THE KREMLIN’S MALIGN INFLUENCE INSIDE THE US NONPROFITS SOCIAL MEDIA CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ENERGY SEPARATISTS FREE RUSSIA FOUNDATION 2021 THE KREMLIN’S MALIGN INFLUENCE INSIDE THE US EDITED BY MICHAEL WEISS WASHINGTON, DC 2 021 CONTENTS Preface — Putin’s Plot Against America 5 By Brian Whitmore Russian Interference in The US Energy Sector 13 By Vladimir Milov Russian Influence Networks: Investments in Critical Infrastructure 37 By Vladimir Milov All The Kremlin’s Men 55 Charitable Giving in the US By Casey Michel American Disunion 71 How Russia has cultivated American secessionists and separatists in its quest to break up the US By Casey Michel A Moving Target 89 The Kremlin’s Social Media Influence Inside The US By Maria Snegovaya and Kohei Watanabe Conclusion 152 By Gregory Feifer Photo courtesy: Rodion Kutsaev PREFACE — PUTIN’S PLOT AGAINST AMERICA By Brian Whitmore Vladimir Putin’s regime hasn’t exactly been hiding its forecasts more and more often. They are surprised campaign to weaponize globalization and leverage in- and enraged by the paranormal preferences of their terdependence to undermine the United States (US) and electorates. Confused, they announced the invasion other Western democracies. But just in case anybody had of populism. You can say so, if you have no other failed to get the message, longtime Kremlin aide Vladislav words.1 Surkov effectively said the quiet part out loud in a Febru- ary 2019 article in the Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gaze- Surkov is hardly a random commentator. He has ta. In a widely circulated manifesto titled, “Putin’s Long served as a senior aide to every post-Soviet president. State,” Surkov lays out his vision for the future of Russia As First Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff during Putin’s first and the demise of Western liberal democracy. two terms, Surkov masterminded the system that became known alternatively as “sovereign democracy” and “man- Surkov argues that democracy is a mirage and West- aged democracy.” This postmodern version of authoritar- ern societies only work because people believe the illu- ianism took on the external forms and ceremonies of lib- sion that they have choice. In contrast, Putin has created eral democracy but twisted these into Potemkin institutions a system that can rule Russia for 100 years, if not longer, controlled and manipulated by an overbearing executive. because it understands the “algorithm of the Russian peo- The signature components of this system include de fac- ple.” In fact, Surkov claimed that Putin’s Russia represents to state control of most electronic media, sham elections, the fourth manifestation of the Russian state, following the fake political parties, the subordination of the legislative iterations of Tsars Ivan III and Peter I, and Soviet found- and judicial branches to the executive, regime-controlled er Vladimir Lenin. And he argues that Putinism — with its youth groups, and so-called GONGOS (Government stress on sovereignty, populism, traditionalism, and pat- Organized Non-Governmental Organizations). rimony — is the ideology of the future and will challenge liberal democracy for supremacy. This domestic political system is in essence a mock- ery of Western democracy. It deploys diversion, subter- And then there was this provocative quote: fuge, dramaturgy, disinformation, lawfare, and strategic Foreign politicians accuse Russia of interference in corruption to maintain the continued rule of Putin and his elections and referendums across the globe. In fact, oligarchic ruling clique. It uses sanctioned kleptocracy as it is even more serious — Russia is interfering with a tool to keep the elite loyal and pliant, it unleashes dra- their brains, and they do not know what to do with maturgy and disinformation to keep the population dis- their own altered consciousness. Since the failed tracted, and it tasks politicized courts and lawfare with 1990s, our country abandoned ideological loans, punishing its opponents. This is Surkov’s “algorithm of the Russian people,” and understanding its logic is essential began to produce its own meaning, and turned the to understanding the Kremlin’s efforts to interfere in West- information offensive back on the West. European ern democracies.2 This is because in many ways Surkov- and American experts began to err in their political 1 Владислав Сурков, «Долгое государство Путина,» Независимая газета, 11.2.19 (Vladislav Surkov, “Putin’s Long State,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 11, 2019) https://www.ng.ru/ideas/2019-02-11/5_7503_surkov.html. 2 See Brian Whitmore, “The Revisionist: Why the West Has a Russia Problem and What To Do About It,” The Riga Conference Policy Brief, 2020. Preface 5 ism has gone international, insofar as the ethos, methods, impulse