380 THE WAB IN SOUTH AFBICA CHAPTER XI THE ADVANCE TO MIDDELBURG After From Lord Eoberts's point of view these events in the Hiiiiiord Western Transvaal, and in Ehodesia, were merely incidental. Roberts's jjis chief pre-occupation, after organising the operations were to against the Free State Boers, was to bring about the sub- liiission of the Transvaal Government and of Louis Botha's (1)"th.e Deiagoa Bay arinj, both of whom were still firmly established on the railway, Delagoa Bay railway. Nor had he any doubt that the best way of effecting this object, and of so ending the war, was to make a direct advance along that railway. Once driven from it, the Boers would be cut off, not only from foreign sources of supply, but from all communication with the outside world. Even if their army and their government escaped immediate defeat and capture during such an advance, they would soon be driven to terms by the loss of the asset, which alone, according to all appearances, still enabled them to keep up some form of organized resistance to the British (2) The Natal armies. Besides this offensive policy, however, the need railway. strategically strengthening his defensive position was impressed upon Lord Eoberts by his first week's experience in Pretoria. As long as his main army could be fed, it would always be able to hold its own ; but while he depended for supplies on a single line of railway, which at any moment was liable to interruption, he could feel no permanent security. A secondary, but still very important object with him, therefore, was to open up, as a second line of supply, the still unconquered part of the Natal railway between Volksrust and the capital. His plana for Thus, after Diamond Hill, Lord Eoberts's principal objec- so doing. ; THE ADVANCE TO MIDDELBVRO S81 tives in the Transvaal were the two lines of I'ailway to Komati Poort and Volksrust respectively. Buller's occupa- tion of Volksrust on June 12,* and Ian Hamilton's entry into Heidelberg ten days later, left only 120 miles of the latter railway to occupy before a second connection would be established between Pretoria and the sea. The task of capturing and repairing these 120 miles was assigned to Buller. For the capture of the Delagoa Bay railway, which he regarded as his main offensive object, the Field-Marshal contemplated the employment of several columns in com- bination. The remainder of his main army was to march due east along the railway ; Buller, having secured the Natal line, was to co-operate by a flank march from the south Carrington, with part of the Ehodesian Field Force, was to cut off the Boer retreat northwards by occupying Pietersburg; and Baden-Powell was to come up from the west to Warm- baths, also on the Pietersburg railway, to protect the base at Pretoria. An attempt was also to be made at cutting off the Boer retreat eastwards by sending a small force through Swaziland to destroy the railway at some point east of Machadodorp. On the Boer side, Louis Botha, after his retreat from Louis Botha Diamond Hill, had established his headquarters at Balmoral, . ' ^ ' recognises a station half-way between Machadodorp and Pretoria, on importance the Delagoa railway. appreciated hardly less Bay He than Bay raifway Lord Koberts the importance of retaining control of this line, even though the Boer influence at Lourenfo Marques was no longer what it had been in the days of their early successes. Since then their favoured position f had been in some degree impaired not only by their defeats in the field, but also by the arrival in April of Commander Crowe, E.N., as British Consul-General. Before he came the partiality of the Portu- guese officials for the Boers was so evident that contraband of war was smuggled almost openly into the Transvaal ; but his vigorous efforts, well seconded by Captain A. N. Camp- bell, E.A., whom he had brought with him from Buller's intelligence staff, soon introduced a more rigid system of supervision over the railway and limited the complaisance * See chap, ix., p. 300. f See vol. iii., pp. 102-4. 382 TEE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA of the Portuguese ; moreover, by spending large sums in the purchase of all available stocks of goods, which could not actually be classed under the category of contraband of war, he prevented their falling into the hands of the Boers. Nevertheless, in spite of these restrictions, the Boers still had great advantages, both material and moral, in their access to Delagoa Bay; for it left them a possible retreat and a means of obtaining a certain amount of supplies and even some recruits.