Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 1995 Subjectivity and Human Agency Theodora Bryan Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Bryan, Theodora, "Subjectivity and Human Agency" (1995). Dissertations. 3560. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3560 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1995 Theodora Bryan LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO SUBJECTIVITY AND HUMAN AGENCY A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY BY THEODORA BRYAN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS MAY 1995 Copyright by Theodora Bryan, 1995 All rights reserved. 11 To my grandparents I must deliberate from what I am. Truthfulness requires trust in that. .. and not the obsessional and doomed drive to eliminate it. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy CONTENTS INTRODUCTION . 1 Chapter I. NAGEL: A VIEW FROM WHERE? . 5 Levels of Objectivity A View from Nowhere: Reality A View from the Human Perspective: Morality II. REASONS OF AUTONOMY: THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRITY . 32 Reasons of Autonomy Reasons of Autonomy and Act-Consequentialism Proposed Solutions Satisficing Consequentialism: Slote The Notion of an Agent-centered Permission: Nagel and Scheffler III. REASONS OF AUTONOMY AND CHARACTER: AN ACCOUNT OF HUMAN AGENCY . 60 Character Character and the Notion of Vision Character: A Determinant of Action IV. CHARACTER: THE PROBLEM OF AGENCY ................................... 81 Purely Impersonal Theories: Requiring Agents to Act "Contrary to" Their Character 111 Act-Consequentialist Theories Kant Purely Impersonal Theories: Requiring Agents to Act "Apart from" Their Character Kant Act-Consequentialist Theories: Maximizing and Satisficing Self-effacing Act-Consequentialism: A Possible Response to the Problem of Agency Moral Theories which Consist of an Impersonal Element: Permitting Agents to Act either "Contrary to" or "Apart from" Their Character V. IMPLICATION FOR MORAL THEORY ......................................... 147 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................. 164 VITA ............................................................................................ 177 iv INTRODUCTION In recent discussions on moral theory, the focus has shifted from an emphasis on what actions are required by moral theories to the problems that arise for the individual agent who applies these theories. The present work continues and furthers this discussion and delineates a particular problem of subjectivity--a problem that arises because of the level at which moral theories are applied: the level of the individual agent. Different problems of subjectivity have been set forth by others. These problems also arise because of the level at which moral theories are applied. The problem of subjectivity that is delineated in the present work, however, is differentiated from these other problems of subjectivity. The present work concerns the standpoint from which agents act and argues that subjectivity, defined in terms of character, is ineliminable with regard to moral deliberation and that human agency is essentially personal. It is personal, in that, agents act from a subjective standpoint, the standpoint of their internalized conception of value--the standpoint of their character. What is offered is an account of the structure of human agency by developing the notion of character. Much has been written on the notion of character and so this work is not the first to have discussed it. However, most of the philosophical literature on character is normative in nature, that is, it focuses on moral or good character in particular and therefore on specific values. This work is not normative but metaethical, and what is said within the normative 2 discussions on character is used to elucidate the notion of character in general and its relation to agency. Although this work is metaethical in nature, the implication of this account for normative ethics is discussed. The metaethical account that is given offers a philosophical justification for a normative character development theory. The present work also delineates the particular problem this account of agency poses for certain types of objective moral theories when they are applied at the level of the individual agent who has a character: theories which either require or permit agents to act either contrary to or apart from their character, that is, theories which require or permit agents to act from an impersonal standpoint. By requiring or permitting agents to act from an impersonal standpoint, a necessary condition of agency is threatened. The particular problem of subjectivity that is delineated is important because it points to the fundamental assumption these theories have regarding moral agency: the assumption that agency is impersonal and that what agents ought to do has nothing to do with their internalized conception of value. It also shows that these competing conceptions of morality, while differing in terms of their theories of the right, share the same assumption regarding moral agency. In terms of the progression of the argument, in Chapter One, the individual agent is situated within Thomas Nagel' s overall framework which differentiates different levels of objectivity. Situating the agent within Nagel' s framework is important since the problem of subjectivity arises because of the level of objectivity at which moral deliberation occurs: the level of the individual agent who has particular projects, goals, commitments, and personal relationships (reasons of autonomy). 3 In Chapter Two, a general characterization of reasons of autonomy (as discussed in the recent literature) is rendered. Reasons of autonomy are not considered here in terms of being the expression of the agent's character so as to later show the significance and implications of what it means to have a character (Chapter Three) and to show how this poses a different problem of subjectivity for certain types of moral theories (Chapter Four). Because moral deliberation occurs at the level of the individual agent who has reasons of autonomy, a particular problem of subjectivity (put forward by Samuel Scheffler) arises for consequentialist theories: the problem of integrity. This problem is delineated and the recent proposals that have been put forward in response to the problem are presented and assessed. In Chapter Three, reasons of autonomy are seen in terms of being the expression of the agent's internalized conception of value. In this chapter an account of human agency is given by developing the notion of character and showing its relation to agency. It is shown that subjectivity, defined in terms of character, is ineliminable and that human agency is essentially personal. In light of the account of agency given in Chapter Three, a different problem of subjectivity arises. The purpose of Chapter Four is to delineate the particular problem this account of agency poses for certain types of objective moral theories when they are applied at the level of the individual agent who has a character: the problem of agency. The problem of agency is differentiated from both the problem of integrity as presented in Chapter Two and the particular problem of subjectivity that is put forward by Bernard Williams. 4 Chapter Five discusses the implication this metaethical account of human agency has for normative ethics and argues that an adequate moral theory is one that reflects this account of agency and does not require or permit agents to act either contrary to or apart from their character, that is, to act from an impersonal standpoint. The type of theory that would reflect this account is a character development theory. The purpose of a character development theory is to tell us what values constitute a good character and how these values are justified and internalized. CHAPTER I NAGEL: A VIEW FROM WHERE? For Nagel, there are different levels of objectivity from which we, the world, values, and beliefs can be viewed. Each level allows for more inclusive views that are less dependent on individual perspectives. Nagel' s primary concern is to show that subjectivity is an ineliminable element at each level of objectivity. The present investigation also argues for the ineliminability of subjectivity: subjectivity at the level of objectivity at which moral deliberation occurs. Since Nagel differentiates different levels of objectivity, and since the problem of subjectivity arises because of the level at which moral deliberation occurs, it is important to situate the individual agent within Nagel's overall framework--to situate the individual at the level of objectivity at which moral deliberation occurs. The purpose of this chapter is threefold: first, and most importantly, to situate the individual agent involved in moral deliberation within the structure of Nagel' s overall framework; second, to elucidate Nagel' s own conception of morality, which will be critiqued in Chapter Four in light of the present investigation; third, to differentiate the