towards rapprochement, and and spirit of Russia’s domestic political system have been exported as weapons to undermine Western democra- that international commerce sublimates cies, including the United States. violence into harmony, the Russian Until relatively recently, Kremlin interference was largely viewed by US officials as something that happens view remains at best mercantilist, with in faraway places. Phenomena like the 2007 cyber-at- tacks and the Kremlin-sponsored civil unrest targeting Es- money and trade used as weapons tonia, the ongoing use of strategic corruption, oligarchic structures, and electoral interference to undermine good and interdependence a mechanism for governance in Ukraine, and the leveraging of the Or- aggression. The new Russia is the raider thodox Church and Kremlin-backed non-governmental organizations (NGOS) to weaken Georgia, though cer- inside globalization.3 tainly a concern for the US policy community, were not viewed as direct security threats to the United States. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the forceful annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Don- Even as Russia’s aggression against its neighbors bas, changed many Westerners’ previously held optimis- went beyond meddling and interference and entered the tic view of Russia’s intentions and strategic goals. Likewise, kinetic realm with the August 2008 invasion of Georgia, Moscow’s support for extremist and xenophobic parties many policymakers in the United States and other Western and movements in Europe, including Marine Le Pen in countries continued to believe that Russia was essentially France, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany, a status quo power with whom we could continue to do and the Northern League in Italy, illustrated that Russia’s business and have friendly constructive relations. From the malign influence operations are not confined to the former efforts of the administration of George W. Bush to engage Soviet space. Putin to the “reset” policy of President Barack Obama, the assumption was that the correct combinations of carrots Then came the Russian interference in the 2016 and and sticks could nudge Russia toward non-revisionist be- 2020 US elections, which exposed the Kremlin’s use of havior. hacking, doxing, and social media manipulation to un- dermine trust in the central institution of American democ- Part of this wishful thinking resulted from the fact that racy: its elections. many US and Western policymakers misread the nature of globalization, assuming that it would spread liber- To understand Russia’s efforts to undermine demo- al democratic values, which it has to a large extent. But cratic institutions and processes in the West, it is necessary globalization has also allowed for the spread of illiberal to first examine its actions closer to home. Despite going to values, something Russia has accomplished through disin- great lengths to project an external image of strength, the formation, troll farms, strategic corruption, and organized Putin regime is inherently insecure. It views the existence crime. of transparent democracies on its borders as existential threats. And since civil societies in post-Soviet states like As Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss write in Ukraine and Georgia increasingly look to the European their seminal 2014 report, The Menace of Unreality: How Union and the United States as models, the Kremlin views the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Mon- efforts in these countries to establish better governance as ey: a Western plot. If the premise of the neoliberal idea of When popular uprisings against what were widely globalization is that money is politically believed to be rigged elections in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004 resulted in pro-Western governments, neutral, that interdependence will be an the Kremlin accused the United States of orchestrating “colored revolutions” in Russia’s neighbors in an effort 3 Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture, and Money,” The Interpreter/The Institute for Modern Russia, 2014. https://imrussia.org/media/pdf/Research/Michael_Weiss_and_Peter_ Pomerantsev__The_Menace_of_Unreality.pdf. 6 THE KREMLIN’S MALIGN INFLUENCE INSIDE THE US to undermine Moscow. When mass protests broke out in Just days before Putin’s address, the Kremlin-con- Moscow and other Russian cities following widespread nected Center for Strategic Communications announced allegations of fraud in the December 2011 parliamen- a new report titled, “Putin: World Conservatism’s New tary elections, Putin accused US Secretary of State Hil- Leader.” The report was never released to the public, but lary Clinton of instigating the demonstrations.4 And when excerpts were leaked to the media. Ukraine’s