Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications 2010-10 Terrorist innovations in weapons of mass effect: preconditions, causes, and predictive indicators Rasmussen, Maria J. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/25358 TERRORIST INNOVATIONS IN WEAPONS OF MASS EFFECT Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive Indicators Maria J. Rasmussen Naval Postgraduate School Mohammed M. Hafez Naval Postgraduate School AUGUST 2010 THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY WORKSHOP REPORT Advanced Systems and Concepts Office Report Number ASCO 2010-019 Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive Indicators WORKSHOP REPORT Maria J. Rasmussen Naval Postgraduate School Mohammed M. Hafez Naval Postgraduate School October 2010 The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government. This report is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office Report Number ASCO 2010-019 Contract Number MIPR 09-2516M The mission of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is to safeguard America and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosives) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat, and mitigate its effects. The Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) supports this mission by providing long-term rolling horizon perspectives to help DTRA leadership identify, plan, and persuasively communicate what is needed in the near term to achieve the longer-term goals inherent in the agency’s mission. ASCO also emphasizes the identification, integration, and further development of leading strategic thinking and analysis on the most intractable problems related to combating weapons of mass destruction. For further information on this project, or on ASCO’s broader research program, please contact: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 8725 John J. Kingman Road Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6201 [email protected] Acknowledgements: The authors gratefully acknowledge the participants in the August 5-6, 2010, “Innovation in WME Terrorism” workshop in Monterey, California, whose presentations and contributions are the basis of this report: Dr. Gary Ackerman, Dr. Rogelio Alonso, Mr. Peter Bergen, Dr. Lindsay Clutterbuck, Dr. Martha Crenshaw, Dr. Adam Dolnik, Dr. Richard English, Dr. Mark Hamm, Dr. Steve Hewitt, Mr. William Matchett, Dr. Assaf Moghadam, Dr. José Olmeda, Dr. Glenn Robinson, Mr. Yoram Schweitzer, and Dr. Stuart Wright. In particular, we would like to acknowledge Mr. David Hamon and Ms. Jennifer Perry, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), for lending their considerable expertise to the discussion. As a project manager, Ms. Perry shaped the project’s framework, advised us on the selection of cases and subject matter experts, and has consistently helped us refine ideas. Dr. Sandra Leavitt, Executive Director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict, coordinated the planning and execution of this DTRA workshop, supported by Mr. Nick Masellis. Our doctoral students, Maj. Paul Brister and Mr. Matthew Dearing helped to organize this workshop and document its findings. We owe special thanks to Maj. Brister who assisted us in crafting this report. Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, Causes and Predictive Indicators TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..............................................................................................................................2 SECTION 1: BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES......................................................................................6 SECTION 2: THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO TERRORIST INNOVATION........................................9 SECTION 3: PFLP’S AIRPLANE HIJACKINGS, 1968-1970.....................................................................11 SECTION 4: ETA’S ASSASSINATION OF LUIS CARRERO BLANCO..................................................13 SECTION 5: IRA’S ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF MARGARET THATCHER ............................15 SECTION 6: AUM SHINRIKYO’S SARIN ATTACK .................................................................................17 SECTION 7: THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING ....................................................................................19 SECTION 8: AL-QAEDA’S 9/11 ATTACKS................................................................................................21 SECTION 9: THE JULY 7, 2005 LONDON BOMBINGS ...........................................................................23 SECTION 10: DISCUSSION SUMMARY AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH .......25 APPENDIX I: MOHAMMED M. HAFEZ AND MARIA J. RASMUSSEN, INNOVATION IN WME TERRORISM: A GUIDE FOR WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS...................................................................27 APPENDIX II: MARTHA CRENSHAW, INNOVATION: DECISION POINTS IN THE TRAJECTORY OF TERRORISM ...........................................................................................................................................35 APPENDIX III: GARY ACKERMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERRORIST INNOVATION THROUGH THE BROADER INNOVATION CONTEXT ...............................................................................................51 APPENDIX IV: YORAM SCHWEITZER, INNOVATION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: THE CASE OF PFLP AND ITS OFFSHOOTS .....................................................................................................86 APPENDIX V: ROGELIO ALONSO, ETA’S ASSASSINATION OF LUIS CARRERO BLANCO AS A CASE STUDY IN TERRORIST INNOVATION ..........................................................................................99 APPENDIX VI: RICHARD ENGLISH, THE IRA’S ATTEMPTED MURDER OF PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER..........................................................................................................................116 APPENDIX VII: ADAM DOLNICK, AUM SHINRIKYO’S PATH TO INNOVATION...........................126 APPENDIX VIII: MARK HAMM, TIMOTHY McVEIGH & THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING ....145 APPENDIX IX: ASSAF MOGHADDAM, TERRORIST INNOVATION: THE CASE OF 9/11 ..............154 APPENDIX X: STEVE HEWITT, 7/7 AS TERRORIST INNOVATION...................................................185 APPENDIX XI: WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS ........................................................................................198 Workshop Report i Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive Indicators EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Innovation is a constant feature of terrorism, yet little is known about how terrorists innovate, the factors that drive them to innovate, and the indicators that could help predict their trajectory toward innovation. On August 5-6, 2010, experts gathered for a workshop sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (DTRA-ASCO), to discuss the preconditions, causes, and predictive indicators associated with terrorist innovation in weapons of mass effect (WMEs).1 They presented their research findings on seven historical and contemporary cases of terrorist innovation, ranging from airplane hijackings by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to the current threat emanating from Al-Qaeda’s mass casualty attacks. These case studies generated a number of generalizations about what motivates innovation, how terrorists come to innovate, and whether it is possible to anticipate innovations in WME terrorism. The experts assessed three categories of terrorist innovation: tactical, strategic, and organizational, with emphasis placed on the first two. Tactical innovation usually involves inventing or adopting new techniques or technologies to achieve unchanging objectives. Strategic innovation entails formulating new objectives, which necessitate the adoption of new operations, targets, or technologies to advance those objectives. Organizational innovation involves new ways of structuring the terrorist group or inventive methods of drawing recruits. Preconditions and Causes Preconditions refer to the context in which innovation took place. This includes political, technological, or security developments which made innovation by terrorist groups more or less likely. For example, experts agreed that larger and/or wealthier terrorist organizations would find it easier to innovate. Causes are those internal and external drivers that directly precipitate innovation or accelerate its progress. The expert consensus was that terrorist innovation is often a product of a gradual, incremental synthesis of earlier innovations, rather than a dramatic leap in terrorist tactics and technologies. • The PFLP airplane hijackings beginning in 1968 involved a synthesis of two innovations that appeared much earlier: non-political airplane hijackings in Latin America and the strategy of internationalizing a local conflict. • Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’s (ETA, Basque Homeland and Freedom) 1973 assassination of Luis Carrero Blanco, the Spanish Prime Minister, by planting explosives in a tunnel beneath his travel route was inspired in part by an earlier ETA prison breakout involving the digging of a tunnel. • Al-Qaeda’s September 11, 2001 attacks, which were the ultimate manifestation of WME terrorism, merged two prior terrorist innovations: airline hijackings and suicide