Lecture 33-34 Intention Based Semantics About the Lectures: In these lectures the main focus is meaning. We discuss the intention based semantics (in short, IBS) which relates to the discourse of meaning and mind. In other words, meaning is construed by the intentional attitude of the speaker. The question that immediately arises whether meaning could thereby exist in the mind or meaning is part of the external world. In this regard, we have discussed the notion of meaning developed by Paul Grice, John Searle, Stephen Schiffer and Brain Loar. Keywords: Language, communication intention, intentional content, language of thought, mental representation, propositional attitude The concept of representation can be further elaborated by focusing on the nature of macro-level function of the language. The macro-level use of language consists in the very exercise of language in the domain of various linguistic activities. These activities describe the relationship between the language and the world. The world is represented in the language. Hence, philosophically speaking, the whole of our linguistic activities explicates the notion of meaning, i.e. the meaningfulness of the linguistic representation of the world. Interestingly, the conception of meaning discloses the complex relationship between language and the world. Intention based semantics (IBS) holds the representational theory of meaning. It emphasizes the speaker’s ‘intention’ as one of the basic features of meaning. Intention, like any other psychological state is entangled with the expressions in language. The linguistic expression makes the intention explicit. Grice, one of the early exponents of IBS proceeds with the assumption that meaning of an utterance has a functional aspect. That is, the functionality of language prevails within the domain of communication intention. Communication intention unfolds the shared intentional content by both speaker and the listener. Moreover, the function of communication intention produces an effect both in the speaker’s intention of representation as well as in the hearer’s recognition of that particular intention of the speaker. This notion of meaning can be interpreted as having “psychological experiences.” As Anton Marty puts it, “… the expression of one’s psychological life, which is the exclusive and primary aim of intentional speech. What is rather intended is to influence or to control the unknown inner life of the hearer. Intentional speech is a special kind of action, which is essentially aimed at evoking certain 1 psychological phenomena in the person.” 1 That is, the discourse of meaning is based the psychological experience in the sense that the inner mental life or mental states are reflected in the linguistic representations and the same is realized in the realm of mental. However, the notion of intentional semantics is pertaining to the domain of psychological experiences, requires further clarification. We have to ask whether there can be an explanation of meaning without any reference to conscious psychological experience. The interoperation by Schiffer and Loar of IBS is naturalistic and meaning can be causally explained with reference the psychological states and functions. Whereas, Anita Avramides’ interpretation of the IBS is non-naturalistic. It is close to Searle’s interpretation precisely because the expression of meaning is a conscious activity. Before going to discuss the two divergent interpretations of the Gricean semantics left us discuss the main contention of Grice’s semantics. According to Grice, the meaning or the intention is entailed by the expression. Whenever one says something or utters a statement x, it is not that the person only means x, s(he) also knows that y must mean that x. this particular analysis of knowing the intention by meaning it, Grice calls a non-naturalistic way of defining meaning. It is non-natural in the sense that meaning is not a causal process. The natural or causal notion of intention based semantics is associated with behaviouristic and physicalistic mode of meaning analysis. The behaviouristic tendency always emphasizes a causal account of meaning, i.e., speaker’s intention produces or causes a typical effect in the listener’s mind, and thereby it maintains a conditional and causal approach to the analyzing communication intention. 2 As Avramides points out, “The causal theorists recognize that to account for meaning one must pay attention to the role of speakers and hearers. Their behaviouristic roots require that whatever it is speakers and hearers that are 1 Frank Liedtke discusses the notion of intentional semantics precisely with reference to Marty and Grice, and finds that they had similar conception of meaning. See, F. Leidtke, “Meaning and Expression: Marty and Grice on Intentional Semantics”, Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics: The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990, p.29. 