NOVEMBER 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 12 COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT CTC SEntinEL OBJECTIVE . RELEVANT . RIGOROUS Contents The Dilemma of the Yemeni FEATURE ARTICLE Detainees at Guantanamo Bay 1 The Dilemma of the Yemeni Detainees By Gregory D. Johnsen and Christopher Boucek at Guantanamo Bay By Gregory Johnsen & Christopher Boucek REPORTS 5 Al-Qa`ida’s Presence and Influence in Lebanon By Bilal Y. Saab 9 U.S. Cross-Border Raid Highlights Syria’s Role in Islamist Militancy By Anonymous 11 Afghanistan’s Heart of Darkness: Fighting the Taliban in Kunar Province By Brian Glyn Williams 14 Al-Qa`ida’s Changing Outlook on Pakistan By Jarret Brachman 16 Violent Trends in Algeria Since 9/11 By Hanna Rogan 19 Interview with a Former Terrorist: Nasir Abbas’ Deradicalization Work in Indonesia By Nick O’Brien 22 Shi`a Leaders Disagree on Integration Camp Delta at Guantanamo Naval Base. - Photo by Mark Wilson/Getty Images of Sons of Iraq into Army By Reidar Visser ore than one-third of the it has repeatedly sought assurances remaining 255 detainees at from the Yemeni government that it 23 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity the U.S. detention facility will set standardized restrictions before 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts in Guantanamo Bay are any individuals are released. Part of MYemenis, representing the single largest this hesitation stems from security national contingent. Since the detention concerns about what would happen to facility opened in early 2002, Yemenis the detainees once they are returned to have consistently comprised a sizeable Yemen. percentage of the population. Other About the CTC Sentinel countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, This article seeks to examine the The Combating Terrorism Center is an have successfully repatriated many of dilemma posed by the detention of independent educational and research their nationals, but Yemen has been Yemeni nationals at Guantanamo Bay. institution based in the Department of Social unable to convince the United States to Following an overview of Yemen’s Sciences at the United States Military Academy, release detainees into its custody. There previous attempts to engage Islamists, West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses is even widespread speculation in both the article will focus on some possible the Center’s global network of scholars and the United States and Yemen that the risks associated with the repatriation of practitioners to understand and confront Yemeni government does not actually the Yemeni detainees. This will include contemporary threats posed by terrorism and want the detainees back and is content identifying individual detainees who other forms of political violence. to let them remain in U.S. custody. have connections to al-Qa`ida members The Yemeni government, however, involved in the recent upsurge in maintains in private its stated, public terrorist violence in Yemen. It will The views expressed in this report are those of goal to return the detainees to Yemen, conclude with a brief look at some the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, charge those it has evidence against possible solutions under consideration. the Department of the Army, or any other agency and release the rest. For the United of the U.S. Government. States, this has been insufficient, and 1 NOVEMBER 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 12 Extremist Disengagement in Yemen1 decided that the Qur’an and the on former prisoners.6 A total of 364 In recent years, the Yemeni government sunna would serve as the basis for the individuals were released through the has engaged in a series of ambitious dialogue, with the hadith providing a dialogue process. Some have escaped programs designed to counter Islamist firm foundation. The dialogue sessions while others have reportedly been killed radicalization in the country. These were explained to participants as being in Iraq. After some initially promising have included traditional poetry comprehensive and that detainees were results, the committee was eventually recitals, the internationally-supported encouraged to persuade the ulama that suspended for a variety of reasons. “Shaykhs Against Terror” initiative, their understandings of Islam were and the use of religious dialogue. While correct, just as the committee would The committee’s primary objectives admirable unconventional approaches, seek to convince the detainees of their were to get participants to recognize some of these efforts—such as religious position. Some sources have questioned the legitimacy of the Yemeni state, not dialogue—have left many in Washington the effectiveness of the process.3 commit violent acts within Yemen, dissatisfied. and ensure that foreigners were not Initial discussions were focused on