COLOMBIA’S ELUSIVE QUEST FOR PEACE 26 March 2002 Latin America Report No. 1 Bogotá/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................................i I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................1 II. HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS................................................................................................................2 A. THE “ERA OF VIOLENCE”, 1948-1965...................................................................................................2 B. THE RISE AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE INSURGENCY ...................................................................3 C. THE RISE AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE DRUG CARTELS AND THE PARAMILITARY FORCES ....4 D. PEACE EFFORTS 1982-1998 ....................................................................................................................5 III. CENTRAL ACTORS.........................................................................................................................7 A. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT...................................................................................................................7 1. The State...............................................................................................................................................7 2. The Insurgents ......................................................................................................................................9 3. The Paramilitary Forces......................................................................................................................11 B. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY .............................................................................................................11 1. The UN and the OAS..........................................................................................................................11 2. Neighbouring States and other Western Hemisphere Countries.........................................................12 3. United States.......................................................................................................................................12 4. Europe.................................................................................................................................................15 IV. HUMANTIARIAN CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT...................................................16 A. MASSACRES ...........................................................................................................................................16 B. ASSASSINATIONS....................................................................................................................................17 C. TORTURE................................................................................................................................................18 D. KIDNAPPING...........................................................................................................................................18 E. CHILDREN IN THE CONFLICT ...............................................................................................................18 F. INDISCRIMINATE MILITARY ATTACKS ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION..........................................18 G. TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST INFRASTRUCTURE...................................................................................19 H. FORCED INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT ....................................................................................................19 V. DYNAMICS OF PEACE AND WAR, 1998-2002.........................................................................20 A. THE PASTRANA INITIATIVE ..................................................................................................................20 B. THE CRISIS OF JANUARY 2002.............................................................................................................23 C. THE FARC: MAKING WAR AND TALKING PEACE ..............................................................................24 D. THE END OF THE PEACE PROCESS......................................................................................................26 VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT NOW IN COLOMBIA?.......................................................................28 A. RETHINKING THE WAY AHEAD ...........................................................................................................28 B. IMPROVING SECURITY PROTECTION ...................................................................................................29 C. RE-ENERGISING THE PEACE PROCESS................................................................................................30 D. COMBATING DRUG TRAFFICKING .......................................................................................................32 E. STRENGTHENING COLOMBIA’S INSTITUTIONS ...................................................................................33 APPENDICES A. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS....................................................................................................................34 B. CHRONOLOGY OF GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA – FARC PEACE PROCESS 1998 – 2002...............35 C. MAP OF COLOMBIA...............................................................................................................................42 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ......................................................................................43 E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS ................................................................................................44 F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .........................................................................................................................48 ICG Latin America Report N° 1 26 March 2002 COLOMBIA’S ELUSIVE QUEST FOR PEACE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Looking Back. In February 2002, negotiations to scope of suffering. The fighting that followed the end the most dangerous confrontation of breakdown of negotiations, while less intense than Colombia's decades of civil war collapsed. Nearly in the immediately preceding month, indicates that four years earlier, the newly-inaugurated President the FARC retains the capacity to operate Andrés Pastrana had opened talks with the effectively throughout much of the country and country’s major remaining rebel groups, the that there is little or no chance the government can Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- impose a military solution in the foreseeable Ejército del Pueblo (FARC) and the Ejército de future. Liberación Nacional (ELN), with great enthusiasm and hope. But the fighting never ended while the At the same time, Colombia's importance as a talks sputtered on, and the country now appears source of narcotics has greatly increased, thereby headed for a new round of violence in its cities and magnifying the stake of the international against its infrastructure. The international community − including the country's neighbours community is concerned about the implications not and the U.S. − in finding a solution to the conflict. only for Colombia’s people and its democratic The legitimate rural economy has suffered greatly institutions, but also wider regional stability. from war and price shocks over the last decade, making the grip of coca producers even stronger. With support from Europe, Latin America and the United States, President Pastrana granted the Colombia has a potentially strong economy and a largest insurgent group, the FARC, a demilitarised long democratic tradition that, though undermined zone (DMZ), the size of Switzerland, in the south by a history of violence, is one of the proudest in of the country. Both he and the FARC, however, Latin America. Its civil war has become kept experienced third parties, Colombian and inextricably intertwined with the narcotics trade, international, at arm’s length. The negotiations, which not only fuels the conflict but also appears courageous initiative though they were, appeared to have altered significantly the character of the to lack a consistent strategy. By the time Pastrana insurgents and the paramilitaries, who now have a declared them over and ordered the army to dependable source of income to fund weapons reoccupy the (DMZ), the endeavour looked to most purchases and ensure their staying power. Colombians like little more than a mirage. The international community has virtually unanimously The surge in Colombia’s illicit narcotics industry supported his decision: in the post-11 September since the 1980s, combined with the ideological world, a strong stance against a terror organisation dislocations of the end of the Cold War, have made has been an easy call. the FARC and ELN far different from earlier Latin American guerrilla groups. Many of their leaders Throughout Pastrana’s tenure, all illegal armed have become “military entrepreneurs” who feel organisations − the FARC, the ELN and the little need to cooperate and communicate with Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, or Colombian society and even less with the paramilitaries) − have intensified their attacks, international community. They have lost most of regularly violating human rights and expanding the their former popular support, and their power is Colombia’s Elusive Quest for Peace ICG Latin America Report N° 1, 26 March 2002 Page ii now reflected almost exclusively in military Everyone