1 The London School of Economics and Political Science The President and the Peacemaker: Jimmy Carter and the Domestic Politics of Arab-Israeli Diplomacy, 1977-1980 Daniel Patrick Strieff A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, October 2013. 2 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 99,732 words. I have followed the Chicago Manual of Style, 16th edition, for referencing. However, in keeping with British practice, I have used single rather than double quotation marks. I have also used British spelling except in cases of quoted text that originally appears in American English, official names or titles. 3 Abstract This thesis offers a study of the impact of American domestic politics on President Jimmy Carter’s role as diplomat-in-chief during the Camp David peace process. It argues that Carter’s personal involvement in fostering an Egyptian-Israeli dialogue, the Camp David Accords and Palestinian autonomy talks created a circular pattern of influence between domestic politics and foreign affairs. Carter’s role as president-mediator engaged political actors, focused public attention and raised the domestic stakes. As his term progressed, he subordinated diplomatic objectives to political needs, which in fact had grown more urgent by controversy in Arab-Israeli negotiations. As chief diplomat, Carter became intimately identified with American policy, which was completely imbued with his own political character. That activated a number of reinforcing domestic factors, some general to American foreign policy and others specific to the Arab-Israeli arena, which served to constrain what he could achieve. By examining newly released archival material, and engaging with news reportage and opinion polling, this thesis demonstrates how advice reaching the president from multiple sources – his domestic, foreign and media advisors – served to augment the other. This thesis does not purport to offer a complete history of the Camp David peace process, Egyptian-Israeli negotiations or Carter’s presidency. Instead, it examines the possibilities and the hazards of presidential diplomacy. It argues that the domestic aspects of the dispute narrowed Carter’s options, limited public debate and influenced decisions at pivotal moments. These forces circumscribed what was politically possible, and interacted with strategic and diplomatic considerations to affect policy. Broadly, this thesis offers fresh perspectives on the nature and limits of presidential power, the role of the news media in American life, U.S. public opinion and foreign policy, and public engagement with the Arab-Israeli conflict. 4 Table of Contents Abstract 3 Table of Contents 4 List of Abbreviations 5 Acknowledgements 9 Introduction 10 Chapter One 37 The Limits of Candour: Carter’s Early Forays into “Open Diplomacy” January-May 1977 Chapter Two 66 Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: “The Need for a Political Plan” May-July 1977 Chapter Three 93 Geneva Roadblock: Fallout from the U.S.-Soviet Joint Communiqué July- October 1977 Chapter Four 121 Tuned Out: “Cronkite Diplomacy” and U.S. Policy Response to Sadat’s Jerusalem Initiative October 1977-February 1978 Chapter Five 150 Jimmy and the Jets: Capitol Hill Fight over Airplane Sales to the Middle East February 1978-May 1978 Chapter Six 178 “Getting Control”: Domestic Politics, the Media and the Camp David Summit June 1978-September 1978 Chapter Seven 205 Desperate Diplomacy: Carter’s Trip to Conclude the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty October 1978-March 1979 Chapter Eight 234 Blurred Lines: Autonomy Talks and U.N. Missteps as Election Approaches April 1979-November 1980 Conclusion 263 Bibliography 275 5 List of Abbreviations ABC – American Broadcasting Company ADST – Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training AIPAC – American Israel Public Affairs Committee AIPO – American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) AP – Associated Press APP – American Presidency Project AYP – Andrew Young Papers bpd – Barrels per day CBS – Columbia Broadcasting System CLOHP – Carter Library Oral History Project CIA – Central Intelligence Agency CPD – Committee on the Present Danger CPDP – Committee on the Present Danger Papers CPP – Carter Presidency Project CSR – Cambridge Survey Reports CT – Chicago Tribune DDRS – Declassified Documents Reference System DNC – Democratic National Committee DNSA – Digital National Security Archive DPMP – Daniel Patrick Moynihan Papers DSB – Department of State Bulletin EGAFP – Ethnic Groups and American Foreign Policy Project F-5E – U.S. light tactical jet fighter F-15 – U.S. all-weather tactical jet fighter F-16 – U.S. multi-role jet fighter 6 FCO – Foreign and Commonwealth Office FCP – Frank Church Papers FRUS – Foreign Relations of the United