A GREAT AND URGENT IMPERIAL SERVICE: BRITISH STRATEGY FOR IMPERIAL DEFENSE DURING THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918 A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Phillip G. Pattee May 2010 Examining Committee Members: Gregory J. W. Urwin, Advisory Chair, History Richard H. Immerman, History Jay B. Lockenour, History Samuel J. Newland, External Member, Washburn University i © Copyright 2010 by Phillip G. Pattee All Rights Reserved ii ABSTRACT Title: A Great and Urgent Imperial Service: British Strategy for Imperial Defense during the Great War, 1914-1918 . Candidates Name: Phillip G. Pattee Degree: Doctor of Philosophy Temple University, 2010 Doctoral Advisory Committee Chair: Gregory J. W. Urwin This dissertation investigates the reasons behind combined military and naval offensive expeditions that Great Britain conducted outside of Europe during the Great War. It argues that they were not unnecessary adjuncts to the war in Europe, but they fulfilled an important strategic purpose by protecting British trade where it was most vulnerable. Trade was not a luxury for the British; it was essential for maintaining the island nation’s way of life, a vital interest and a matter of national survival. Great Britain required freedom of the seas in order to maintain its global trade. A general war in Europe threatened Great Britain’s economic independence with the potential of losing its continental trading partners. The German High Seas Fleet constituted a serious threat that also placed the British coast at grave risk forcing the Royal Navy to concentrate in home waters. This dissertation argues that the several combined military and naval operations against overseas territories constituted parts of an overarching strategy designed to facilitate the Royal Navy’s gaining command of the seas. Using documents from the iii Cabinet, the Foreign and Colonial Offices, the War Office, and the Admiralty, plus personal correspondence and papers of high-ranking government officials, this dissertation demonstrates that the Offensive Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense drafted the campaign plan. Subsequently, the plan received Cabinet approval, and then the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, and the Colonial Office coordinated with allies and colonies to execute the operations necessary to prosecute the campaign. In Mesopotamia, overseas expeditions directed against the Ottoman Empire protected communications with India and British oil concessions in Persia. The combined operations against German territories exterminated the logistics and intelligence hubs that supported Germany’s commerce raiders thereby protecting Britain’s world-wide trade and its overseas possessions. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to acknowledge the archivists and clerks at the Western Manusripts Reading Room, Bodleian Library, Oxford; the British Library, London; the Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; the Parliamentary Archives; and the National Archives, Kew Gardens. I truly appreciate their corteous and efficient service, without which this dissertation would not have been possible. v To my wife, Sally, who endured this project for far too long, and my mother, Dolores, who inspired me to love learning. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. ix CHAPTER 1. THE BRITISH EMPIRE’S DEPENDENCE ON GLOBAL TRADE IN 1914 ............1 2. GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1880 TO 1914 ..............................................40 3. THE BRITISH RESPOND TO GERMAN POWER ..................................................87 4. GREAT BRITAIN’S STRATEGIC OPTIONS IN THE COMING WAR ...............126 5. AVOIDING DEFEAT: THE FIRST STEP TOWARD VICTORY ..........................153 6. A STRATEGY EMERGES: THE KEY IS IN THE COLONIES .............................184 7. WORLD WAR I IN THE COLONIES: EXECUTING THE STRATEGY ..............214 Pacific Islands ......................................................................................................214 Tsingtao................................................................................................................227 Togoland ..............................................................................................................228 The Cameroons ....................................................................................................231 German Southwest Africa ....................................................................................232 German East Africa..............................................................................................234 Mesopotamia ........................................................................................................238 Observations on the Campaign ............................................................................242 vii 8. DIPLOMACY AND THE STRATEGY’S EFFECTS ..............................................252 German East Asia Squadron ................................................................................254 The Japanese Occupy Yap ...................................................................................259 Hunting the SMS Königsberg ..............................................................................260 Diplomatic Challenges to Britain’s Economic Pressure against Germany ..........264 Keeping Trade Moving ........................................................................................271 Attacking German Raiders in Neutral Waters .....................................................276 Curtailing Germany’s Use of Neutral Harbors for Replenishment .....................278 The Situation in Germany and Revised Plans to Attack British Trade................288 9. CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................301 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................326 viii INTRODUCTION On August 3, 1914, the eve of Great Britain’s entry into the First World War, Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey delivered a memorable speech to the House of Commons. With heartfelt eloquence, the British Foreign Minister captured the threat that the looming conflict posed to the island empire: For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside. We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. 1 With these words, Grey conveyed that his country’s interest in the war sprang from more than loyalty to France or a treaty obligation to preserve Belgium’s neutrality; it concerned Great Britain’s way of life. Protecting the United Kingdom’s political and economic independence would require British intervention in the war, not merely as a naval power—which Grey believed would suffice to prevent invasion and keep trade routes open—but also as a land power to preserve the vitality and economies of Great Britain’s trading partners on the European continent. The vast body of literature on the Great War is mesmerized by the colossal human sacrifice acted out on the western and eastern fronts of continental Europe. It depicts the ix huge losses sustained by the opposing forces as the inevitable result of a war directed by incompetent generals and politicians. But the Great War was in fact a world war, with fighting taking place in Mesopotamia, the Levant, Africa, China, and far-flung islands across the Pacific. The immensity of the military effort in Europe dwarfed operations conducted in the war’s other theaters. This fact has led many historians to conclude that those distant campaigns were superfluous sideshows or opportunistic attempts for imperial expansion. This dissertation investigates the reasons behind combined military and naval offensive expeditions conducted outside of Europe during the Great War. It finds that they fulfilled an important strategic purpose by protecting British trade where it was most vulnerable. Trade was not a luxury for the British; it was essential for maintaining their way of life and a matter of national survival. The United Kingdom required freedom of the seas in order to maintain its global trade. A general war in Europe threatened Great Britain’s economic independence with the potential of losing its continental trading partners. The specific nature of the German threat also placed the British coast at grave risk. Military operations against German colonies were necessary to gain and maintain command of the seas while simultaneously protecting the British home islands. In Mesopotamia, overseas expeditions directed against the Ottoman Empire protected communications with India and British oil concessions in Persia. The various overseas campaigns that the British executed or encouraged constituted far more than frivolous adventurism. They formed part of a shrewdly-conceived