Courtesy of The Harry S. Truman Library The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Pro ect AMBASSADOR THEODORE ACHILLES Interviewed by: Richard D. McKinzie Initial interview date: November 13, 197 TABLE OF CONTENTS Department of State 1941-1945 Chief, British Commonwealth Division Death of President Roosevelt Impressions of President Truman ,egotiating NATO Treaty 1945-1949 Peace treaties with European countries Sec. State .ames Byrnes Molotov opposes French and Chinese presence ,orth Atlantic treaty negotiations Soviet intransigence Sec. of State Marshall considers Bevins advice ..F. Dulles role in negotiations Brussels treaty, 1940 Secret 1S-12-Canada negotiations Britain3s Soviet 4mole4, Donald McLean participates Soviet e5pansion in Eastern Europe disturbs Allies Senator 6andenberg3s role in 7estern Alliance and 1, 4The 6andenberg Resolution4 ,egotiating NATO Agreement The difficult French 2ennan and Bohlen oppose treaty concept .ac8 Hic8erson3s contributions to NATO negotiations Senate Foreign Relations Committee views France and its North African territories 9eographical limits of NATO Treaty duration France wants Italy included in NATO :uestion of Iberian and Scandinavian inclusion Sweden e5cluded Ireland imposes conditions 1S-12-FRA,CE Standing 9roup Truman3s Point I6 problem Acheson becomes Sec. State; 7ebb his deputy ,ATO signing ceremonies Senate ratification First ministerial meeting 2orean 7ar 1950 Acheson statement spar8s invasion? 7hat should 1S do? 1, Security Council meeting 7ar frightens Europeans into upgrading their military ,ATO standardization problems e5posed French views of NATO infrastructure ,ATO Council Discussions 1950-1953 Rearming 7est 9ermany France opposes 9erman rearmament Schumann proposes EDC (European Defense CommunityA 1S opposes and then supports EDC concept Supreme commander to be 9enl. Eisenhower Douglas MacArthur II influence on Eisenhower Alfred 9ruenther Chief of Staff Eisenhower committed to Atlantic 1nity ,ATO Defense College established in Paris ,ATO Status of Forces Agreement ,ATO Selects its Secretary 9eneral Is Eisenhower a Republican? Reflections on London and Brussels Assignments London in 1941 conservative; in 1945 socialist Brussels treaty absorbed into NATO military org. 7ho should be invited to join NATO? Canada prefers a strong Atlantic Community INTERVIEW Q: Ambassador Achilles, at the end of the Second World War I believe you were First Secretary in the Embassy in London, is that correct? ACHILLES: A bit later. From 1941 to 1945 I was here in 7ashington as Chief of the British Commonwealth Division in the State Department. I went bac8 to London as First Secretary shortly after 6-. Day, but actually at the end of the war I was still here in the Department. Q: Do you have any personal recollections of Mr. Truman.s coming to office? ACHILLES: Ces, I do. Little things. At that time my office was on the east side of the State Department, on the third floor, overloo8ing the 7hite House. Fairly late one afternoon I saw the 7hite House flag starting down the flagpole and I thought, 4It isn3t Duite sunset yet, somebody3s being a little bit early.4 The flag stopped at half-staff, and a few minutes later a secretary came in out of breath saying, 4President Roosevelt is dead.4 I remember hearing a few days later that in the ne5t two hours after President Roosevelt3s death had been on the radio that the new President and Mrs. Truman had something li8e twelve telephone calls as8ing to rent their apartment. My first sight of President Truman came at the San Francisco Conference, which too8 place shortly after that. Our Secretary of State EEdward R., .r.F Stettinius, put on a large reception for President Truman to meet the delegates, and my first impression of Mr. Truman was, 4This little fellow loo8s much more li8e the president of a very small town country club than li8e the President of the 1nited States,4 but we learned to develop a great respect for that little fellow in the years to come. In September of that year I was assigned to London and also detailed as Secretary of our delegation to the first Council of Foreign Ministers which met in London immediately after 6-. Day to try to negotiate peace treaties with Italy and 9ermany and the eastern European countries. Secretary of State E.ames F.F Byrnes, who had just become Secretary of State, was chairman of our delegation. .ohn Foster Dulles went and represented Senator EArthur H.F 6andenberg, who was then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. .immy E.ames C.F Dunn was the second-ran8ing member of the State Department. Chip ECharles E.F Bohlen was there as interpreter and also adviser on Soviet affairs. .immy Byrnes was Duite new to the process; he had been in Congress, in the Senate, and a Supreme Court .ustice. At the end of the first day3s meeting, as usual, I typed up a telegram to the State Department reporting what happened that day. I too8 it to .immy Dunn who initialed it, and too8 it to Secretary Byrnes for signature. Secretary Byrnes loo8ed at it and said, 47hat3s this?4 I said, 4This is the usual telegram to the State Department reporting what happened.4 Byrnes said, 49od Almighty, I might tell the President sometime what happened, but I3m never going to tell those little bastards at the State Department anything about it.4 There was a fairly tough situation the ne5t few days in the Council of Foreign Ministers. 