Harold Agnew TAKING ON THE and Los Alamos scientists discuss the potential of the FUTURE Laboratory nuclear capability? What kinds of Project and was director of the Labo- activities are necessary to avoid sur- ratory from 1970 to 1979. He be- prises from foreign military technol- came president of General Atomic ogy? Why has basic research always Company after leaving Los Alamos been an essential part of the Labora- and is now retired. He is known for tory? What is special about the Los his candor, his enthusiasm for nu- Alamos culture? What new opportu- clear energy, his pride in Los Alamos, nities have been brought about by and his strength as a leader. Harold the end of the Cold War? How can very effectively encouraged the par- the Laboratory contribute to the eco- ticipants to express their diverse in- Harold Agnew and Paul White nomic security of the nation? terests and opinions. he occasion of the fiftieth an Last October Los Alamos Science Here we present a condensed ver- niversary of Los Alamos Na- invited Laboratory physicists, mathe- sion of the day-long discussion. We Ttional Laboratory offers an op- maticians, biologists, chemists, and thank everyone who participated and portunity to celebrate the past and computer scientists to discuss these hope our readers will appreciate the explore questions about the future. questions in an open forum. To add individuality, talent, creativity, and What is the Laboratory’s mission historical perspective and a little passionate commitment to science now that the Cold War is over? more spice, we invited Harold Agnew and the nation that characterize What responsibility does the Labora- to join us. Harold began his career these scientists and, in fact, the en- tory have in maintaining the nation’s at Los Alamos during the Manhattan tire staff of the Laboratory. 4 Los Alamos Science Number 21 1993 Taking on the Future Harold Agnew: I was asked to success in stopping Soviet expan- I’ve given just one brief example of begin this discussion of the Labora- sion certainly enabled, in the long the importance of the United States tory and its future by commenting run, what transpired in the last two weapons capabilities, hoping to il- first on the past impact of the nu- years; that is, the disintegration of lustrate how important our weapons clear-weapons laboratories. Fol- the Soviet Union. Most people don’t labs are to the stability of both this lowing World War II, the Lab’s first appreciate what transpired in the nation and the world. Clearly the big impact on world politics was in late forties and early fifties and the United States needs to maintain a 1948 when NATO was first being role the weapons labs played. We credible nuclear weapons deterrent formed. In a program called Back- actually made all the weapons at Los capability, and I think Los Alamos is breaker, Los Alamos and Sandia had Alamos and worked with Sandia on in the best position to help do that the job of producing fifty Mark V packaging those weapons in appro- job, not only because of its facilities fission weapons and then shipping priate aerodynamic shapes. People but also because most of the them over to England on a newly also seem to forget that Sandia was weapons in the stockpile were de- initiated Air Force B-47 squadron. part of Los Alamos in the early days. signed at Los Alamos. I am some- The Soviet Union had been gobbling Now there’s some talk of consolidat- what concerned about proposals to up the Eastern European countries, ing Sandia and Los Alamos under a make Los Alamos the sole nuclear- but as soon as NATO was formed, single University of California con- weapons laboratory, but if there is to backed up by the deployment of the tract as part of the plan to scale be only one, I believe it should be at Mark Vs overseas, Soviet expansion down the weapons program. It will Los Alamos. On the other hand, I came to an abrupt halt. NATO’s be interesting to see what happens. don’t like the idea that Los Alamos 1993 Number 21 Los Alamos Science 5 Taking on the Future may perhaps work on nothing but Los Alamos has always been a David Sharp: As I see it the need nuclear weapons. The Laboratory unique institution. Over the last for national security is going to tran- employs a tremendous group of five decades both the importance of scend the end of the cold war. The technical people who can contribute nuclear weapons and the difficulty world is going to remain an uncer- to a broad range of national needs. I of advancing nuclear technology tain place, and nuclear-weapons think your director, Sig Hecker, has have required that Los Alamos be a technology is not going to disappear. done a tremendous job of fostering We will have to live with uncertain- collaboration with General Motors, ty on the political landscape as well and with industry in general. That as with the virtual certainty of new is the sort of thing the Labs are technological challenges. So we going to have to do. Now I’d like to will need to maintain a nuclear- hear your major concerns and ideas weapons capability. One of the keys about the future of the Laboratory. to that capability is people. How are we going to retain a group of Greg Canavan: As I see it, the en- people who are smart, motivated, tire future of the nuclear-weapons and knowledgeable about nuclear program in this country is very un- weapons? The only way is to give certain. On the one hand, the mili- these people things to do that are in- tary forces are essentially walking teresting, challenging, and impor- away from nuclear weapons as fast tant. I have a couple of thoughts on as they can. On the other hand, a lot what those things might be. of senior people in the defense es- tablishment understand that nuclear Greg Canavan First, in the present political climate weapons are a class unto themselves we need to develop the capability to and that we must maintain nuclear design simple, robust nuclear competence regardless of whether It’s clear that the size weapons, the reliability of which these weapons are currently popular and scope of the nuclear can be guaranteed in the absence of relative to smart conventional full-scale testing. We have to learn weapons. Those senior people will establishment are going to design weapons on the basis of be around for the next decade or two to contract pretty sharply better computations, better model- and will ensure that the nuclear- ing, and the testing of components. weapons laboratories maintain some over the next one or two Second, this Lab is rich in dual-use level of competence. But it is decades. The question technologies, technologies that doubtful whether the laboratories apply to both defense and non-de- will be asked to develop new nu- is: What does that fense problems, and we need to turn clear technology. If you listen to the mean for Los Alamos as those strengths in new directions. debates within the nuclear establish- ment, you hear some say it would be a whole? Ray Juzaitis: These are good sug- useful to develop an earth-penetrator gestions, but the political process weapon in case we have to fight a fairly broad-spectrum laboratory at may have overtaken our technologi- Gulf-type war again, but that’s about the forefront of a whole range of cal preparedness. The constraints the only new need that’s mentioned. technologies, including materials, on nuclear testing imposed by the So it’s clear that the size and scope explosives, nuclear physics, atomic Hatfield provisions will prevent the of the nuclear establishment are physics, radiation transport, and so type of deliberate and careful transi- going to contract pretty sharply over on. But nuclear weapons are not tion that you are describing. A few the next one or two decades. The going to be a catalyst for technology years ago Congress legislated a question is: What does that mean development in the next one to two Test-Ban Readiness program, but at for Los Alamos as a whole? decades. the same time, our budgets were cut, 6 Los Alamos Science Number 21 1993 Taking on the Future so we could not address all the tech- now. If we wanted to respond to a fy nuclear weapons at the same high nical issues and requirements that national crisis, we’d be able to come level of confidence as the airlines “test-ban readiness” implied. Now up with a smaller, more efficient certify 747s. But unless we have a we are caught. We would like to put weapon—and do it faster—even if program that exercises our nuclear on the shelf more robust and safer we started from scratch again. So, capabilities to at least the intermedi- weapon design as well as execute what do we want the program to be ate level of contained underground some good “bridging experiments” capable of doing now? We need to testing, there will come a time when in anticipation of a zero-test envi- maintain the stockpile, but we need no one will be able to certify a ronment, but the political climate to specify what that entails. We weapon and the whole image of de- may now prevent us from doing so. must also be able to respond to fu- terrence with safe and reliable nu- ture belligerent governments.