TIME, CAUSATION, AND THE LAWS OF NATURE: COMBINING THE GROWING BLOCK VIEW WITH A HUMEAN THEORY OF LAWS SYD XIAO YANG A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy March 2019 Abstract In this thesis I have two main concerns. The first is with the metaphysics of time, and the second is with the metaphysics of causation and laws. First, with regard to the metaphysics of time, I consider all the extant metaphysical view - (i) presentism, (ii) B-theory eternalism, (iii) the moving spotlight view, and (iv) the growing block view. By considering the historial and current literature on these topics in detail I argue that each of (i)-(iii) should be rejected, but that (iv) should be accepted. Then, with regard to the metaphysics of causation and law, by considering the arguments of David Hume, I argue in favour of a Humean view according to which the laws of nature supervene upon the temporal extent of what exists. This will then provide a challenge: can the growing block view of time be combined with the Humean view of causation and law? I finish by arguing that, despite the fact some have thought it problematic, these two views can be combined. I develop a novel account of how this is to be done, which I argue is the most satisfying account that has so far been given. In this thesis I thus defend growing block Humeanism, a unified view of time, causation and the laws of nature. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ................................................................................................................... 1 Table of Contents .................................................................................................. 2 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 5 Chapter 1: Against Presentism .......................................................................... 9 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 9 Section 1: Understanding Presentism ..................................................................... 10 Section 2: Primitive Tense Operators, Presentism, and Past and Future Tense Sentences ................................................................... 17 Section 3: The Truthmaker Objection ...................................................................... 20 Section 4: Presentist Reply 1 - Modifying the Truthmaker Principle ..................................................................... 22 Section 5: Presentist Reply 2 - Appealing to Presently Existing Surrogates ........................................................ 26 Section 6: Presentist Reply 3 - Reformulating Presentism ................................................................................... 32 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 36 Chapter 2: Against the B-Theory [Part 1] ……………………………………… 37 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 37 Section 1: The A-Series, B-Series, A-Theory and B-Theory .................................. 39 Section 2: Do A-Properties Make a Difference? ..................................................... 41 Section 3: The Spatializing Time Objection ............................................................ 44 Section 4: Defining the Asymmetry of B-Relations in Terms of A-properties: Mellor’s First Definition ................................................... 48 Section 5: Defining the Asymmetry of B-Relations in Terms of A-Properties: Mellor’s Second Definition ............................................. 52 Section 6: Defining the Asymmetry of B-Relations 2 in Terms of A-Properties: Mellor’s Third Definition ................................................. 54 Section 7: Can the B-Theory Deny There Is a Problem? ....................................... 57 Section 8: Temporal Flow/Temporal Becoming: Illusion or Reality ........................ 58 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 67 Chapter 3: Against the B-Theory [Part 2] ..................................................... 69 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 69 Section 1: Endurantism vs. Perdurantism .............................................................. 70 Section 2: An Argument for Endurantism................................................................ 71 Section 3: The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics..................................................... 75 Section 4: The Relational Properties Solution ........................................................ 82 Section 5: The incompatibility of B-theory and endurantism ................................... 87 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 90 Chapter 4: Against the Moving Spotlight ...................................................... 91 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 91 Section 1: The Moving Spotlight View Outlined ...................................................... 91 Section 2: The First Objection - Hypertime ............................................................. 93 Section 3: The Second Objection - The Rate of Passage Objection ..................... 97 Section 4: The Third Objection - the McTaggart Argument ................................... 98 Section 5: The Fourth Objection - The Open Future and Free Will ....................... 105 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 109 Chapter 5: The Growing Block View ............................................................ 110 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 110 Section 1: Outline of the Growing Block View........................................................ 110 Section 2: How the Growing Block View Solves the Problems Other Views Cannot ........................................................................ 114 3 Section 3: How Do We Know It Is Now Now?………………………………………. 117 Section 4: Peter Forrest’s Response to Braddon-Mitchell..................................... 122 Section 5: Michael Tooley’s Tenseless Growing Block View ............................... 128 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 137 Chapter 6: For the Humean Theory of Causation and Law.................... 138 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 138 Section 1: Background: Aristotle’s Influence......................................................... 139 Section 2: Hume on Inductive Inference............................................................... 140 Section 3: Hume on Necessary Connection and Laws of Nature......................... 147 Section 4: Mackie’s Objection: INUS conditions................................................... 154 Section 5: Lewis’s view ........................................................................................ 159 Section 6: Dispoositional Analyses of Causation ................................................. 165 Conclusion............................................................................................................ 167 Chapter 7: Combining the Growing Block View with the Humean Theory of Causation and Law ...................................... 168 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 168 Section 1: Smart’s NOLAW argument ................................................................. 169 Section 2: Smart’s Hypertemporal Humeanism ................................................... 171 Section 3: Smart’s Treatment of C2 and C3 ........................................................ 173 Section 4: Potential-Laws .................................................................................... 174 Section 5: The Big Bang (and Before) ................................................................. 178 Section 6: More on the Growing Block View and Necessary Connections ................................................................................. 179 Conclusion of Thesis ........................................................................................... 185 References ........................................................................................................ 186 4 Introduction In this thesis I have two main concerns. The first is with the metaphysics of time, and the second is with the metaphysics of causation and laws. The two areas are nearly always dealt with independently of each other, but (as I will argue) they intersect at a crucial juncture. More specifically, there is a difficulty with combining certain views in the metaphysics of time with certain views in the metaphysics of laws. More specifically still, there is a difficulty with combining a view known as the growing block view in the metaphysics of time with a view known as Humeanism in the metaphysics of laws.