Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 64 (2017) 64e66 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Studies in History and Philosophy of Science journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa Essay Review Scientific pluralism and metaphysics David J. Stump University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA, USA Scientific Pluralism Reconsidered: A New Approach to the (Dis) (Hacking, 1982; 1992; 2012). Hasok Chang’s work (2012) is also Unity of Science, Stéphanie Ruphy. University of Pittsburgh mentioned but not really engaged with, since it appeared later, but Press, Pittsburgh, PA (2016). pp. xxi D 186, Price US$40.00 the Stanford Disunity of Science volume (Galison and Stump 1996) hardback, ISBN-978-0-8229-4458-4 plays an important role. Of course the focus on Stanford is in part simply because of the topic, which is central to the Stanford School. She also discusses Philip Kitcher’s work extensively (Kitcher, 2003; What makes someone a scientific pluralist? One path is to aim at 2011), as well as that of Mitchell (2003; 2009) and Longino (1990; a unique and objective description of the natural world, but to find 2002; 2013). that the world is itself disunified and plural. Accurate description Ruphy divides the book into three chapters. The first begins with then would require multiple accounts. It is also possible to be a the classic notion from Logical Positivism that science is unified by metaphysical monist, believing in the unity of nature, and still its language, as well as Carnap’s pluralism. She moves on to briefly argue for pluralism on the basis of the limitations of our knowledge dismiss the idea that science is unified by its method and to discuss and viewpoint. We do not know, with certainty, that our repre- Hacking’s styles of reason in order to develop her own view, which sentations of the world are accurate, so it would be good, it could be she calls foliated pluralism. The key point is that styles serve to argued, to hedge our bets and leave open multiple lines of inquiry. define what there is in the world (Ruphy, 2016, 32). Ruphy’s point Furthermore, whether or not our representations are successful or throughout the book is that our interests define what counts as not depends on our goals and our interests. We have then, realist explanation (leaning on the work of Garfinkel (1981)) and define epistemology with pluralistic metaphysics on the one hand, or styles of reasoning. This epistemological point overrides any pluralist epistemology and monistic metaphysics on the other. In metaphysical arguments. Rather than making metaphysical claims, addition to these extremes, there are mixed accounts that provide a pluralism should be based on these considerations, according to basis for scientific pluralism. The recent literature on scientific Ruphy: “. a more pertinent starting point for pluralists is, I sug- pluralism is itself quite heterogeneous, taking different stands on gest, the contention that the representations delivered by science both the epistemological and the metaphysical issues. depend on our practical and epistemic interests” (Ruphy, 2016, 82). Ruphy’s book is a compilation and reworking of material, much Still in chapter 1, Ruphy then considers the key claim of whether of it originally published in English in journals and then unified as a or not there are different kinds of things that can be known only in book in French (Ruphy, 2013) before being reworked again to different ways, an argument that seems central to John Dupré’s become the current work in English. The overall question is argument for pluralism. Ruphy argues that we are not in a position whether contemporary arguments for scientific pluralism reach too to make this claim. It simply does not follow from the fact that we far, making metaphysical claims that cannot be justified. Ruphy cannot make a reduction now that no reduction will ever be aims to clarify issues and to present her own thesis of scientific possible. Following Ernest Nagel, Ruphy says that the only claims pluralism, without claiming to have presented an exhaustive that we can make about the lack of a reduction are temporally analysis of all possible positions. Thus, while the presentation in the qualified. book is structured, it analyzes the works of major players in the Chapter 2 considers the question of intertheoretic reduction and contemporary literature on scientific pluralism, rather than posi- its metaphysical implications. Ruphy includes a discussion of tions. The extent to which she engages the work of what has been Kitcher and Fodor and the multiple realizability arguments against called the Stanford School of the Philosophy of Science is striking. reduction (Ruphy, 2016, 45), but the central argument is about the Ruphy not only mentions Patrick Suppes’ very early article on sci- universality of scientific laws. Cartwright makes a positive meta- entific pluralism (Suppes, 1978) and discusses the central works of physical claim that the world is dappled, that is, parts of reality are Dupré (1993) and Cartwright (1999), but she also relies heavily on unruly and do not fit our models and laws. Here Ruphy goes beyond Ian Hacking’s styles of reasoning in developing her own view the kind of skeptical argument that she raised against Dupré. We can certainly ask how we know that the world is dappled in this way, but Cartwright has an argument that many phenomena that E-mail address: [email protected]. naturally belong to the domain of physics are not describable in it. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.07.002 0039-3681/Ó 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. D.J. Stump / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 64 (2017) 64e66 65 We can only have laws for phenomena that are idealized. Ruphy enough to leave open the door to reductionism. After all, it seems to points out that whether a phenomenon is unruly or part of a work in some limited cases, as Ruphy notes, citing among others nomological machine depends on what questions are asked, and work from Morrison (2000; 2011). Indeed, Ruphy highlights recent these questions are relative to our interests. Therefore, Ruphy can unification schemes, which “should at least invite pluralists to be say that “I guess that I am a more radical heathen than Cartwright: I wary of claims of permanent, irreconcilable plurality” (Ruphy, 2016, do not believe that bits of the world are nicely ordered because I am 134). Of course, there is a very big question about how resources at a loss to make sense of what it means for a real-world system to should be allocation under any pluralist scheme. How do we know be ordered without reference to my cognitive and practical ex- which research program to fund? Ruphy does not address these pectations” (Ruphy, 2016, 65). The upshot is that once again, epis- practical issues. She is not so much defending scientific pluralism as temology triumphs over ontology. We cannot make sense of parts clarifying the arguments for it. of the world in themselves being well-ordered or unruly, they are Ruphy has made a good case that metaphysical claims do not only well-ordered or unruly relative to our interests. The major follow from the failure of reduction. I am very sympathetic with her claim through all of the discussion is that the general antireduc- argument and indeed think that it can be carried further to show tionist claim has not been justified adequately. that pluralism does not necessarily imply relativism or any form of I wonder if it is not possible to use a burden of proof argument anti-realism. Fallibilism, even when conjoined with the meta- here against the reductionist, something along the lines of arguing physically realist idea that there is one independent world, opens that if we cannot even imagine what an adequate reduction would the door to one kind of argument for pluralism. Even if we accept look like, it is up to the reductionist to show up how it can work. that “the ultimate aim of science is to establish a single, complete, Furthermore, the reductionist would simply be begging the ques- and comprehensive account of the natural world” (Kellert, Longino, tion to say that there must be a reduction, given the unity of nature. and Waters 2006, x), pluralism may be the best way to get there, The unity of nature is in question in this debate. Thus, there must be given that we are in a position of being unable to know the world positive reasons given for why it will eventually be possible to give with certainty. From that starting point, we can argue that we are a reduction, even if we cannot now. Therefore, in cases where we do better off leaving multiple accounts of the world open to investi- not yet have a reduction, there is still a case to be made for gation so as to hedge our bets. Thus, if pluralism is thought of pluralism. Finally, I will argue below that we have reason to be epistemically, it is compatible with even a strong form of meta- scientific pluralists even if we accept the metaphysical unity of the physical realismdif there is one world and only one correct inter- world; all we need is fallibilism to make the argument. pretation of it. Chapter 3 discusses representation in relation to the arguments Furthermore, there is no reason to hold that the alternative over scientific pluralism, opening with a discussion of maps as accounts of the world to be left open are all equally valid, as a representations. Ruphy discusses the idea of pluralism given either relativist might argue.