View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Loughborough University Institutional Repository SPECIAL ARTICLE The Transfer of Jodhpur Railways, 1947–48 Denials, Delays and Divisions Rakesh Ankit The process of partition between India and Pakistan, eventy years on, the shadow of partition of British India that is, dividing up material assets, remains an remains “long” and “great” with its “deadly legacy” in perpetual “fl ux” (Zamindar 2007; Khan 2007; Gould under-written subject, barring its border-building S et al 2013; Hajari 2015). From history-writing in academe aspects. While the old scholarship offered an adversarial (Pandey 2001), to public politicking (Singh 2010), to increas- account of this exercise, the recent attempts revise this ing documentation1 and memorialising,2 the “savage” crop of narrative by stressing upon the cooperation evinced by 1947 is literally being harvested around us all the time (Sarna 2013). While the “high politics” leading up to that cataclysmic the two sides. Where the former found antagonism, the event was the fl avour for the longest time (Moore 1983; Jalal latter has sought to locate some mutually agreed 1985; Roy 1990; Chatterji 1994), the historical fl air has since method in the madness. Focusing on Jodhpur, a shifted to counting its considerable divisions, dissonances and princely state, which has not found a place in this matrix, spoils (Hasan 1997; Sikand 2004; Talbot 2006, 2011; Chatterji 2007); in other words, from the eclipse of empire and making this paper brings together a slice of history from the the new commonwealth (Moore 1987; Low 1991) to borders integration of the princely states with the history of and boundaries (Menon and Bhasin 1998), refugees and citi- partition, a connection not usually made. Delineating a zens (Jayal 2013) and the making of “partitioned lives” in “ex- facet of early interdominion relations on the division of ile” from their “homelands” in postcolonial India and Pakistan (Chakraborty et al 2007; Nair 2011; Roy 2012; Bhavnani 2014). asset of a princely state, it questions the “two peas A vital, perhaps the fundamental, aspect of partition was in a pod” seeking-consensus approach to early the division of assets of British India between its succeeding India–Pakistan relations that puts two unequal entities dominions. From pins to planes and typewriters to trains, the together on an equal plane. Partition Council and its subcommittees distributed these in varying permutations and combinations. The emerging schol- arship on this carving up of material by men, thin as it is (Samaddar 1999; Yong and Kudaisya 2000, 2007), can be grouped into two schools of thought: one asserting the adver- sarial and contentious nature of this exercise (McLeod 2008), while the other, more recent attempt(s), countering the prag- matic cooperation evinced by the two sides and, thus, compli- cating the confl ictual process (Sengupta 2014; Raghavan 2016). While the former has found antagonism in ideological and theological foundations manifesting “in a confl ict of self and other with both states questioning the legitimacy of the other,” the latter has probed if in “the actual process of dividing the country, there was some method in the madness” and has found “cooperation, mutual trust, order, an air of certainty and decisions through discussions and deliberations.” Following these trends, but focusing on a region, a princely state, which has not found a place in these, this paper brings together a slice of history from the integration of the princely The author is grateful to Ronil Chaudhuri for providing the inspiration, states with the history of partition; a link not often established. occasion and space to write this article. Special thanks to Abhishek Concerned with the old Marwar capital of Jodhpur from the Dimri for indulging a hearing of the piece and his suggestion on its title. Rajputana region (currently the Indian state of Rajasthan) and Rakesh Ankit ([email protected]) is with OP Jindal Global University, viewing an episode of its interaction with the governments of Sonipat, Haryana. Pakistan and India, it examines the myriad ways and multiple 40 OCTOBER 7, 2017 vol liI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly SPECIAL ARTICLE levels through which the sentiments of partition affected the gleaned from File No 27 (40)/48 of the Prime Minister’s secre- subcontinent. At the heart of that episode was the fate of the tariat branch of the Government of India collection in the Jodhpur railway and this paper, by tracing it, throws yet more National Archives of India (New Delhi), and the Subject File light on the nature of the early postcolonial state in India and Serial No 35 of the V Instalment of the Sri Prakasa Papers in Pakistan. In doing so, it fi rst questions the narrative of a the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (New Delhi)— Nehruvian elite consensus in the