GOD, OIL AND CO U N T R Y Changing the Logic of War in Sudan ICGAfrica Report N° 39 © Copyright 2002:International Crisis Group,149 Avenue Louise - B-1050 Brussels,Belgium Cover photograph:Reporters Press Agency GOD, OIL AND CO U N T R Y Changing the Logic of War in Sudan International Crisis Group Press, Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD . VII EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . XI PART I. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND . 1 1. CONFLICT WITHOUT END? . 3 A. Introduction . 3 B. Sudan Before 1989 . 7 C. The 1989 Bashir Coup and its Aftermath . 14 D. Current Battle Lines . 21 E. 11 September and Beyond:AWindow of Opportunity for Peace? . 24 2. UNDERSTANDING THE PLAYERS . 33 A. Within Sudan . 33 B. With Friends Like These:The Regional Players . 53 C. Other Key International Actors . 62 3. THE TERRORIST CONNECTION . 71 A. Terrorism and the National Islamic Front . 71 B. The Impact of 11 September on the Terrorism Issue . 80 PART II. THE CIVIL WAR . 91 4. CAUSES OF THE WAR . 93 A. Religion . 93 B. Resources . 99 C. Governance and Self-Determination . .106 5. CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR . .115 A. Conduct of the War . 115 B. Forced Displacement and Slave Raiding in Bahr al-Ghazal . 120 VI INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: SUDAN C. Scorched Earth in the Upper Nile Oilfields . 132 D. Population Clearing in the Nuba Mountains . 144 E. Use of Food as a Weapon . 147 PART III. CONSTRUCTING PEACE . 151 6. THE TRAFFIC JAM OF PEACE INITIATIVES . 153 A. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Process . 155 B. The Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative . 160 C. The Eritrean Gambit . .165 D. Nigeria’s Effort . 166 E. The European Role . .168 F. U.S. Activity . .169 7. CONSTRUCTING A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE . 177 A. Shaping a Viable Peace Process . .177 Conclusions and Recommendations on the Peace Process . 196 B. Laying the Groundwork for Democracy . 197 Conclusions and Recommendations on Democracy . 202 C. Countering Human Rights Abuses . 203 Conclusions and Recommendations on Human Rights . .214 D. Peace,Human Rights and Anti-Terrorism Policy . 215 Conclusions and Recommendations on Terrorism . 218 8. CONCLUSION: CHANGING THE LOGIC OF WAR . 219 APPENDICES A. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS . 223 B. ABOUT ICG . 225 C. ICG REPORTS SINCE JANUARY 2000 . 227 D. ICG BOARD OF TRUSTEES . .235 MAPS MAP 1.SUDAN . 2 MAP 2.SUDAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES . 32 MAP 3.RECENT BATTLES AND KEY INFRASTRUCTURE . 99 MAP 4.SUDAN’S ETHNIC GEOGRAPHY . 145 INDEX . .237 VII FOREWORD The International Crisis Group (ICG) works to prevent and contain deadly conflict through a unique combination of field-based analysis, policy prescription and high-level advocacy. Few countries are more deserving of such attention than Sudan, where the scale of human suffering has been mind numbing, and where the ongoing civil war continues to severely disrupt regional stability and desperately inhibit development.ICG launched a Sudan project in 2001 because we felt the country was at a crossroads,and that now was the time when concentrated attention by the international community could make a decisive difference. As this report shows,a small window for peace has opened.The reasons for this include the shock effect of the 11 September terror attacks in the United States (U.S.) and their aftermath on policy debates within the Khartoum government;the military calculations of the government and its main opposition, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) insurgency; a difficult economic situation; and the increasing desire of the Khartoum authorities to escape international isolation and enjoy their new oil wealth. Importantly also, the U.S. government, by appointing distinguished former Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy, is showing some willingness to become more engaged. P ro gre s s , n o n e t h e l e s s , will not be easy. This re p o rt makes clear that the