States HBP – Howard Baker Papers HIRC – House International Relations Committee IPS – Institute for Palestine Studies IFRSD – Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents ISA – Israel State Archives JCL – Jimmy Carter Presidential Library JJP – Jacob Javits Papers JVL – Jewish Virtual Library LAT – Los Angeles Times LHP – Lee Hamilton Papers LOC – Library of Congress memcon – Memorandum of conversation MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.a. – No author NAAA – National Association of Arab Americans NARA – National Archives and Record Administration NBC – National Broadcasting Corporation NER – Near East Report n.d. – No date NLC – Remote Archives Capture program, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library NPR – National Public Radio NSA – National Security Affairs NSC – National Security Council 7 NYT – The New York Times OPEC – Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries PBS – Public Broadcasting Service PLO – Palestine Liberation Organization PNC – Palestine National Council PNP – Paul Nitze Papers PPP – Public Papers of the Presidents PREM – Prime Minister’s Papers PRC – Policy Review Committee PRM – Presidential Review Memorandum PRO – Public Record Office QOP – Question of Palestine REP – Rowland Evans Papers RG – Record Group SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SCC – Special Coordinating Committee SEP – Stuart Eizenstat Papers SFRC – Senate Foreign Relations Committee SHAFR – Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations SLP – Sol Linowitz Papers UKNA – United Kingdom National Archives UNSC – United Nations Security Council UPI – United Press International WAFA – Palestine News Agency WHCF – White House Central File VTNA – Vanderbilt Television News Archive 8 WCP – Walter Cronkite Papers WP – The Washington Post WSJ – The Wall Street Journal 9 Acknowledgments I have many people to thank for helping me complete this thesis, which is the outcome of four years of work. Sadly, I will only be able to name some of those helped me along the way. First, I would like to thank my co-supervisor Dr. Kirsten Schulze, whose Master’s seminar on political Islam spurred my interest in the Middle East. Kirsten then stuck with me through the dramatic twists and turns that my PhD topic took on its way to its final product. Along the way, Dr. Steven Casey showed uncommon generosity in taking me on as a co-supervisee at short notice. Kirsten and Steve’s respective specialities ensured that I received the complementary advice that I needed on the Middle Eastern and U.S. aspects of this topic. Deepest gratitude also must go to the London School of Economics, which shocked me with the offer of a PhD scholarship, without which I likely would not have taken on this challenge. The International History Department has also been supportive. I would like to extend special thanks to Dr. Roham Alvandi and Dr. Piers Ludlow, both of whom offered much-needed advice and encouragement in various seminars and conferences. Thanks also to the department’s Mathew Betts, Nayna Bhatti, Milada Fomina and Demetra Frini. I also owe thanks to the many archivists who helped me with this project. In particular, members of staff at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, were, to a person, tremendously knowledgeable and warmly welcoming. They put up with my idiosyncrasies during the seemingly countless weeks I spent conducting research there. I am also deeply indebted to Sara Palmor, who kindly located several useful documents in the Israel State Archives for me when circumstances prevented me from travelling to the region. Several chapters have benefited greatly from feedback I have received from expert panellists at conferences. These include Dr. Andrew Johnstone, Professor William Quandt, Dr. Svetozar Rajak and Professor Salim Yaqub. I would like also to thank my LSE PhD colleagues for social conviviality and intellectual succour, especially Ranj Alaaldin, Aurelie Basha-i-Novosejt, Maria Chen, Bryan Gibson, Paul Horsler, Rui Lopes and Chris Parkes. Outside the department, Dina Fainberg and Ziv Rubinovitz were extremely helpful. Seth Anziska graciously shared his extraordinary knowledge of the Middle East with me and invited me onto a terrific SHAFR panel in 2013. On a personal note, many friends and loved ones have shown patience with me as I have droned on about my topic. I would especially like to thank Ryan Devine and Adrienne Mong, both of whom are far better read than I and provided incisive feedback on various drafts. Finally, I can only inadequately thank my parents. Without the love and support of my mom and dad, I never would have walked away from a career to pursue this crazy PhD. My gratitude knows no bounds. 10 Introduction As James Earl Carter Jr. stepped into view on the floor of the U.S.