WIT AS ARGUMENT IN CICERO AND BEYOND By Robert P. Webber A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland July 2015 © 2015 Robert P. Webber All Rights Reserved Abstract The large quantity of invective deployed by aristocrats in Roman criminal cases and political arguments of the late Republic has led scholars to argue that Romans considered character of great probative value. This dissertation examines the surprising fact that in such an environment, where reputation was one of the most important assets of an aristocrat, some individuals began to respond to criticism of their character in a manner that had not been seen in the earlier Republic – nearly admitting to certain character flaws. The foremost practitioner of this strategy was Cicero. Herein I trace how he often responded to criticism by avoiding denial and instead responded with misleading admissions that shifted the meanings of accusations to grounds on which he had an advantage. I also provide anecdotal evidence for such a practice in Caesar and Catullus, as well as Quintilian’s positive assessment of it. I argue that contemporary sociolinguistic studies of such strategies indicate that the individuals who are most likely to learn such strategies often come from “macho” cultures in times of political upheaval who have challenged the dominant ethos of that culture. In other words, the more an individual is criticized by others, the more that individual learns that the best response to criticism is often one that minimizes its seriousness or dismisses it altogether. Such was the case with Cicero and Catullus, whose pursuit of distinction did not follow the traditional military path, and to some extent with Caesar, whose political ambitions threatened the senatorial dominance of Rome’s political structure. ii Dissertation Committee: Matthew Roller, Johns Hopkins University (chair) Christopher Celenza, Johns Hopkins University Marian Feldman, Johns Hopkins University Andrew Riggsby, University of Texas at Austin Joshua Smith, Johns Hopkins University iii Acknowledgements I would like to express my enormous gratitude, first and foremost, to my adviser, Matthew Roller, for all of his graceful criticism, good humor, patience, and the overall inspiration for project. I would also like to single out Joshua Smith who, though he came to it late, provided extremely helpful feedback on every part of the dissertation. For the financial support I received here, I’d like thank the Department of Classics and the Expository Writing Program. And for all of the logistical support I would like to extend my thanks to our administrator, Ginnie Miller, and librarian, the always supportive and fun Don Juedes. For their intellectual and, far more importantly, social support, and a great deal more, I am continuously thankful to Helene Coccagna and Sara Davis, without whom I most certainly would not have finished this undertaking. I must thank Nicole Jerr for the very same far-reaching support. Thanks to Adam Maskevich for all of his culinary munificence, camaraderie, and a Near Eastern Archaeologist’s point of view. Thanks to Greg Jones and Charles Read for all the good times and their unrivaled hospitality – I’ll never forget the fun I had at “The Mill,” particularly that storm-filled weekend of power outages, copious wine, Jefferson’s Cookbook, and great company. Last but far from least, I would like to thank my parents, Ray and Judy Webber, for all of their emotional support, encouragement, and the interest they showed in my work. I thank my brother, Andrew Webber, and his inimitable sense of humor, as well as my sister, Courtney Rutherford, and her family: Rob, Hayden, and Alex. iv Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction and Scholarship Section Title Page Number 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Why isn’t Greek Oratory 4 as Funny as Roman? 1.3 Character, Humor, and 7 Argument 1.4 Previous Scholarship 14 1.5 Organization of 21 Following Chapters Chapter 2: Political, Anthropological, and Sociolinguistic Theories Section Title Page Number 2.1 Introduction 23 2.2 Defining Power 24 2.3 Competition 30 2.4 Political Anthropology 32 2.5 Face and Sociolinguistics 46 2.6 Audiences 42 2.7 Retort Ethnologies 59 2.8 Conclusion 65 Chapter 3: An Analysis of Cicero’s Defenses Section Title Page Number 3.1 Introduction 66 3.2 Results 70 3.3 Brief Analysis 75 3.4 Discussion based on 79 Charge 3.5 Conclusion 114 Chapter 4: Quintilian’s Assessment of Ciceronian Humor Section Title Page Number 4.1 Introduction 118 4.2 Targets of Humor 120 4.3 Quintilian’s Catalog of 121 Jokes 4.4 Analysis 132 4.5 How Humor Should Be 153 Used v 4.6 Conclusion 158 Chapter 5: Humor as Argument beyond the Courts Section Title Page Number 5.1 Introduction 159 5.2 Ciceronian Oratory 161 Beyond the Courts 5.3 Philippicae 168 5.4 Altercatio 175 5.5 