former, and second, compli- directly impinged, one fi nds a confi dent, substantial, total and cates the understanding of a consolidated colonial “offi cial rigid way in which Jodhpur, New Delhi, and, to the extent it mind.” Third, given that the crux of the matter was the ques- could, Karachi behaved during “partitioned times” (Deschaumes tion of ownership of a railway line, this also refl ects upon its and Ivekovic 2003). impact on the movement of refugees. Here, it contrasts the le- gal position of the problem, emphasised by some, with the hu- A Nehruvian Elite Consensus man app roach to it taken by others. In June 1948, one year from the partition plan of British India, Thus, delineating another facet of the deterioration of early the metre gauge railway in the now Pakistani province of interdominion relations on a rather small issue made signifi - Sind was still being managed by the Jodhpur government. cant, this paper wonders whether the new alternative history This had been the case since 1924, following an agreement of India–Pakistan relations (Chatterji 2012) stressing cooper- between the then secretary of state and Jodhpur princely ation and coexistence puts two unequal entities together on state. All rolling stock, machinery, plant and stores, whether an equal plane. This “two peas in a pod” approach that sees required for the Jodhpur section or the Sind section were pro- both needing each other to assert distinction so as to function vided by the Jodhpur government. In the Partition Council as viable entities against each other “risks pharisaism, given (July–August 1947), it was decided to terminate this arrange- their respective starting-points, not to speak of the responsi- ment, anomalous after Sind went to Pakistan and Jodhpur bility of the stronger in doing its best to sabotage the weaker acceded to India, and the responsibility for working this from the outset” (Anderson 2013: 145). Highlighting the hap- railway line was to pass on to the Pakistan government latest penings in Jodhpur through 1947–48, this study shows that, by 31 July 1948. contrary to this recent revisionism in the literature, it was in- The 1924 agreement had made a provision for a separation deed the “policy of paramountcy of self-preservation” (Ra- of the two sections. The then secretary of state had agreed to ghavan 2012: 15) that held sway in the ultimate analysis and take over “on payment” a share of the rolling stock, machin- action—notwithstanding the intention—between the domin- ery, plant and stores. Herein, lay the nub of the dispute: did ions and princely states. There was certainly “negotiation and “on payment” mean “prepayment” as insisted by Jodhpur rail- exchange,” but it was between two sides, two governments way authorities, from March to November 1948, the duration that were just not starting from the same point. of the dispute? Or, as expressed by the Pakistani offi cials, was While Pakistan emerged in August 1947, India inherited the this insistence for “pre-payment” by the Jodhpur government “successor status to the Raj, its seat at the UN, control of the at variance with the established practice, while carrying the capital, three-quarters of the territory and population of Bri- likelihood of mutual suspicion and argument? tish India, 14/20 armoured regiments, 40/48 artillery regi- Interestingly, it was Karachi that asked for the Government ments, 21/29 infantry regiments, larger part of the air force of India’s intervention in this tussle and not Jodhpur. If any- and navy and 137,000/160,000 tonnes of ordinance” (Cohen thing, the latter was rather reluctant for New Delhi to be in- 1984: 7; Talbot 1998: 99; Anderson 2013: 67). volved. In the summer of 1948, Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Even if one underplays the religious emotionalism, nation- Khan, Pakistan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, complained to alist irrationalism and a predisposition towards vengeful then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, “that the Gov- confl ict, as urged by the revisionist scholarship, how can one ernment of Jodhpur is creating a dead-lock in regard to the write about a “mutual aim,” when the meaning of “closure to the transfer of Pakistan section of Jodhpur railway.” Vehemently process of partition” was not reciprocal (Raghavan 2012: 10–11)? denying this charge, Jai Narain Vyas, Jodhpur’s premier, Nothing encapsulates the evasive and contradictory character claimed to Nehru in a demi-offi cial letter written on 21 June of the revisionist take better than the following quotation: 1948 (No 186/S) that “both the Government of Pakistan and Whether it was the case of a territorial dispute or property or people, the Jodhpur Government had agreed that the Pakistan Gov- the approach that both governments took in forming their bilateral ernment should make an advance payment for the stock they positions were very consistent.