Framing the Global Economic Downturn Crisis Rhetoric and the Politics of Recessions

Framing the Global Economic Downturn Crisis Rhetoric and the Politics of Recessions

Framing the global economic downturn Crisis rhetoric and the politics of recessions Framing the global economic downturn Crisis rhetoric and the politics of recessions Edited by Paul ’t Hart and Karen Tindall Published by ANU E Press The Australian National University Canberra ACT 0200, Australia Email: [email protected] This title is also available online at: http://epress.anu.edu.au/global_economy_citation. html National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Title: Framing the global economic downturn : crisis rhetoric and the politics of recessions / editor, Paul ‘t Hart, Karen Tindall. ISBN: 9781921666049 (pbk.) 9781921666056 (pdf) Series: Australia New Zealand School of Government monograph Subjects: Financial crises. Globalization--Economic aspects. Bankruptcy--International cooperation. Crisis management--Political aspects. Political leadership. Decision-making in public administration. Other Authors/Contributors: Hart, Paul ‘t Tindall, Karen. Dewey Number: 352.3 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Cover design by John Butcher Cover images sourced from AAP Printed by University Printing Services, ANU Funding for this monograph series has been provided by the Australia and New Zealand School of Government Research Program. This edition © 2009 ANU E Press John Wanna, Series Editor Professor John Wanna is the Sir John Bunting Chair of Public Administration at the Research School of Social Sciences at The Australian National University and is the director of research for the Australian and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG). He is also a joint appointment with the Department of Politics and Public Policy at Griffith University and a principal researcher with two research centres: the Governance and Public Policy Research Centre and the nationally-funded Key Centre in Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance at Griffith University. Table of Contents The contributors ix Part I. Setting the stage 1. From ‘market correction’ to ‘global catastrophe’: framing the 3 economic downturn Paul ’t Hart and Karen Tindall 2. Understanding crisis exploitation: leadership, rhetoric 21 and framing contests in response to the economic meltdown Paul ’t Hart and Karen Tindall Part II. One crisis, different worlds: the United States and Canada 3. The United States: crisis leadership in times of transition 43 Isaac Ijjo Donato 4. Canada: the politics of optimism 69 Anastasia Glushko Part III. Dark clouds and turbulence in Europe 5. United Kingdom: the politics of government survival 99 Justin Pritchard 6. Republic of Ireland: from Celtic tiger to recession victim 127 Adam Masters 7. France: dominant leadership 157 Natalie Windle 8. The European Union: from impotence to opportunity? 181 Tully Fletcher Part IV. No hiding place: the meltdown and the Asia-Pacific Region 9. Australia: ‘the lucky country’ on a knife edge 203 Matthew Laing and Karen Tindall 10. New Zealand: electoral politics in times of crisis 243 Michael Jones 11. Singapore: staying the course 267 Faith Benjaathonsirikul vii Part V. Comparisons and reflections 12. Contesting the frame: opposition leadership and the global 287 financial crisis Brendan McCaffrie 13. Crisis leadership in terra incognita: why meaning making is 309 not enough Arjen Boin 14. Framing dilemmas in the quest for successful crisis management 315 Allan McConnell 15. Managing trans-boundary crises: leadership challenges for the 323 EU Presidency Bengt Sundelius 16. Public leadership and the social construction of economic 331 catastrophe Paul ’t Hart and Karen Tindall viii The contributors Editors Paul 't Hart is Professor of Political Science at The Australian National University, Professor of Public Administration at Utrecht University, the Netherlands, and adjunct professor at the Australia New Zealand School of Government. Karen Tindall is completing a PhD on government responses to large-scale consular emergencies at the Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University. Case study authors (Parts II±IV) Isaac Ijjo Donato, Anastasia Glushko, Justin Pritchard, Adam Masters, Natalie Windle, Tully Fletcher, Michael Jones and Faith Benjaathonsirikul study political science (Hons) at The Australian National University. Matthew Laing is completing a PhD in political science at the Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University. Theme chapter authors (Part V) Arjen Boin is an associate professor at the Public Administration Institute, Louisiana State University. Brendan McCaffrie is completing a PhD in political science in the College of Arts and Social Science, The Australian National University. Allan McConnell is a professor in the Department of Politics, Strathclyde University, Glasgow. Bengt Sundelius is Professor of Government at Uppsala University and at the Swedish National Defence College. ix Part I. Setting the stage 1. From ‘market correction’ to ‘global catastrophe’: framing the economic downturn Paul ’t Hart and Karen Tindall 