Sudan situation is far more complex than norm a l ly port rayed in the m e d i a , or by advocates of particular causes. It is a stru g g l e , to be sure , b e t ween a nort h e rn gove rnment that is large ly A rab and Muslim and a s o u t h e rn insurgency that is large ly bl a ck and signifi c a n t ly Chri s t i a n , but it is also incre a s i n g ly a contest between a non-democratic centre and h i t h e rto peri p h e ral groups from all parts of the country. It is a contest over oil and other natural re s o u rc e s , but also one about ideologi e s , i n cluding the degree to which a gove rnment's radical Islamist agenda can be moderated and a rebel movement's authori t a rianism can embra c e civilian democra c y. The Sudanese gove rnment faces stark ch o i c e s , b rought into sharp re l i e f since 11 September. It can build on the pro gress that has been made on c o u n t e r - t e rro rism and commit itself to negotiate peace seri o u s ly.Or it can VIII INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: SUDAN t ry to pocket the go o dwill it has gained and intensify the war while remaining shackled to the ideology that was the inspiration of its 1989 c o u p . The Sudanese opposition faces difficult choices and ch a l l e n ges of its ow n . The SPLA can remain a re l a t i ve ly limited rebel gro u p , with a re s t ricted ge o graphic base and a low - risk minimalist part n e rship with its allies in the National Democratic A l l i a n c e ,i n cluding a number of nort h e rn political part i e s . Or it can deepen its commitment to a hearts and minds campaign in the south and its cooperation with National Democra t i c Alliance part n e rs around a cre d i ble peace age n d a . Among the main conclusions we re a ch , and recommendations we a d va n c e ,a re these: ❏ a compre h e n s i ve peace may be possible but only if the intern a t i o n a l c o m munity for the fi rst time makes its ach i evement a signifi c a n t o b j e c t i ve , and commits the necessary political and diplomatic re s o u rc e s ; ❏ t h e re will be no success if the parties can continue to play one i n i t i a t i ve off against another, w h i ch means the major existing effo rts - the Egy p t i a n - L i byan Joint Initiative , and that led by Ke nya in the Inter- G ove rnmental Au t h o rity on Development (IGAD) - must either be u n i fied or a single new peace process cre a t e d ; ❏ a unified peace process should be built around the vital element of IGAD's Decl a ration of Pri n c i p l e s , n a m e ly self-determ i n a t i o n , recognising all the room this leaves for cre a t i ve negotiation on c o n t ex t , detail and timing; ❏ a unified peace process needs to be energised from outside:the ideal team to coordinate both incentives and pres s u r es for the parties to negot i a t e se ri o u s l y would include the U.S . , in d i s p e n s a bly, and key Europeans — id e a l l y the UK rep r esenting the European Union (EU) joined by Norway — with a meaningful degree of buy-in from key neighbours and other co n c e r ned states such as China, Ma l a ysia and Canada; ❏ c o n c e rned members of the international community should purs u e v i go ro u s ly and concurre n t ly four major interests in Sudan: stopping the wa r, l aying the gro u n d - wo rk for democra c y, p rotecting human ri g h t s and winning cooperation in the fight against terro ri s m ;a n d , FOREWORD IX ❏ the top pri o rity should be a compre h e n s i ve peace, grounded in the re s t o ration of democra c y, w h i ch is the circumstance most like ly to b ring both fundamental human rights improvements and guara n t e e s against backsliding on terro ri s m . ICG developed this re p o rt , as alway s , t h rough ex t e n s i ve fi e l dwo rk .T h e p ri m a ry author,A f rica Pro gram Co-Director John Pre n d e rg a s t , made thre e t rips between June and November 2001 and conducted many scores of i n t e rv i ews in Sudan - both Khartoum and wa r - t o rn areas of the south - as well as in Egy p t , E ri t re a , E t h i o p i a , Ke nya , E u rope and North A m e ri c a .