targeted in the country. With respect In September 2002, the Yemeni whether or not Yemen was an Islamic to these objectives, the committee government established the Committee state, and the legality of President `Ali for Religious Dialogue. Led by Judge `Abdullah Salih’s rule. Sana`a’s foreign “Yemen’s once promising Hamoud al-Hitar, it was created to treaty obligations and relations with interact with security detainees held non-Muslim states were also discussed, rehabilitation program by the government on suspicion of as was the permissibility of killing now appears to be a failure, involvement with Islamist extremists non-Muslims. The committee worked and terrorists. The committee sought to to demonstrate the legitimacy of the while its recent record Yemeni government and attempted to of releasing convicted al- “Unlike in other countries show the appropriate rules for jihad. It was clearly stated that those who Qa`ida members has done that have since adopted renounced violence would be eligible for little to ease U.S. fears.” extremist rehabilitation release through a unique presidential 4 programs, the Yemeni amnesty program. government provided Much of the committee’s efforts focused achieved some relative successes. It on getting participants to recognize the appears, however, that the committee freed detainees with little authority of the state and obtaining was less concerned with affecting actual external social support.” assurances from them that participating ideological change in participants than in violence within the country was it was with obtaining their acquiescence forbidden. The “covenant of protection” on sensitive political matters. Following (when the government issues a legal the 9/11 attacks, Washington exerted dialogue with these men, and through visa) that exists between the state considerable pressure on Sana`a to their religious discussions and debates and foreigners was also stressed. round up Islamist extremists, terrorists demonstrate that terrorism based on In essence, once detainees acceded and activists. Many of these individuals religious grounds was impermissible. to these points, they were released. had broken no laws. Others had gone The initiative was the first post-9/11 Unlike in other countries that have abroad to fight in Afghanistan, and prison rehabilitation program for since adopted extremist rehabilitation some were suspected (tangentially) of extremists, a format that has now been programs, the Yemeni government involvement in the October 2000 attack adapted in a number of Arab and Muslim provided freed detainees with little on the USS Cole. It has been argued that countries. external social support. Many released religious engagement and dialogue was detainees were absorbed into the thus used as a method to process the On September 15, 2002, al-Hitar and military and security services,5 and large numbers of security detainees, three other ulama met for the first time there was some attempt made to assist and, in exchange for their allegiance to with prisoners at the Political Security others through a non-governmental the Yemeni government, release them Organization Center in Sana`a.2 organization. These efforts, however, from prison. The committee met with prisoners were minimal. Passports were collectively, and they exchanged reportedly not confiscated, nor did the The first participants in the program questions and responses directly. At Yemeni government maintain close tabs are believed to have fared better than the first meeting, it was collectively later participants, aligning with those individuals radicalized at home versus 1 Section based on Christopher Boucek, Shazadi Beg, 3 Ibid. those radicalized through the global and John Horgan, “Opening up the Jihadi Debate: Ye- 4 Abd al-Mun’im al-Jabri, “Yemeni Interior Minister jihad. Initial participants recognized men’s Committee for Dialogue,” in Tore Bjorgo and John Discusses Terrorism Issues, Cooperation with US,” 26 authority and were thus more Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind (New York: Routledge, September, October 17, 2003. susceptible to dialogue and negotiation. 2008), pp. 181-192. 5 Eric Westervelt, “Growing Repression in Yemen May 2 Boucek et al., “Opening up the Jihadi Debate: Yemen’s Feed al-Qaeda,” National Public Radio, November 10, 6 Personal interview, Yemeni analyst, Sana`a, July Committee for Dialogue,” p. 185. 2005. 2007. 2 NOVEMBER 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 12 Individuals who participated later, of knowledge that hampered U.S. efforts Zakariya, were among the 23 escapees. the so-called younger generation, did in the fearful months after the 9/11 Both turned themselves in to Yemeni not do as well. When the government attacks. The most accurate description authorities in late 2006 and were eventually attempted to use the is probably a combination of both.