* Botha had a further reason for mshing to retain his hold on the line, that President Kruger with the government officials and the State treasure were established at Machadodorp Station. Kruger, no longer a young man like Steyn, would obviously not be able to adopt the peri- patetic life of his brother president. It might, therefore, become a serious question how to guard him from capture, if he were once driven away from the comparative comfort and security of the railway. Botha stays Botha remained at Balmoral until the temporary de- at Balmoral tj.- ^ retreat -i. during June, nioralization usual alter a had run its course m his army. During the last weeks of June many Transvaal burghers handed in rifles to the English and went back quietly to their farms. But as the English troops made no offensive movement, the Boer leaders had ample time to reorganize their forces, and many of the very burghers who had surrendered returned to their commandos after a rest. This result was partly due to a wise redistribution of forces eff"ected by Botha. He had already sent back the Wakker- stroom commando from the main army to its own district, thinking it would fight extended the better there ; t he now * Immediately after the battle of Diamond Hill, Botha sent a foreign ofBcer with a commission to smuggle through some ammunition and war stores waiting at Loiirencjo Marques and to buy up other necessaries. This officer found things very diSerent from what they had been when he landed three months before. Then Delagoa Bay seemed almost a Dutch port ; now in his attempts to make purchases in the town he would often find an English agent at his elbow outbidding him at any price he chose to offer. Nevertheless he succeeded in smuggling through his ammuni- tion and war stores by bribing a custom house official not to look too closely at certain biscuit tins and meal sacks which he conveyed in a goods truck. t See chap, iv., p. 137. THE ADVANCE TO MIDDELBURG 383 principle, and arranged, as far as possible, that each commando should be fighting in the country which it knew best, and where it would be most likely to find recruits. The large Middelburg commando, under Fourie, which had lutherto been fighting in Natal, was brought up to Bronkhorst Spruit to cover the prin- cipal town of its own district ; the Heidelberg, Bethal, Ermelo and Carolina commandos were detached from his own army to assist his brother Christiaan in preventing BuUer's advance through those places ; while at the beginning of July De la Key took off to the Magaliesberg most of the men of the western commandos still east of Pretoria. Thus about the Distribution beginning of July the disposition of the Boer forces in the ?^ ^j^e Vrans^ Eastern Transvaal was as follows : Grobler had the Water- vaal at tho berg and Zoutpansberg commandos based on Pienaars Eiver °^ Station, to defend the northern line to Pietersburg and to act as a link between De la Eey and Botha ; north-east of Pretoria, between the Pietersburg and Delagoa Bay lines, Erasmus was stationed with the Pretoria commando ; the Middelburg commando guarded the railway ; and further east, at Machadodorp, the Boer Government had a bodyguard composed of Lydenburg men and of Police ; between the railway and Springs Ben Viljoen, who had recently been promoted general from the command of the Johannesburg commando, had a miscellaneous force, consisting of part of the Krugersdorp commando, under Kemp,* the Germiston (Gravett) and Johannesburg (Pienaar) f commandos, the Johannesburg Police and some smaller detachments, in- cluding the foreigners who had not already returned to Europe; Commandant Dirksen kept his Boksburg commando in the neighbourhood of Springs and Boksburg. All the fore- going commandos were under the more immediate direction of Louis Botha. His brother Christiaan had charge of those along the Natal line ; under him Buys commanded the Heidelbergers near Heidelberg, and kept in touch with Dirksen ; south-east of Buys, the Bethal, Standerton, Ermelo, * The greater part of the Krugersdorp commando had returned to the west under De la Rey. t Commandant Pienaar succeeded Ben Viljoen in the command of the Johannesburg commando, but was very soon superseded by W. J. Viljoen, Ben Viljoen's brother. 384 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA Carolina, Piet Eetief and Wakkerstroom commandos and remains of the Lydenburg and Swaziland contingents held the high ground north of the railway, the strongest division under the command of Joubert, a relative of the late com- mandant-general, being near Graskop, in the mountainous country north of Volksrust and Wakkerstroom. Good Although this was the general disposition of the Trans- ^^^^ forces in the east for nearly two months, they were kept good^informa tion of the moving within certain limits, as weak spots appeared in Lord Boers, Eoberts's defences.