Catullus 177 5.6 Apophthegmata 186 5.7 Concluding Remarks on 189 Roman Verbal Competitions Conclusion 191 Bibliography 197 vi Chapter One 1.1 Introduction In Suetonius’s Life of Caesar, an unusual exchange in the senate is reported by the biographer. It involves Caesar boasting about his acquisition of the province of (transalpine) Gaul despite the law of Vatinius, passed as an attempt by the senate to assign him the less desirable Cisapline Gaul and Illyricum. Suetonius says: Quo gaudio elatus non temperauit, quin paucos post dies frequenti curia iactaret, inuitis et gementibus aduersaris adeptum se quae concupisset, proinde ex eo insultaturum omnium capitibus; ac negante quodam per contumeliam facile hoc ulli feminae fore, responderit quasi adludens: in Suria quoque regnasse Sameramin magnamque Asiae partem Amazonas tenuisse quondam.1 Elated with such joy he could not hold himself back from boasting a few days later in the crowded Curia that he, having taken what he had desired despite his opponents resisting and groaning, was forthwith going to jump upon the heads of all of them; but when someone, as an harsh insult, stated that this would be no easy thing for a woman, he responded as though he were merely kidding: “in Syria Semiramis too had reigned and that the Amazons controlled a sizable part of Asia at one time.”2 Caesar compares himself to a woman. This is not a comparison we would expect from a politician, especially a Roman politician. What possible reason could Caesar have had for likening his power to that of a woman, “the weaker sex?” He does of course compare himself to a uniquely powerful woman. But one might ask why he does not deny that he is a woman altogether. Why does he not respond by challenging the suggestion? Why not respond by threateningly stating “I’ll show you who is the woman?” By comparing himself to a woman, was he attempting to “own” a trait he had been accused of before? For Suetonius famously described Caesar as “every woman’s man and every man’s 1 Suet. Caes. 22.2.1 - 22.2.8 2 All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. 1 woman;” and according to Plutarch Cicero expressed bewilderment that a man who picked his hair with one finger could take over the republic.3 Or, was he trying to humiliate his challenger and the senate by asking what it meant for them that they were bested by an effeminate? Could the wit of his retort have affected the senate’s perception of him? This dissertation is an attempt to explain such witty but unusual retorts. As such, it touches upon some of the same questions raised in Andrew Riggsby’s important article “Did the Romans Believe in Their Verdicts?” Therein, Riggsby considers why Roman defendants did not respond to accusations by denying their guilt and offering alternative explanations, and instead engaged in “flamboyant use of certain rhetorical figures, self- reference, and invoking the ambiance of the arena or the comic theater.”4 Riggsby argues that there are two ways for scholars to explain this rhetorical excess: to conclude that Roman courts were not concerned with guilt and that we are imposing our own concepts of justice on them,5 or to conclude, as he does, that we have a “tendency to underestimate drastically the ‘relevance to the case’ of many of Cicero’s arguments.”6 Riggsby contends that the reason we see so much invective is not that Romans didn’t care about guilt and innocence, but that they viewed character as relevant to this question. His implication is, therefore, that Romans believed character to be evidence of guilt or innocence to a greater degree than we do in the modern era, where forensic evidence and testimony are given more weight than character or motive. Furthermore, Riggsby 3 Plut Caes. 5.9: “ἀλλ' ὅταν” ἔφη “τὴν κόµην οὕτω διακειµένην περιττῶς ἴδω, κἀκεῖνον ἑνὶ δακτύλῳ κνώµενον, οὔ µοι δοκεῖ πάλιν οὗτος ἅνθρωπος εἰς νοῦν ἂν ἐµβαλέσθαι τηλικοῦτον κακόν, ἀναίρεσιν τῆς Ῥωµαίων πολιτείας. 4 Riggsby 1997: 235. 5 He correctly notes (236) that this conclusion would require some degree of collusion between the various elements of the courts. 6 Ibid 237. 2 collects a convincing number of examples of Roman discourse involving the courts where truth and guilt seem clearly to be the end goal.7 He does of course allow the possibility that orators viewed the courts differently than the jurors, with the former regarding the latter as manipulatable. This possibility is significant and something that we shall be returning to in future chapters. However, in regard to Riggsby’s original question as to whether Romans believed in their verdicts, it is my contention that there is a third explanation for the excessive rhetoric that gives rise to the question: the clever orator avoided denial whenever possible because, for Roman audiences, being accused of something was almost the same as being proven guilty of it.