Material objects: coincidence & composition Today weʼll be turning from the paradoxes of space and time to series of metaphysical paradoxes. Metaphysics is a part of philosophy, though it is not easy to say exactly which part. On one traditional definition, it is the attempt to say what reality, ultimately, consists in - what the “basic building blocks” of reality are. To understood, it is obviously a very broad subject matter. Over the next four classes we will be discussing paradoxes which arise from metaphysical reflections on four topics: the existence of material objects; the nature of persons; meaning; and freedom of the will. Our topic today - material objects - might seem an unlikely topic for a course on paradoxes. One might be willing to concede that difficult questions arise when we consider abstract questions about infinite divisibility; but surely, one might think, no paradoxes can arise from the existence of ordinary physical objects, like tables and chairs. This, as weʼll see, is a mistake. Some very difficult problems result from the ordinary view that such ordinary objects exist. One way to bring this out is via consideration of the following simple example: Imagine a sculptor taking a lump of clay, and fashioning it into a statue. It seems as though the sculptor has brought something new into existence - namely, the statue. But it also seems as though the lump of clay, which pre-existed the sculptor's work, still exists. So it seems as though where there was formerly one thing, there are now two things. But this is very puzzling. After all, the two things are, for example, located in exactly the same location - and isnʼt it impossible for two distinct things to be in exactly the same place? What's going on here? We can turn this example into an explicit paradox, as follows. (I use Siderʼs names for the various assumptions he discusses.) Imagine a sculptor taking a lump of clay, and fashioning it into a statue. It seems as though the sculptor has brought something new into existence - namely, the statue. But it also seems as though the lump of clay, which pre-existed the sculptor's work, still exists. So it seems as though where there was formerly one thing, there are now two things. But this is very puzzling. After all, the two things are, for example, located in exactly the same location - and isnʼt it impossible for two distinct things to be in exactly the same place? What's going on here? We can turn this example into an explicit paradox, as follows. (I use Siderʼs names for the various assumptions he discusses.) 1 Before the sculptorʼs action, a lump of clay exists & after the sculptorʼs action a statue exists. EXISTENCE 2 The lump of clay continues to exist after the sculptorʼs actions. SURVIVAL 3 The statue comes into existence when the sculptor makes it. CREATION 4 The lump of clay and the sculpture have different properties after the sculptorʼs actions: one 1, 2, 3 existed before the sculptorʼs action, and one did not. 5 If x & y have different properties at the same time, then x≠y. LEIBNIZʼS LAW 6 The statue ≠ the lump of clay. 4, 5 7 The statue and the lump of clay occupy the same location at the same time. 2 8 Two distinct objects never occupy the same location at the same time. NO CO-LOCATION 9 The statue = the clay. 7, 8 _____________________________________________________________________________ C The statue = the clay & the status ≠ the lump of clay. 6, 9 The conclusion is a contradiction - which is as clearly false a claim as you can get. But the argument seems valid; hence one or more of the premises must be true. The problem is that each of the premises looks pretty attractive. 1 Before the sculptorʼs action, a lump of clay exists & after the sculptorʼs action a statue exists. EXISTENCE 2 The lump of clay continues to exist after the sculptorʼs actions. SURVIVAL 3 The statue comes into existence when the sculptor makes it. CREATION 4 The lump of clay and the sculpture have different properties after the sculptorʼs actions: one 1, 2, 3 existed before the sculptorʼs action, and one did not. 5 If x & y have different properties at the same time, then x≠y. LEIBNIZʼS LAW 6 The statue ≠ the lump of clay. 4, 5 7 The statue and the lump of clay occupy the same location at the same time. 2 8 Two distinct objects never occupy the same location at the same time. NO CO-LOCATION 9 The statue = the clay. 7, 8 _____________________________________________________________________________ C The statue = the clay & the status ≠ the lump of clay. 6, 9 The conclusion is a contradiction - which is as clearly