GAVIN CAMERON Viewpoint WMD Terrorism in the United States: The Threat and Possible Countermeasures GAVIN CAMERON Gavin Cameron is a Senior Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, CA. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, and is author of Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment for the 21st Century (St. Martin’s Press, 1999). ederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director represented, due largely to a misinterpretation of the sig- Louis Freeh has called the terrorist acquisition of nificance of the slew of low-level incidents that have Fweapons of mass destruction (WMD) “perhaps the characterized terrorism within the United States in the most serious potential threat facing the United States past two years. The viewpoint argues that although the today.”1 The US government has spent billions of dol- threat posed by chemical and biological agents cannot lars in an effort to counter the perceived danger. Public wholly be dismissed, the more immediate terrorist dan- interest in, and fear of, the phenomenon have led to ex- ger to the United States continues to come from the use tensive discussion within the media, government, and of conventional weapons. The paper concludes with a academia of the vulnerabilities of the United States to discussion of the implications of this argument for the terrorism, particularly involving WMD. This increased future of US efforts to counteract the threat of WMD fear and public awareness of the issue have been ac- terrorism. Overall, it contends that a more realistic threat companied, and fuelled, by a dramatic increase in hoaxes assessment will be necessary if counterterrorism pro- and other low-level incidents, as individuals and groups grams are to prove sustainable. With respect to specific with a grievance have realized that merely by using a programs, this viewpoint suggests that some of the fund- key word they can create considerable disruption and ing for improving domestic preparedness for possible publicity for their cause. This succession of incidents, attacks involving non-conventional weapons is being in turn, has served to strengthen public and governmen- directed to national-level programs that are likely either tal concerns, reinforcing the belief that the United States to duplicate or to be less effective than comparable ca- is facing a probable danger paralleled only by the threat pabilities at the state and local levels. It proposes a stra- of Soviet nuclear weapons during the Cold War. tegic vision in which local and state agencies would be This viewpoint starts with a discussion of the defini- primary in responding to most incidents, with federal tion of WMD and then examines the nature of the present resources available to supplement these efforts when threat to the United States from terrorist use of WMD. It necessary. suggests that this danger has been overstated and mis- 162 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2000 GAVIN CAMERON DEFINING WMD with the proliferation of advanced conventional weap- For the purposes of this paper, mass-destructive weap- ons, defines WMD as those involving chemical, biologi- 4 ons mean exclusively those weapons capable of caus- cal, or nuclear weapons. Falkenrath, Newman, and ing mass casualties. Although this may seem a Thayer avoid the problem by discussing nuclear, bio- controversially narrow definition, it is arguably the only logical, and chemical (NBC) weapons, rather than 5 workable one. One of the biggest problems in assessing WMD. Hoffman, in his 1998 book, equates WMD with 6 the likelihood or the possible impact of mass-destruc- nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Jessica Stern tive terrorism within the United States is the very basic, suggests that the term WMD means weapons that are 7 but surprisingly difficult, question of designing a work- capable of killing many people at one time. able definition of weapons of mass destruction. The Establishing a definition of WMD raises a number of Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabil- questions: does it depend on the type of weapon used or ity for Terrorist Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass on the results achieved with that weapon? What is “mass Destruction (also known as the Gilmore Commission, destruction” in this context: physical destruction, casu- after its chair, James S. Gilmore III), noted in its first alties, or disruption? And what is the level of each that annual report to Congress and the president, that not only would qualify an incident as mass-destructive? Physical is there no agreement across the US government on what destruction is clearly not a defining characteristic of constitutes WMD, there is not even agreement on a defi- WMD terrorism, although it may be a consequence of nition of terrorism.2 it. Neither chemical nor biological weapons cause ex- The definition of WMD matters on at least two lev- tensive destruction, yet, conversely, both would obvi- els. First, in order to assess the threat and countermea- ously be included in any list of potential WMD, however sures involved in mass-destructive terrorism, it is it was defined. Like physical destruction, disruption is a imperative that there is an understanding of the danger likely result of WMD terrorism, but cannot be used to against which the US program intends to defend. Sec- determine whether an incident should be classified as ond, a major argument of this viewpoint is that WMD involving a WMD. By itself, disruption is simply the and non-conventional (chemical, biological, radiologi- response to a perceived threat, rather than a judgment cal, and nuclear [CBRN]) weapons are not synonymous. on the true nature of the threat itself. A credible threat of Therefore, it is important to specify what is intended by an attack may be capable of eliciting the same level of a reference to WMD. response, and thus cause the same level of disruption, as a genuine attack. As such, disruption alone is not the The US Domestic Preparedness Program, intended to defining characteristic of WMD terrorism. protect against WMD within the United States today, is based on a fairly limited definition of the issue. The Using casualties as the defining characteristic of WMD Domestic Preparedness Program (officially The Defense terrorism is distasteful, since it inevitably requires that Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act) was part of one put an arbitrary figure above which an incident would the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year be classified as involving WMD. If one puts that figure 1997. It, in section 1403, defines WMD as “any weapon at 100 fatalities, for example, does that really mean that or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause an incident involving “only” 99 is somehow less sig- death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of nificant? In addition, using casualties as the defining people through the release of toxic or poisonous chemi- characteristic of a WMD incident limits effective analy- cals or their precursors, a disease organism, or radiation sis to those incidents where a weapon was used. To clas- or radioactivity.”3 This clearly gives rise to a number of sify as WMD cases those incidents that did not succeed questions: how is “a significant number of people” de- but probably would have resulted in 100 or more fatali- fined? How is the capability of a weapon determined? ties is problematic as it necessitates a considerable de- Most significantly, the definition in the Domestic Pre- gree of speculation. Nevertheless, casualties, as the most paredness Program completely excludes conventional obvious consequence of a massive terrorist attack, do weapons as potential weapons of mass destruction. need to be at the heart of any definition of WMD terror- ism, and, as was noted earlier, are the core of the Do- Other authors and official sources define WMD in mestic Preparedness Program’s mission statement. Both slightly different ways. The FBI, although also concerned considerable destruction and disruption may occur as The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2000 163 GAVIN CAMERON the result of an incident, without that incident being con- The difference between the real level of the threat to sidered an example of WMD terrorism. Of the various the United States from CBRN weapons and the poten- criteria, only mass casualties are likely to ensure that an tial of these same weapons is an important one. This incident is classified as involving a WMD. difference has been widely recognized, but appears to Does the definition depend also on the type of agent have had relatively little impact on public policy. As- or material used, or solely on the capability of the sessments of the threat continue to be based on the vul- weapon? Clearly, some types of incident are self-evi- nerability of US society, rather than on the desire or dently examples of WMD: a detonation of a nuclear- ability of terrorists to use CBRN weapons on civilian yield weapon or release of a chemical or biological (CB) populations in the United States. It is undeniable that agent that caused hundreds to die are the most obvious communities in the United States would be vulnerable cases. However, suppose exactly the same weapon is to such attacks, should they ever occur. However, these not detonated or released, so there are no casualties, but assessments assume a worst-case scenario where terror- the capability existed; is that WMD terrorism? Most ists succeed in acquiring and effectively using such a analysts would probably say that it was, suggesting that weapon, assumptions not supported by the historical the potential of the incident to cause mass casualties was evidence. In fact, terrorist groups or individuals, seek- the vital factor. Common sense dictates that the classifi- ing to cause extensive casualties, have tended to use cation of an incident has to rest on its results, or at least conventional weapons, such as explosives to achieve on its potential results, rather than simply on the type of their objective.