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This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza Benjamin S. Lambeth Prepared for the United States Air Force Approved for public release; distribution unlimited PROJECT AIR FORCE The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract FA7014-06-C-0001. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lambeth, Benjamin S. Air operations in Israel's war against Hezbollah : learning from Lebanon and getting it right in Gaza / Benjamin S. Lambeth. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-5146-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Lebanon War, 2006—Aerial operations, Israeli. 2. Arab-Israeli conflict—1993--- Aerial operations, Israeli. 3. Israel. Hel ha-avir. 4. Hizballah (Lebanon) I. Title. DS87.65L36 2011 956.9204'5248—dc22 2011009982 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover design by Pete Soriano. Photo courtesy U.S. Air Force. © Copyright 2011 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/permissions.html). Published 2011 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface The RAND Corporation is providing analytical support to the U.S. Air Force (USAF) on a variety of issues having to do with the role and future potential of air and space power in counterinsurgency and coun- terterrorist warfare. This book is a contribution to that effort. It exam- ines the conduct of combat operations by the Israel Air Force (IAF) against well-endowed Hezbollah irregular forces in Lebanon in July and August 2006 in a 34-day joint campaign that was dominated until its last week by an almost exclusive resort to precision standoff attacks by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The campaign ended inconclu- sively for Israel. Because the IDF’s Chief of Staff at the time happened to be, for the first time in Israel’s history, an IAF airman; because he chose to rely at the outset principally on standoff attacks by IAF air- craft, supplemented by IDF battlefield rockets and artillery, rather than taking the bolder and riskier step of committing Israeli ground troops to early combat in large numbers; and because the campaign, in the end, failed to produce the excessive and unattainable goals that were avowed shortly after its start by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, a widespread belief persists to this day that the war’s less than satisfactory outcome for Israel ensued from the IDF chief’s allegedly unfounded convictions regarding what air power by itself could deliver by way of desired combat results. More to the point, it remains accepted wisdom in most quarters that Israel’s second Lebanon war represented a “failure of air power.” The purpose of this book is to demonstrate that both of these con- clusions are oversimplifications of a more complex reality that must first be clarified in order for the real causes of the IDF’s flawed performance iii iv Air Operations in Israel’s War Against Hezbollah in Lebanon to be properly understood. The book’s intent is to marshal and assess the main details associated with the IDF’s campaign against Hezbollah and, as appropriate, to correct the record regarding what Israeli air power did and did not accomplish (and promise to accom- plish) in the course of contributing to that campaign. Toward that end, it considers IAF operations in the larger context of the numerous premises, constraints, and ultimate errors in both military and civilian leadership strategy choice that, in combination, drove the Olmert gov- ernment’s decisionmaking throughout its 34-day counteroffensive. The book also examines the IDF’s more successful 23-day joint operation, under different leadership, against the terrorist organization Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009, to provide points of comparison and contrast in the IDF’s conduct of the latter campaign based on lessons learned and assimilated from its earlier combat experi- ence in Lebanon. This research was sponsored by then–Major General William Rew, USAF, at the time Director of Operational Planning, Policy, and Strategy in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements (AF/A5X), Headquarters USAF. The study, “Israeli Air Operations Against Hezbollah,” was conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND’s Project AIR FORCE as part of a larger fiscal year 2008 project titled “Emerging Threats to U.S. Interests in the Greater Middle East.” It should be of interest to USAF officers and other members of the national security commu- nity concerned with strategy and force employment issues raised by Israel’s joint campaigns against Hezbollah and Hamas and with the implications of those two successive experiences for force development, doctrine, and concepts of operations for air and joint warfare against asymmetric opponents. RAND Project AIR FORCE RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Cor- poration, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and devel- opment center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force Preface v with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the devel- opment, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future aerospace forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Train- ing; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. Additional information about PAF is available on our website: http://www.rand.org/paf/ Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Tables .............................................................................. xi Summary .........................................................................xiii Acknowledgments ............................................................. xxv Abbreviations .................................................................. xxxi CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 CHAPTER TWO Highlights of the Campaign ...................................................13 Initial Reliance on Standoff Attacks ........................................... 20 The Standoff War Continues ....................................................33 First Signs of Emerging Doubt ..................................................41 The Move to Ground Operations ...............................................49 Countdown to a Ceasefire ...................................................... 56 An Inconclusive Ending ..........................................................63 CHAPTER THREE Key Israeli Air Accomplishments ............................................73 Sustaining a New Battle Rhythm ...............................................78 Defusing the Strategic Rocket Threat ......................................... 92 UAV Operations ................................................................