Scientific practices and their social context Dan Hicks [email protected] Copyright c 2012 by Daniel J. Hicks ii Contents 1 Introduction1 1.1 Three vignettes in science and values..................1 1.2 Methodology and assumptions......................6 2 A conception of practice 17 2.1 Introduction................................ 17 2.2 Practitioners................................ 18 2.3 Goods................................... 19 2.4 Progress.................................. 32 2.5 Practices and institutions........................ 42 2.6 Relations among practices........................ 46 3 Science as practice 55 3.1 Introduction................................ 55 3.2 Points of agreement............................ 55 3.3 The narrow view............................. 66 3.4 The broad view.............................. 78 3.5 An appendix on ends........................... 95 4 Science and values: Isolationism 99 4.1 Introduction................................ 99 4.2 Pure and applied............................. 111 4.3 The threat of domination......................... 118 5 Some case studies in transaction 127 5.1 Introduction................................ 127 5.2 Feminism................................. 128 5.3 Stephen Jay Gould............................ 136 5.4 Otto Neurath............................... 144 5.5 Pascual Jordan.............................. 162 5.6 John Dewey................................ 171 iii 6 Science and values: Transactionism 185 6.1 Introduction................................ 185 6.2 The possibility of progress........................ 186 6.3 Interdependence.............................. 190 6.4 Pure and applied............................. 194 6.5 The threat of domination......................... 201 6.6 The idiom of the narrow view...................... 204 6.7 Reconsidering science and values.................... 207 7 Justice and practices 213 7.1 Introduction................................ 213 7.2 Politicization and the right to research................. 214 7.3 The framework of political liberalism.................. 228 7.4 Individualism and the metaphysics of collective agents........ 237 7.5 The basic structure............................ 250 7.6 Overlapping consensus and recognition................. 264 7.7 Freedom, equality, and fairness..................... 268 7.8 Conclusion................................. 279 8 Conclusion 281 References 289 Index of technical terms 311 iv List of Figures 3.1 The Connection Argument........................ 71 3.2 The Connection Argument........................ 72 3.3 The Inverse Connection Argument.................... 92 6.1 The Inverse Connection Argument.................... 187 6.2 Basic Broad View Transactionism.................... 193 v vi Acknowledgments This dissertation is not just the product of the last three years | although it is certainly that. Initially, it was conceived as a synthesis of some of the work I had done in the preceding four or six years, during my coursework as a graduate student at Notre Dame and, before that, reading philosophy in my spare time while studying math at the University of Illinois, Chicago. But, as the project developed, I found myself recovering themes and worries from my intellectual past: the history of science and technology that I had studied as an undergraduate; the optimistic socialism of my late teens; the disappointment with a profoundly unjust world, apparently lifelong; and the sense of wonder and curiosity at the great diversity of our social and biological world. So I cannot just thank those who have done so much as mentors and colleagues during the past few years | though Don Howard, Paul Weithman, Janet Kourany, and Peter Wicks all deserve special thanks, as does the HPS Reading Group taken collectively. I must also thank Lynn Hankinson-Nelson, Jim Evans, and Paul Loeb, whose classes pushed an undergraduate from mathematics into philosophy (and his- tory) of science. Before these were so many other formative relationships with teachers and friends. Through all of these three long decades have been my mother and father. They were the source of so many of the ethical and intellectual commitments that I have brought to this project. From my father I learned to love the natural world and the science that explores it. And from my mother I learned the love of justice and peace and the virtue of persistence. Without the last of these, I most certainly would not have seen this project to its completion. vii viii Preface This PDF includes the complete text of my Ph.D. dissertation, completed in April of 2012 at the University of Notre Dame, with margins and layout more efficient and appropriate for reading than those required by Notre Dame's graduate school. Both presentations of the dissertation were typeset in LATEX 2". ix x Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Three vignettes in science and values A small group of feminist scientists are outspoken critics of evolutionary psychology. They argue that evolutionary psychology depends on dubious assumptions, such as the differential parental investment model, and sexist values. Clearly, they say, the \science" of evolutionary psychology has been deliberately designed to rationalize sex- ist beliefs and values: that men are naturally promiscuous and that women should be housewives, for example. Evolutionary psychology is biased, special-interest science, and therefore unacceptable. A small group of scientists affiliated with the fossil fuels industry are outspoken critics of the anthropogenic explanation for climate change. They argue that the anthropogenic explanation depends on dubious assumptions, such as the legitimacy of interpolated historical temperature data, and environmentalist and anti-capitalist values. Clearly, they say, the \science" of climate change has been deliberately de- signed to rationalize socialist and environmentalist beliefs and values: that human industry is destroying the world and that a strong central government should carefully regulate the economy, for example. Anthropogenic explanations for climate change are biased, special-interest science, and therefore unacceptable. A small group of environmentalist scientists are outspoken critics of microbiolog- ical research on transgenic crops. They argue that this research depends on dubious assumptions, such as reductionist accounts of cell biology and ecology, and the values of globalized commerce. Clearly, they say, the \science" of transgenics has been de- liberately designed to rationalize the beliefs and values of globalization: that biotech- nology, developed and controlled by multinational corporations, is the best way to feed the world and that sustainable traditions and close-knit community should be sacrificed for the sake of efficiency and a global market, for example. Transgenics are biased, special-interest science, and therefore unacceptable. How are we { whether \we" are active participants or outside observers { to sort through the claims, counterclaims, and counter-counterclaims in each of these three 1 2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION vignettes? I'm inclined to say that the feminist scientists are correct, the climate change skeptics are wrong, and the environmentalist scientists, while they have a point, are a bit hyperbolic. But what can I do to support these inclinations? And what's to stop those with different views from arguing that feminist scientists, clima- tologists who support the anthropogentic explanation, and environmentalist scientists are illegitimately designing their \science" to rationalize their own beliefs and values? These three are not, of course, the only seemingly-intractable public disputes over scientific research. Controversy over creationism and evolution by natural selection seems to have died down a bit since the 2005 case of Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, but no doubt it will spring to life again within a decade or two. At least once a year, some finding that some socially significant trait { often something to do with intelligence { is statistically heritable is played up in that nebulous entity-space, \the media," usually in the grossly misleading form of a claim that the trait has been proven to be genetically determined. And, over the last few years, numerous controversies have erupted over the economics of various public policies { bailouts of large financial firms, economic stimulus through fiscal policy, large governmental debt, and, as I write these words in early March 2011, public employee unions. Does philosophy have anything to contribute here? In particular, since we are talking about controversies that touch on both politics and science, can political philosophy and philosophy of science do anything to help? Consider first philosophy of science. For the better part of fifty years,1 philosophers of science have discussed the relationship between science and its social context { including its political context { in a subfield that, today, is often called science and values. Some of this work has had a great deal of influence on the public controversies. To simplify the picture a bit, both the political left and the political right rhetorically appeal to scientists and scientific research to support their policy proposals, and both rhetorically decry the \junk science,"\bias,"and \ideology" of the other side. As Daniel Sarewitz has pointed out, all of this presupposes a \naive and idealized" conception of science and the (il)legitimate influence of ethical and political values; and this conception dates back to certain disputes