7e were ma8ing a little progress towards negotiating a treaty of peace with Italy. The Russians were being obstinate and difficult, but no more so than usual. But one morning Molotov opened the session by declaring that unfortunately the whole procedure was illegal. There were five governments represented at the tal8s: our 1nited States, 9reat Britain, Soviet 1nion, France, and China. Molotov announced, obviously on the basis of new instructions overnight, that the French and Chinese had no business to be there and he would not participate any further in the Conference. That presented everyone else with a real choice. Should we as8 the French and the Chinese to leave, try to wor8 out agreements with the Russians and the British; or, should we stand firm and insist that they continue there and ris8 the brea8up of the conference? I remember at the time thin8ing that that might mar8 the transition from a short-lived postwar era to the beginnings of a potentially prewar era. Secretary Dulles records in his boo8 7ar and Peace, that he followed Secretary Byrnes up to his bedroom that night and insisted that Secretary Byrnes ta8e the hard line, that France and China should stay regardless of whether the Russians bro8e off the conference or not. Byrnes was of two minds, but Dulles was Duite persuasive. As I say, Dulles recalls that in his boo8. Shortly after the boo8 appeared and I had read it, I met Mrs. Dulles at a coc8tail party and told her that I had just read that chapter and vividly recalled that day at the London Council of Ministers. She said, 4Foster wrote that he had followed .immy Byrnes into his bedroom to tell him that, but he didn3t write in his boo8 that he3d also followed him into his bathroom and told him that if he too8 any other course Senator 6andenberg would denounce him on the floor of the Senate the ne5t day.4 After a year in London and a year in Brussels I returned to 7ashington as Chief of the Division of 7estern European Affairs, and it became my duty with .ac8 Hic8erson, to concentrate for the ne5t year and a half on negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty and getting it ratified. Somehow the North Atlantic Treaty will always be associated in my mind with fishhouse punch. The Metropolitan Club in 7ashington always holds open house on Christmas Eve and New Cear3s Eve. Christmas Eve they serve free drin8s and charge you for lunch and New Cear3s Eve they charge you for drin8s and serve free lunch. Between the two they ma8e a tidy profit. But, having just come bac8 from abroad, I forgot to go to either of them. On that New Cear3s Eve EDecember 31, 1947F I was sitting at my des8, slightly drowsy in the middle of the afternoon, when my immediate chief, .ac8 Hic8erson, Director of the Bureau of European Affairs, came into my office, well mellowed by fishhouse punch and said, 4I don3t care whether entangling alliances have been considered worse than original sin ever since 9eorge 7ashington3s time. 7e3ve got to negotiate a military alliance with 7estern Europe in peacetime and we3ve got to do it Duic8ly.4 I said, 4Fine, when do we start?4 He said, 4I3ve already started it. Now it3s your baby. 9et going.4 He sat down and elaborated. He had been with 9eneral E9eorge C.F Marshall, who succeeded .immy Byrnes as Secretary of State, at the last meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in December E1947F. That meeting had bro8en up with no progress on negotiating the treaties which they had been trying to negotiate for the last two years. The night it bro8e up the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, invited 9eneral Marshall to dinner alone in his apartment. That night, after dinner, he made a statement to 9eneral Marshall, which was almost word for word the same one he made in the House of Commons two or three wee8s later. He said, and I Duote, 4There is no chance that the Soviet 1nion will deal with the 7est on any reasonable terms in the foreseeable future. The salvation of the 7est depends upon the formation of some form of union, formal or informal in character, in 7estern Europe, bac8ed by the 1nited States and the dominions, such a mobilization of moral and material force will inspire confidence and energy within and respect elsewhere.4 At that point 7estern Europe was devastated, prostrate and demoralized and it badly needed confidence and energy within.