2 H. P. Grice maintains the distinction between natural and non-natural or conventional method of analyzing meaning referring to Stevenson. According to him Stevenson argues for the natural intention based semantics. See, Grice, “Meaning” Philosophical Review, Vol.66, 1957, p.379. (Henceforth, “Meaning”). 2 relevant to meaning should be accessible to observation.”3 The causal explanation of speaker’s intention with reference to the intentional aspect of mental life gives a naturalistic interpretation of the notion of IBS. On the other hand, the non-naturalistic account of IBS, according to Grice, must deal with the explication of the notion like, “means the same as”, “understands”, “entails” and so on and the utterances which are specifically “informative or descriptive”. (op.cit., p.381) Grice, however, in his notion of non-natural meaning, maintains that in the case of IBS, the speaker’s intention of uttering sentences is to induce the audience and subsequently tries to see that the intention is well recognized by the audience. As he writes, “Shortly, perhaps, we may say that “A meantnn something by x” is roughly equivalent to “A uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention.” 4 To say that the hearer recognizes the intention of the speaker or that the speaker’s intended utterances, in both the cases induce the hearer, is to produce an effect which gives rise to further psychological states by generating either pleasure or displeasure. In this connection, the accessibility to the domain of knowledge of each other’s intentional states or cognitive states can be explicated in the framework of communication intention. Because in the process of communication the speaker does not utters just to induce, rather s(he) makes a deliberate attempt in telling and making the hearer to think over it in order to fulfill his/her intention. Therefore, the utterer thinks before s(he) intends to speak and also correlates his intentional states with other possible facts for the realization of the goal. This whole ‘course of action’, i.e. starting from the thinking to intending, intending to speak and intending to realize or fulfill the intention itself can be characterized as intentional action. Thus, it is a special case of forming an intention.5 However, in the case of IBS the content of intention of the speaker is realized in a particular linguistic domain. Language use or expression meaning is domain specific or context bound activity. The domain specifies the rules of the language use. There is fixity of ‘reason’ in 3 Behaviourists explains meaning through notion of “psychological habits”. And each habitual states then becomes a dispositional states. In the case of linguistic communication or linguistic behaviour the dispositional states get affected and brings forth certain responses. Hence behaviourists emphasize the speakers psychological states. Anita Avramides discusses it in her introductory chapter ‘Approaches to Meaning’, Meaning and Mind: An Examination of a Gricean Account of Language, A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1989, p.1. 4 For Grice, meaningnn signifies the nonnatural meaning. See, “Meaning”, p.384. 5 Grice, “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions”, Philosophical Review, Vol.78, 1969, p.166. 3 the domain of communication intention which could be maintained precisely for the convenience of recognition of intention. Moreover, the reason for having such rules in the IBS is not a limiting factor, rather a constitutive condition for the coherent linguistic communication. As Grice points out, “This points to the fact for x to have meaningnn, the intended effect must be something which in some sense is within the control of the audience, or the in the sense of “reason” the recognition of intention behind x is for the audience a reason not merely a cause …(‘reason for believing’ and ‘reason for doing’).” 6 The rational way of believing and performing linguistic behaviour in the specific context follows specifically certain rules. For Grice, linguistic rules are conventionally defined. Convention here strictly signifies the specificity of language use within a particular context. That justifies the reasonable discourse of linguistic exercise insofar as the IBS is concerned. Schiffer’s interpretation of IBS is based the notion of sentential meaning. In explaining sentential meaning, Schiffer proposes that a sentence has a meaning if and only if speaker utters it, and its intention is recognized well by the hearer; then it is understood that the hearer recognizes the meaning of speaker’s utterance. Thus intention is a derivative notion and persists parasitically within the discourse of communication itself. This conception of intention builds up a typical conventional framework, where the both speaker and the hearer shares some “mutual knowledge.” And the sharing the mutual knowledge is an essential prerequisite for the IBS. Moreover, the functional aspects of intentional content show, whenever x intends to produce a reason R in the audience A. It means x knows about the responses in A. That is, the intention of the speaker shows a reason to the hearer in the process of communication.