GRADUATE – Disciplines Menu Doctorate and Masters in Economics DISCIPLINE: Dynamic Games and Applications CODE: MDPTEC096 ACRONYM: PROFESSOR: WORKLOAD: 40h Lucas Jover Maestri CREDIT HOUR: 4 MANDATORY: COURSE: ☐YES ☒ NO ☐M ☐D ☒MD PREREQUISITES: The student should have taken the first-year Microeconomics sequence. CONCENTRATION AREA: Economic Theory. STUDY PLAN Course in Dynamic Games and Applications The first part of the course will deal with repeated games under perfect and imperfect monitoring. This part will be based on the book by Mailath and Samuelson (2006). The second part will cover reputations and applications of dynamic games. The grade will be based on a final exam and a student presentation. Topics 1) General properties of repeated games with perfect monitoring. 2) The Perfect Monitoring Folk Theorem. 3) Applications of repeated games with perfect monitoring. 4) General properties of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. 5) Applications of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. 6) Reputations. GOALS This course develops tools to study dynamic games. It applies these tools to several economic applications, including principal-agent models, collusion, dynamic adverse selection and reputations. BIBLIOGRAPHY Dilip Abreu (1988). "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica. Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stachetti (1990). "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring", Econometrica. Dilip Abreu, Paul Milgrom and David Pearce (1991). "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnership", Econometrica. Praia de Botafogo, 190 – 11º andar – Rio de Janeiro – RJ – CEP: 22250-900 – Brasil Tel.: (55 21) 3799-5479/Fax: (55 21) 2552-4898 GRADUATE – Disciplines Menu Doctorate and Masters in Economics Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell (2001). "Optimal Collusion with Private Information", RAND Journal of Economics. Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin (1986). The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, Econometrica. Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Eric Maskin, (1994)."The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica. Jonathan Levin (2003). Relational Incentive Contracts, American Economic Review. George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson (2006). Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships. 2006 Oxford University Press. Eric Maskin, Roy Radner and Roger Myerson (1986). An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria. Review of Economic Studies. References: Reputations Dilip Abreu and Faruk Gul, 2000, “Bargaining and Reputation”, Econometrica. Alp Atakan and Mehmet Eckimecki, 2012. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships", The Review of Economic Studies. Simon Board and M. Meyer-ter-Vehn, 2013, “Reputation for Quality”, Econometrica. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2011. Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems, Journal of Economic Theory. Mehmet Ekmekci, Olivier Gossner and Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations", Journal of Economic Theory. Jeff Ely and Juuso Valimaki, 2003. “Bad Reputation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics. Olivier Gossner, 2011. "Simple bounds on the value of a reputation", Econometrica. Johannes Hörner, 2002. “Reputation and Competition”, American Economic Review. Qingmin Liu, 2011. "Information acquisition and reputation dynamics" The Review of Economic Studies. George Mailath and Larry Samuelson, 2001, “Who Wants a Good Reputation?” The Review of Economic Studies. George Mailath and Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships". Oxford University Press . George Mailath and Larry Samuelson, 2014. "Reputations in Repeated Games," with Larry Samuelson, in The Handbook of Game Theory, vol. 4, Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir (editors), Elsevier Press. Praia de Botafogo, 190 – 11º andar – Rio de Janeiro – RJ – CEP: 22250-900 – Brasil Tel.: (55 21) 3799-5479/Fax: (55 21) 2552-4898 GRADUATE – Disciplines Menu Doctorate and Masters in Economics Ariel Rubinstein, 1982. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica. Steven Tadelis, 1999. “What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset”, American Economic Review. Steven Tadelis, 2002. "The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism". Journal of Political Economy. Praia de Botafogo, 190 – 11º andar – Rio de Janeiro – RJ – CEP: 22250-900 – Brasil Tel.: (55 21) 3799-5479/Fax: (55 21) 2552-4898 .