false a claim as you can get. But the argument seems valid; hence one or more of the premises must be true. The problem is that each of the premises looks pretty attractive. There are only five independent premises, all of which are given names in the argument above. Leibnizʼs Law, as its name suggests, is a premise which most philosophers take to be clearly true. Can you see why? What would it take for this premise to be false? If we assume that Leibnizʼs Law is true, then responses to this paradox basically fall into two groups. One might either deny one or more of the (intuitively quite plausible) existence claims in premises 1, 2, and 3. The other strategy is to accept all of these claims and deny premise 8 - the No Co-Location premise. As weʼll see, there are two quite different ways of doing this. 1 Before the sculptorʼs action, a lump of clay exists & after the sculptorʼs action a statue exists. EXISTENCE 2 The lump of clay continues to exist after the sculptorʼs actions. SURVIVAL 3 The statue comes into existence when the sculptor makes it. CREATION 4 The lump of clay and the sculpture have different properties after the sculptorʼs actions: one 1, 2, 3 existed before the sculptorʼs action, and one did not. 5 If x & y have different properties at the same time, then x≠y. LEIBNIZʼS LAW 6 The statue ≠ the lump of clay. 4, 5 7 The statue and the lump of clay occupy the same location at the same time. 2 8 Two distinct objects never occupy the same location at the same time. NO CO-LOCATION 9 The statue = the clay. 7, 8 _____________________________________________________________________________ C The statue = the clay & the status ≠ the lump of clay. 6, 9 But letʼs turn to the first strategy first. How could any of premises 1, 2, or 3 be denied? Letʼs focus on premise 1, Existence. How could one reasonably deny that before the sculptorʼs action, a lump of clay exists, and that after the action, a statue exists? The only way, it seems, is to simply deny that there are such things as statues and lumps of clay. After all, it seems, if there ever are such things as statues and lumps of clay, this is such a case, But of course nothing special here depends on the example of clay and a statue; it might seem that an argument of the same sort could be generated for any type of material objects. Does this mean that if we deny Existence, we are forced to deny that there are any material things at all? Not quite. The argument just given does depend on one important feature of statues and lumps of clay: namely, that they are made of parts. After all, the lump becomes the statue by re-arrangement of the parts of the lump of clay. So it seems that we can deny Existence without denying that there are any material things; but it looks like we do have to deny that there are any composite material things - that is, any material things that have parts. 1 Before the sculptorʼs action, a lump of clay exists & after the sculptorʼs action a statue exists. EXISTENCE 2 The lump of clay continues to exist after the sculptorʼs actions. SURVIVAL 3 The statue comes into existence when the sculptor makes it. CREATION 4 The lump of clay and the sculpture have different properties after the sculptorʼs actions: one 1, 2, 3 existed before the sculptorʼs action, and one did not. 5 If x & y have different properties at the same time, then x≠y. LEIBNIZʼS LAW 6 The statue ≠ the lump of clay. 4, 5 7 The statue and the lump of clay occupy the same location at the same time. 2 8 Two distinct objects never occupy the same location at the same time. NO CO-LOCATION 9 The statue = the clay. 7, 8 _____________________________________________________________________________ C The statue = the clay & the status ≠ the lump of clay. 6, 9 Letʼs focus on premise 1, Existence. So it seems that we can deny Existence without denying that there are any material things; but it looks like we do have to deny that there are any composite material things - that is, any material things that have parts. This view - that there are no composite material objects, and hence no tables, chairs, buildings, etc. - is known as nihilism. The nihilist has an immediate resolution of our paradox - since, if nihilism is true, then premises 1 and 2 are false. But of course, nihilism comes with a cost - and that is just that the view seems crazy. Can it really be true that there are no tables, chairs, etc? One way to bring out the oddness here is by thinking about people. It seems that you (if you exist) are a composite material thing; so, if there are no composite material things, then you do not exist.