View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by The Australian National University Rebuilding Contested States A comparative study of institutional design during political transition in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, & Tunisia Jessica Genauer November, 2018 A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University © Copyright by Jessica Genauer, 2018 All Rights Reserved Declaration I declare that this PhD thesis contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic degree or diploma. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work. This research was supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship. Jessica Genauer Forward and Acknowledgments In 2011, as the Middle East and North Africa region exploded in political upheaval, I was in Jerusalem completing my Masters in Political Science. Watching long-term regimes that seemed so impermeable, shaken to their core in a matter of months, left a dramatic and lasting impression. Following closely over subsequent years, the missteps, twists and turns, and political trajectories in each state left me with the question: what do we understand about rebuilding contested states, and how is our knowledge still incomplete? Designing my thesis project a few years later, it was clear to me that I wanted to address this question. The goal of my research project was to contribute to our understanding of how the interaction amongst societal groups on the design and implementation of new political institutions shapes the trajectory of a political transition. Despite an impressive and extensive canon of literature on this issue, my aim was to focus on how the interface amongst groups frames the transition period, and whether generalisations can be drawn across countries regarding the facilitation of these interactions in a way that produces widespread confidence in the political system. Looking at Syria, Yemen, and Libya, in 2018, it appears that rebuilding political institutions will remain relevant to the region for years to come. I was fortunate to interview electoral experts and transition architects involved in the study’s countries of focus at the time of political transition. I extend my thanks and appreciation for valuable insights to Ahmed Badawi, co-founder of the Transform Center for Conflict Engagement and Political Development, responsible for running workshops and public forums in Egypt and Tunisia post-2010; Larry Diamond who served as a senior advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq from January to April 2004; Feisal Istrabadi who was the principle legal drafter of the interim constitution in Iraq that was in effect during 2004 and 2005; Radwan Masmoudi, the founder and President of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, a key organisation facilitating deliberative forums in Tunisia post- 2010; Andrew Reynolds, an international electoral expert who provided electoral advice to political parties in Egypt in early 2011; and Dirk Vandewalle, who served as political advisor to Ian Martin, the special representative for the Secretary General in Libya, during 2011 and 2012. Completing the thesis has been a rewarding journey and I am indebted to those that accompanied me throughout. I was very fortunate to complete this project under the expert guidance and mentorship of my supervisor, Professor Ian McAllister. I extend thanks also to my panel members, Professor Bob Bowker and Dr Richard Frank, for much-appreciated support and area-expertise. I wish to thank the School of Politics and International Relations at the Australian National University for the opportunity to join the department for the duration of my research project. Thanks goes also to colleagues, family, and friends - Shaq Genauer, James Frost, Lars Moen, Björn Dressel, Darren Lim, Vicki Hendricks, Ellen Schupbach, Kate Wilson-Woolley, Nataniel Wolfson, and Julia Wolfson - without whom this project would not have reached completion. Abstract Rebuilding a contested state following an authoritarian breakdown requires widespread support for the new political system from all communal groups. A central theoretical assertion of the institutional design literature is that inclusion of communal groups in institutional frameworks creates support for a political system. However, empirical evidence to either verify or refute this claim is inconclusive. A survey of institutional design literature reveals an implicit distinction between de jure inclusion (inclusive frameworks) and de facto inclusion (inclusion in practice). To date, this distinction has not been sufficiently differentiated and systematically examined, with large-N studies most often examining the impact solely of de jure inclusion on support, and case studies failing to make a clear conceptual distinction between these two elements of inclusion. To address this gap in the research, this study asks: during a period of political transition in a contested state, does de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, or a combination of both, build support for a political system? To investigate this question, the study undertakes a small-N comparative study of institutional design during political transitions in the Middle East and North Africa region. Four countries are selected that underwent rebuilding of their political institutions following authoritarian breakdown: Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia. Four hypotheses are advanced that capture the expectation that either de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, or a combination of both, will build support for a political system. The hypotheses are investigated in two key institutional design moments in the selected countries: electoral system design and constitution-making. The study finds that de jure inclusion is not a sufficient mechanism to create support of all communal groups for the political system, whilst de facto inclusion may be sufficient. In no case where de jure inclusion alone was observed, was support for the political system present. In all cases where de facto inclusion was present, there was support for the political system, regardless of whether or not there was de jure inclusion. The study contributes to our understanding of the rebuilding of contested states following authoritarian breakdown, suggesting that, alongside an emphasis on de jure inclusion in electoral system design and constitution-making, de facto inclusion deserves consideration. Contents CHAPTER ONE: REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES ............................................................... 1 1.1 Problem: building support for a political system ................................................................ 2 1.2 Puzzle: does inclusion build support? ................................................................................. 4 1.3 Argument ............................................................................................................................ 6 1.4 Research design .................................................................................................................. 8 1.5 Outcome ........................................................................................................................... 12 1.6 Thesis overview ................................................................................................................ 13 CHAPTER TWO: THEORISING INCLUSION IN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN ............................... 16 2.1 Contested states, inclusive institutions, and political support ......................................... 17 2.2 Electoral system design and constitution-making ............................................................ 23 2.3 Disaggregating de jure and de facto inclusion .................................................................. 28 2.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 33 CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN ................................................................................ 36 3.1 Research design and case selection ................................................................................. 36 3.2 Measurement of variables ................................................................................................ 50 3.2.1 Measuring the salient communal cleavage ............................................................................................ 50 3.2.2 Measuring the independent variables: de jure and de facto inclusion ......................................... 53 3.2.3 Measuring the dependent variable: support for a political system ............................................. 60 3.3 Data .................................................................................................................................. 64 CHAPTER FOUR: CONTESTED STATES IN CONTEXT - EGYPT, IRAQ, LIBYA, AND TUNISIA ... 67 4.1 The colonial period: consolidation of a salient communal cleavage ................................ 68 4.2 The independent republic: governance by exclusion ....................................................... 75 4.3 Political contestation: constitutions and elections ........................................................... 78 4.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 82 CHAPTER FIVE: NEGOTIATING ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN ............................................