I CHAPTER VI 1875-1880: A SLOW GATHERING OF TECHNOLOGICAL MOMENTUM Stephen V. Benet was Dyer's successor. Benet was oommissioned in 1849 as an ordnance second lieutenant. Like Dyer, Ben6t passed more senior members of the Department when he rose in Tune 1874 from major 1 to brigadier general. Unlike Dyer, his appointment was not clouded in innuendos of political manipulation. The sharp confrontations with congressional committees that marked Dyer's reign over the Department were nearly absent during Ben6t's administration, but other than that, for the first years at least, the new chief pursued the polioies of his predecessor. Bonenrt's first annual report, in October of 1874, might well have been signed by Dyer. In that report Benet related that the weapons se­ lected by the Heavy Gun Board two years earlier were not yet ready for 2 a trial. The modest effort with field artillery of a year before also had lost its momemtum. The one significant step taken in artillery design was the serious consideL'ation of hydraulic buffers for recoil 2 control. "Europeans had jumped ahead of Americans in the use of fluid compressors to restrict the motion of recoil. In 1873, the English had 3 adapted an oil filled, piston driven cylinder to a heavy gun oarriage; and at the same time, they began to use th6 devices for light naval 4 artillery. When the American Board on Gun-Carriages met in 1873, it had oonsidered an English hydraulto buffer, but it failed to recommend 147 148 one for test. Lieutenant Colonel Crispin, the commander of the Ordnance A~enoy and Arsenal in Now York City, informed the Department in 1874 that one of his subordinates, A. G. Sinclair, had invented a hydraulic buffer that was superior to the Engtish design. Crispin was enthusiastic about the buffer. His agenoy had successfully tested the device on a 15-inoh carriage, and he was convinced that It was superior to pneumatic designs 6 in ocost and simplicity. (Figure 11 shows a hydraulic buffer on a 10­ inch carriage.) Sinclair's initiative, under Crispin's sponsorship, had closed the brief gap between American and English achievements in heavy gun recoil control. I The success of the Department with fluid buffers was a disttnct contrast to the lack of progress with gun designs. As Dyer had done for several years, Bon6t asked Congress for funds to purchase cast-iron Ku Rodman guns (Rodman was dead by this time). However the argument took a new form. Ben•t maintained that an early decision to buy was needed because a restoration of the capacity of American industry to produce the weapons, idle since 1866, would take time. Trees had to be felled for charcoal; and pig-iron casting facilities, long converted to other uses, had to be readopted to ordnance work. To add force to his request, Benit sent letters to Congress from manufacturers appealing for orders for cannons to provide work for "... the laboring class, many of whom 7 have been thrown out of employment . • • ' because of " the present stagnation in business resulting from the late financial 8 panic, . " The appeal had no effect. Ben6t approached the problem in yet a different manner the next year. Through the Secretary of War, he sent to the President a report 149 f1 FIGURE 11 10-INCH CARRIAGE WITH HYDRAULIC RECOL CHICK IL L --.S ReooCoCheHk e 2~~Sd and Top_____View !ar. Ex. o.+No.1, 44t o.,, ... s.j 17g- pt ,3 plate VI. 150 of the successful test of a 8-inch rifle that had been converted from a 10-inch Rodman smoothbore. In response, in January 1875, Grant took the unusual step of sending a special message -to Congress requesting 9 $250,000 to make additional conversions. Congress responded with 10 $75,000. Unsatisfied, Benet termed it "A small appropriation ... " The 8-inoh rifles were based on the plans originated by Crispin and submitted by the Ordnance Departmont in the competition judged by the 1872 board. The rationale offered by Ben6t for sponsorship of additional conversions was that although, "There is little doubt that steel is the best material for guns, . the product is by far too costly to be considered now, and, besides, would have to be procured 11 abroad." Banot stated that, "We have the best cast-iron gunmetal known, and this plan of conversion enables us to utilize our own produo+t. The wrought-iron tubes can probably be manufactured in this country also." And, as a practical consideration, the casements of the sea­ coast forts " are contracted to acoomodate a gun of much larger size than the 10-inch Rodman; . " Finally, to give urgency to the appeal, Bon6t reported that in England there had been a preliminary test of an 81-ton while the