1. Economic rhetoric in times of turbulence The global downturn that followed the collapse of major US financial institutions is no doubt the most significant economic crisis of our times. Its effects on corporate and governmental balance sheets have been devastating. It destroyed the employment and compromised the wellbeing of tens of millions of people. At the time of writing, it continues to pose major challenges to public policymakers and economic actors around the world. Although it had been bubbling away for more than a year in the form of a US-based `credit crunch', the crisis deepened and widened to a truly global and whole-of-economy phenomenon during a number of critical months in 2008. This volume studies how public policymakers in a range of polities responded to the cascading problems in financial institutions and their growing impact on the `real' economy. In particular, our focus is on how these public leaders described and explained the downturn to the public and sought to persuade it of the courses of action they proposed to tackle the crisis. Ours is, therefore, a study of crisis rhetoric, embedded in a broader perspective of the challenges of leadership and governance in times of crisis. When nagging problems such as financial-sector instability escalate, policymakers face the challenge of switching from `business as usual' into `crisis management' mode. Doing so entails much more than turning to emergency plans and invoking emergency powers. The very act of perceiving a certain set of events as a `crisis' and publicly labelling it as such involves numerous judgment calls. When are economic conditions considered to be so bad one can start using the otherwise dreaded `r', `c', or `d' words (recession, crisis, depression) to describe them? What does using those words do in terms of public perceptions and emotions? How does one use the language of crisis without sounding defeatist or opportunistic? How does one persuade audiences not just that a crisis is occurring, but that it has done so for particular reasons and should be met with particular responses? These are questions in which issues of fact, speculation, values and interests are intimately intertwined. Policymakers will grapple with these problems in their 3 Framing the global economic downturn own minds, particularly when situations are fast moving, uncertain, ambiguous or when different bodies of evidence and advice seem to pull them in different directions. At the same time, however, policymakers can seldom afford to wait until they really know what's going on before communicating about it publicly. In the case of economic turbulence, for example, markets, media and mass audiences will be talking about the issues constantly, and if the voices of key leaders are absent from those debates, governments will be on the back foot and will in effect lose credibility. Risk and crisis communication is a tricky business in any sectorÐwitness the recent dilemmas regarding the global `swine flu' outbreak: how should one respond to and talk to the public about a virus with ominous potential but whose current manifestations are quite mild? Such communication is especially tricky in the world of finance and economics. If, as is often observed, economics is essentially about psychology, then the ill-considered use of terms such as crisis, recession or depression by authority figures can generate self-fulfilling prophecies. That is a scary thought in an age when truly massive capital flows can be redirected across the world in a matter of seconds. If, however, key economic or political elites maintain an upbeat, business-as-usual facade when public sentiment is already heading south, they might look out of touch, inept or impotentÐwhich will create a backlash in markets in a different way. Talking up the economy makes sense for public leaders only when there is at least some basis in fact and when the intended audience has not already made up its mind in the other direction. Timing and the tone of conveying both good and bad news about the economy in an overall climate of uncertainty and anxiety are, therefore, crucial. 2. A leadership perspective on economic crisis management This volume analyses the economic rhetoric of key government figures during the escalation of the US and later global financial crisis in 2008±09. Its chief analytical tools

View Full Text

Details

  • File Type
    pdf
  • Upload Time
    -
  • Content Languages
    English
  • Upload User
    Anonymous/Not logged-in
  • File Pages
    362 Page
  • File Size
    -

Download

Channel Download Status
Express Download Enable

Copyright

We respect the copyrights and intellectual property rights of all users. All uploaded documents are either original works of the uploader or authorized works of the rightful owners.

  • Not to be reproduced or distributed without explicit permission.
  • Not used for commercial purposes outside of approved use cases.
  • Not used to infringe on the rights of the original creators.
  • If you believe any content infringes your copyright, please contact us immediately.

Support

For help with questions, suggestions, or problems, please contact us