UNDERSTANDING THE EUROSCEPTICISM IN TURKISH POLITICS SECKIN BARIS GULMEZ ROYAL HOLLOWAY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. in Politics and International Relations 1 Declaration of Authorship I ……SECKIN BARIS GULMEZ…. hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated. Signed: ______________________ Date: ____18 December 2013____ 2 ABSTRACT This PhD project scrutinizes why Turkish mainstream politics turned against EU membership. By taking into account three mainstream parties (AKP, CHP and MHP) in comparison with the views of the BDP, a pro-Kurdish party, this study seeks to explain the main determinants of the rising scepticism against EU accession engulfing Turkish politics since 2002. Accordingly, the study applies the term Euroscepticism to candidate countries and Turkey in particular by (i) categorizing domestic political reactions based on the complex nature of EU conditionality involving both formal issue-specific and additional country-specific pressures; (ii) focusing on both domestic and external factors behind domestic resistance to accession process; and (iii) comparing the Turkish case with other candidate countries focusing on the negotiation process.The study argues that Euroscepticism in Turkey and candidate countries in general develops as a response to the complex nature of EU conditionality comprising both issue-specific and country-specific accession conditions. Euroscepticism in reaction to issue-specific conditions involves an opposition to particular reforms deriving from the EU’s formal membership conditionality. Euroscepticism in response to country-specific conditionality, however, involves broader political resistance against the EU’s extra conditionality which targets a particular candidate. To grasp Turkish Euroscepticism, two reform areas under the EU’s issue-specific conditionality (minority rights and foreign land ownership) and two cases of country-specific pressures (the EU’s Cyprus conditionality and the rising Turkish suspicion that the EU won’t accept Turkey’s membership) are studied. Outlining six hypotheses regarding the effects of party ideology, strategy, and EU-driven factors on the development of Eurosceptic politics in Turkey, the study overall reveals that until 2006, ideology explains the opposition’s attitudes while the governmental approach follows strategy. Since the partial suspension of negotiations in 2006, both opposition and government reflect similar scepticism towards the EU irrespective of their ideology and competition strategies. Instead, they provide a case for strong Euroscepticism by emphasizing the role of EU- driven factors –especially, the rising uncertainty of membership and the EU’s ‘perceived’ reluctance to accept Turkish accession–in complicating Turkey-EU relations. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………..10 CHAPTER I: LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………………….24 1.1. Political Party Contestations towards European Integration: Definition and Classification………………………………………………………………………...24 1.2. Determinants of Party Stances towards European Integration …………….31 1.2.1. Ideology ………………………….…………………………………………...31 1.2.2. Strategy ………………………………………………………………………38 1.2.3. Other factors ………………………………………………………………...40 1.3. Euroscepticism in Accession Countries………………………………………42 1.4. Party attitudes towards European integration in Turkey .…………………45 CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK - EUROSCEPTICISM IN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES ………........................................................................53 2.1. A particular focus on the stage of EU accession negotiations in accession countries……………………………………………………………………………..55 2.2. Why is Euroscepticism in candidate countries different from Euroscepticism in member states?......................................................................................................56 2.3. What drives Euroscepticism in candidate countries?.......……………...........61 2.3.1. Domestic factors……..……………………………………………………….62 2.3.2. EU-driven Factors …………………………….……………………………..63 2.4. Varieties of Euroscepticism in candidate countries ………............................65 4 2.4.1. Euroscepticism as reaction to the EU’s issue-specific conditionality........66 2.4.2. Euroscepticism in response to the EU’s country-specific conditionality..................................................................…………………………...68 2.5. ‘Ideology vs. Strategy’ or pure reaction to the EU?: Specifying the main hypotheses………………………………………………………………….…….....72 2.5.1. Party Ideology: Does ideology explain Euroscepticism in candidate countries?...................................................................................................................74 2.5.2. Party Competition……………………………………………………….