The Israeli Strategy Vis-À-Vis the Us Foreign Policy in the Iran Nuclear Deal

The Israeli Strategy Vis-À-Vis the Us Foreign Policy in the Iran Nuclear Deal

ULB- LUISS Double Degree Master’s Degree in International Relations, Major in: Political violence and Security Practices ( ULB) Geopolitical Scenarios and Political risk (LUISS) Master’s dissertation: THE ISRAELI STRATEGY VIS-À-VIS THE US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL SUPERVISORS Prof. Christian Olsson (ULB) Prof. Giuseppe Scognamiglio (LUISS) CANDIDATE Michela Muscau (638382) CO-SUPERVISOR Prof. Gregory Alegi (LUISS) 0 1 Alla mia famiglia, A Davide e a mio Padre, a chi non smette di credere. 2 TABLE OF CONTENT ACKNOWLEDGMENT .......................................................................................................................................................... II ACRONYMS/ LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. ........................................................................................................................... III SUMMARY. ............................................................................................................................................................................. I INTRODUCTION. .................................................................................................................................................................. 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: PREMISES AND THEORY. .......................................................................................... 5 METHODOLOGY. ................................................................................................................................................................. 8 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS. ............................................................................................................................................. 10 LITERARY REVIEW. .......................................................................................................................................................... 10 I. LITERARY REVIEW AT LEVEL 1. .................................................................................................................................. 11 II. LITERARY REVIEW A LEVEL 2. .................................................................................................................................... 12 CHAPTER I: ......................................................................................................................................................................... 17 THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE ISRAEL ACTION. ........................................................................................................... 17 1.1. THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS’ POSITION. .......................................................................................................... 17 1.1.1. IRAN: ITS POSITION AND ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. ......................................................................................... 17 1.1.2. US POSITION. ........................................................................................................................................................... 19 1.1.3. ISRAEL POSITION. ................................................................................................................................................... 22 1.1.4. CHIEF NEGOTIATORS’ RELATIONS: OBAMA AND NETANYAHU ..................................................................... 23 1.2. DOMESTIC ACTOR: THE PRO ISRAEL LOBBY. ..................................................................................................... 25 1.2.1. STRUCTURE AND CHANNELS OF ACTION. ......................................................................................................... 26 1.2.2. AIPAC AND THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL. .............................................................................................................. 29 CHAPTER II ......................................................................................................................................................................... 30 FROM INFLAMMATORY RHETORIC TO MILITARY ACTION: US FEARS AND THE INCREASING IRAN SANCTIONS. ......................................................................................................................................................................... 30 2.1. INTRODUCTION. ......................................................................................................................................................... 30 2.2. NETANYAHU’S ACTIONS AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL. .................................................................................... 31 2.2.1. IRAN AND PALESTINE: A STRATEGIC LINK? ...................................................................................................... 31 2.2.2. RISK SEEKING IN NEGATIVE TERMS: AVERSION TO WORLD LOSSES. ........................................................... 33 2.3. DOMESTIC ACTION. ................................................................................................................................................... 34 2.3.1. LESS HOSTILE TO ISRAEL MORE INCLINE TO APPOINTED ............................................................................. 35 2.3.2. CAPITOL HOME. ...................................................................................................................................................... 36 2.3.3. FROM THE HILL TO THE HOUSE CROSSING ELECTIONS FOR MORE SANCTIONS. ..................................... 42 2.4. A TWO LEVELS’ GAME FOR A MILITARY OPTION. ............................................................................................. 45 2.4.1. A LONG FRIENDSHIP: PANETTA AND BARACK RELATIONSHIP. .................................................................... 45 2.4.2. INTELLIGENCE TIES IN THE IRAN NUCLEAR AFFAIR. ...................................................................................... 49 2.4.3. THE PRO-ISRAEL LOBBY AND THE MILITARY OPTION. .................................................................................... 50 2.4.4. A SUCCESSFU INFLUENTIAL MILITARY STRATEGY? ........................................................................................ 55 2.5. CONCLUSION. ............................................................................................................................................................. 57 CHAPTER III: ...................................................................................................................................................................... 58 NEW FRIENDS -OLD ENEMIES: NEW STARTEGIES AND A NEW DEAL. .................................................................. 58 3.1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 58 3.2. BEFORE THE INTERIM DEAL. .................................................................................................................................. 58 3.2.1. INFORMATIONAL FLOW: THE SYRIAN AFFAIR. ................................................................................................. 58 3.2.2. THE NECESSARY UNOFFICIAL CONSENSUS ...................................................................................................... 60 3.2.3. HOME SWEET HOME. ............................................................................................................................................. 62 3.3. AN UNFORGETTABLE AD INTERIM DEAL. ........................................................................................................... 66 0 3.3.1. NETANYAHU CONTINUED THE MILITARY PATH. .............................................................................................. 66 3.3.2. NEW INTERNATIONAL FRIENDS ........................................................................................................................... 67 3.3.2.1. ISRAEL AND RUSSIA AT LEVEL ONE. .............................................................................................................. 68 3.3.2.2. THE REVERSE OF PERIPHERY DOCTRINE: SAUDI ARABIA ......................................................................... 70 3.3.2.2.1. ISRAELI AND SAUDI ARABIA RELATIONSHIP AT LEVEL 1. ..................................................................... 71 3.3.2.2.2. AIPAC HELPS OLD ENEMIES. ...................................................................................................................... 72 3.3.3. AIPAC AND OBAMA: A CLEAR DIVISION UNDER VETO THREAT. ................................................................... 73 3.3.3.1. OLD STRATEGY, GOLD STRATEGY? A NEW ROLE FOR THE CONGRESS. .................................................. 74 3.3.3.2. THE NEWORK: TRUE FRIENDS SHOW UP WHEN YOU NEED: ARE THEY NECESSARY? ......................... 80 3.4. CONCLUSION. ............................................................................................................................................................. 82 CHAPTER VI: ....................................................................................................................................................................... 84 THE END OF THE AGREEMENT, THE RECOVERY OF A FRIENDSHIP. ................................................................... 84 4.1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................................... 84 4.2. THE OBAMA’S FAREWELL ......................................................................................................................................

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