United States " for the want of necessary appropriations is forced to depend on a smooth-bore system and a few 13 small rifles . Crispin, one of the evaluators in the 1872 heavy gun design competition, was also the Constructor of Ordnance and head of the Ordnance Board, as well as the Commander of the Ordnance Agenoy and Arsenal in New York. Among his responsibilities were the construction and tests of the weapons recommended by the 1872 board. Ben't publicly praised Crispin and the rest of the.Ordnance Board in his annual report IT W 14 report for the excellent work that they had done on the 8-inch pieces. At the same time that Benet campaigned with vigor for the quick adoption of converted Rodman guns, the Ordnance Department could only report that the rest of the weapons recommended for trial by the 1872 Board on Heavy Cannon were still in preparation. Benet anticipated that 15 some of the weapons would be ready for test in the spring. Department emphasis was clearly on using the converted Rodman muzzle-loaders. Thea is a strong inclination to infer that there was some procrastination by the Department in the preparation of the other weapons for tests. England's 81-ton gun, mentioned above, began a new stage in the European heavy artillery race. It was a rifled weapon with a caliber of 16 14-inch. In contrast, the largest gun constructed by the American 17 Ordnance Department, the 20-inch smoothbore, weighed about 50 tons. TOe weight of metal in the 81-ton gun permitted the use of heavy pro­ pelling charges, which gave it the power to hurl a shot that would pene­ 18 trate 20 inches of iron armor. Not to be outdone, the Italians soon purchased a 100-ton gun that was said to be able to penetrate 30 inches 19 of armor. Germany then ordered a gun of 124 tons from Krupp; and the 20 British began to talk of one of 200 tons. The race for super heavy weapons was on in Europe; but the Ordnance Department, wrapped up in its own projects, did not become seriously involved in it. By 1876, the Chief of Ordnance was ready to admit that, at least in oasemated works, breech-loading artillery had an advantage over the muzzle-loading variety. As might have been expected, he requested funds to convert rifled Rodman weapons to breeohloaders. Several of the long awaited experimental guns approved by the 1872 Board had finally been completed; but at the requests of the inventors they had been sent to ftr 152 the Centennial Nxihibition in Philadelphia. It made little difference-­ no funds remained for their tests. Benet pointed out that it cost about $100 for each round fired. Since guns were tested for their endurance, the trial of a.12-inch weapon that could discharge 500 rounds without failure would cost 450,000. Benit did take steps to secure additional funds for the tests. In the same report that he submitted to Grant requesting $250,000 for Rodman conversions, he also asked for 82 an equal amount to begin tests on the other experimental weapons. Congress refused to provide another quarter million dollars for the 1872 heavy gun program. It was yet another delay for the non-Department weapons; at the same time, the Chief of Ordnance continued his efforts to salvage the Rodman guns. In spite of the delay with large weapons, the Department began •. .11 to work on a Sutoliffe breech design adapted to a 3-inch Ordnance Rifle, figure 12. (The Sutoliffe 9-inch rifle was one of the heavy pieces awaiting tests.) The modified 3-inch rifle would give the Department another breech-loading field piece to test. However, progress was certain to be slow. Although the Moffatt field gun had been available for three years, only 175 rounds had been fired from it; and the tests I 23 were still not complete. Without question, field artillery was of secondary importance to the Department. Although work was generally stalled on American artillery, the Department had taken steps to gather information on European advances. In 1873, the Secretary of War had directed that Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Laidley and Majors Silas Crispin and James Benton "proceed to England, France, Germany, Austria, and Russia, for the purpose of collecting information in regard to the construction.of heavy cannon and ir 153 FIGURE 12 SUTCLIFFE BR3ECH-LOADING FIELD PIECE • R AA I : 1 t II I-Il Section -B SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Seoretay oIf War, Ex. Dos. No. 1, 44th Cong., 2d mess., 1876, pt. 2, 3:app. h, plate II. NOTE: The section shows the breech in the open position. A twist of the breeoh handles rotated the breech plug downward, provi­ ding access to the bore for loading.