide a model of future U.S. declaratory nuclear policy. 2. The British and Chinese examples challenge the notion that deterrence at low-levels of nuclear weapons must always be tied to targeting cities, a notion that inhibits consideration of “minimum deterrence” in some U.S. circles. Rigorous modeling and Team B exercises involving knowledgeable outsiders should test this proposition within the context of future U.S. and Russian nuclear force levels. 3. In 1998, Britain decided not to discontinue its uninterrupted practice of having at least one ballistic missile submarine at sea at all times on the grounds that to re-introduce such patrols during a crisis might be perceived as highly provocative. The same reasoning would seem to apply not only to U.S. operational nuclear forces but also the “responsive force” of reserve warheads. Unless some portion of this reserve is routinely activated for peacetime training purposes, U.S. military planners cannot take for granted the decision of the political leadership to activate it in time of crisis. i INTRODUCTION On behalf of the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) has completed this assessment of deterrence at low levels of nuclear weapons. Consistent with its charter to be a forward-looking source of ideas to help inform current and future U.S. defense policy, ASCO commissioned a review of how certain nations have conducted nuclear deterrence with only a few hundred nuclear weapons at their disposal. The ultimate goals of this study are twofold: to begin to assess the strategic implications of significantly lower levels of U.S. nuclear weapons that might be attained in the decades ahead and more immediately to identify how rogue states with new or emerging nuclear weapons capabilities might seek to deter the United States. Building upon a predecessor study completed by SAIC in mid-2001, this study takes a closer look at the origins and evolutions of nuclear strategy, doctrine, and force posture in the United Kingdom, France, and China, each of which have for decades maintained no more than a few hundred operational nuclear weapons. Arguably, these countries are said to ascribe to “minimum deterrence.” That phrase lacks precision, however. It is generally interpreted as being able to inflict, in a second-strike, a level of damage that while sufficient to deter a would- be aggressor, falls well short of societal or global annihilation normally associated with the “maximum deterrence” postures of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In some circles, minimum deterrence is automatically equated with indiscriminate nuclear strikes on cities. Yet, as the case studies in this report make clear, the actual and perceived targeting strategies adopted by the United Kingdom, France, and China are generally more nuanced in this regard. Accordingly, this study adopts the less elegant but perhaps more accurate expression of “deterrence at low levels of nuclear weapons” as its primary term of reference. Our research and analysis was designed to address to the extent possible in the open sources the following key questions: 1.