…..77 2.5.2.1. Is Euroscepticism only embraced by fringe parties in candidate countries?...................................................................................................................77 2.5.2.2. Is Euroscepticism an opposition phenomenon in candidate countries?....................................................................................................................78 2.6. Conclusion………………………………………………………………….…..80 CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES………………………….….83 3.1. Case study……………………………………………………………………....84 3.2. On the selection of actors…...………………………………………………….86 3.3. On the selection of cases……..…………………………………………………89 3.4. On the selection of ideological categories………….………………………….92 3.5. Data collection………………………………………………………………….95 3.5.1. Elite interviews ………………………………………..……………………..96 3.5.2. Ethical considerations………………………………………………………101 CHAPTER IV: THE REFORM OF MINORITY RIGHTS…..………………..103 4.1. The EU Conditionality on Minority Rights and Responses from Accession Countries…………………………………….……………………………………..104 5 4.2.The minority rights regime in Turkey……..………………………………....112 4.2.1. Political resistance to the reforms of minority rights in Turkey………....114 4.2.2. The Reform of Minority Foundations….………………………………….118 4.2.3. Symptoms of the Sèvres syndrome……………………………………...…121 4.3. Reflections of Turkish Parliamentarians on minority rights........................123 4.3.1. The AKP Responses………………………………………………………...123 4.3.2. The CHP Responses………………………………………………………...130 4.3.3. The MHP Responses………………………………………………………..135 4.4. Conclusion………………………………………………………………….....137 CHAPTER V: THE REFORM OF FOREIGN LAND OWNERSHIP ….…....147 5.1. Foreign Land Ownership and its application in the EU …….…………….147 5.2. Political Resistance to the FLO Reform in EU Accession Countries....…...152 5.3. Foreign land ownership in Turkey …………..……………………………..158 5.4. Reactions to the FLO reform from the opposition parties………………...160 5.5. Reflections of Turkish Parliamentarians on the issue of FLO………….....164 5.5.1. The AKP responses………………………………………………………....165 5.5.2. The CHP responses………………………………………………...……….168 5.5.3. The MHP responses………………………………………………………...170 5.6. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….171 CHAPTER VI: THE EU’S CYPRUS CONDITIONALITY ON TURKEY......176 6.1. The EU’s country-specific conditionality and responses from accession countries……………………………………………………………………………177 6.2. A Brief Discussion of the Cyprus problem and the EU’s Cyprus policy….183 6 6.3. Turkey’s Cyprus policy………………………………….…………………...186 6.4. The AKP government and Cyprus……………………………….......…...…188 6.4.1. The views of the AKP Members of the Parliament……………………….191 6.5. The CHP and Cyprus…………………………………………………………195 6.5.1. The views of the CHP Members of the Parliament……………………….197 6.6. The MHP and Cyprus………………………………………………………...202 6.6.1. The views of MHP members of the Parliament…………………………...204 6.7. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..206 CHAPTER VII: TURKISH POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS OF RISING TURKEY-SCEPTICISM IN THE EU.………..……….………………………...210 7.1. Main determinants of Turkish perceptions towards the EU…….…………212 7.2. The EU’s ‘perceived’ reluctance for Turkish accession and Responses of Turkish Political Elite……………………………………………………………..215 7.2.1. The AKP government: from indifference to strong criticism……………215 7.2.2. The CHP: Increasing criticisms towards the EU...……………………….218 7.2.3. The MHP: The EU as a ‘Christian Club’………………............................222 7.3. Reflections of Turkish Parliamentarians……………..……………………..224 7.3.1. The AKP respondents………………………………………………………224 7.3.2. The CHP respondents………………………………………………………231 7.3.3. The MHP respondents……………………………………………………...236 7.4. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..239 CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION………………………………………………..244 8.1. Discussion of the Hypotheses………………………………………………...249 7 8.2. Contributions of the study……………………………………………………255 8.3. Limitations of the Study……………………………………………………...260 8.3.1. Trade-off between multiple cases and in-depth analysis…………………261 8.3.2. Other actors and reform areas……………………………………..............261 8.3.3. Some major developments………………………………………………….263 8.3.4. On generalisation…………………………………………………………...266 8.4. Answering questions and addressing potential criticisms………………….269 8.4.1. Is there an ideological shift in the AKP government?................................270 8.4.2. The AKP’s support for EU membership: Pure pragmatism?...................273 8.4.3.Where does the ‘Sèvres Syndrome’ fit in the discussion of Turkey’s Euroscepticism?.......................................................................................................274 8.4.4.