A DEFENSE OF MORAL PERCEPTION ___________________________________ A Dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School University of Missouri __________________________ In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy ___________________________ by JUSTIN PATRICK MCBRAYER Dr. Peter J. Markie, Dissertation Supervisor MAY 2008 The undersigned, appointed by the Dean of the Graduate School, have examined the dissertation entitled A DEFENSE OF MORAL PERCEPTION Presented by Justin P. McBrayer A candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy And hereby certify that in their opinion it is worthy of acceptance. ____________________________________________ Dr. Peter Markie (Chair) ____________________________________________ Dr. Matthew McGrath ____________________________________________ Dr. Robert Johnson ____________________________________________ Dr. Brian Kierland ____________________________________________ Dr. Philip Peters for Anna ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many people have contributed over the years to my philosophical development, and it’s only proper that I mention a few of them by name. My mother was always a source of intellectual encouragement growing up (she let me stay up past bedtime on the condition that I was reading books!). Talks over Backwoods with Erik, Garrett, Josh, Landon, Ramu, and Ty have been among the greatest pleasures in my life. My wife, Anna, has been a source of unflagging support and provision, even when it seemed that earning a PhD in philosophy was a futile endeavor. My views in both epistemology more generally and moral perception in particular have profited from discussion with colleagues at the University of Missouri and abroad. I owe a debt of thanks to Jason Bernsten, Kenny Boyce, Adam Carter, Michael Hartsock, Mat Konieczka, Clayton Littlejohn, Andrew Moon, Ted Poston, Eric Roark, and Alan Tomhave. My philosophical debts are many and varied. I learned a great deal about how to do good philosophy by reading folks like Roderick Chisholm, Michael Huemer, Peter van Inwagen, J.L. Mackie, W.D. Ross, and John Schellenberg. Graduate seminars under Albert Borgmann, Robert Johnson, Brian Kierland, Matt McGrath, and Peter Vallentyne were the highlights of my graduate career. Each of these philosophers has given generously of his time in reading and commenting on my work both inside and outside of class. ii My most significant philosophical debts are to Jon Kvanvig and Peter Markie. Jon took me under his wing when I was a freshman graduate student, and he worked with me for several years on projects in both epistemology and the philosophy of religion. I had the privilege of serving as his research assistant in the philosophy of religion, and in that role I learned a great deal of first-rate philosophy and worked with a number of first-rate philosophers. My first TA assignment at Missouri was under Peter, and it’s not hyperbole to say that most of what I’ve learned about being a good teacher and a competent philosopher is due to his influence. He agreed to lead an independent study in the epistemology of perception for both Michael Hartsock and me, and this dissertation is the result of work that began in that seminar. Peter’s philosophical acumen and his demand for rigor and clarity have improved my work tremendously. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………….ii Analytic Table of Contents …………………………………………………………....v Abstract …………………………………………………………………………….…...x Chapter 1: Defending Moral Perception.………………………………………….....1 Chapter 2: Moral Perceptual Experience…………………………………………...25 Chapter 3: Moral Perception.………………………………………………………...68 Chapter 4: The Epistemology of Moral Perception………………………………..97 Afterword: The Limits of Perception………………………………………………..152 Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………….....156 Vita …………………………………………………………………………………....165 iv ANALYTIC TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract Chapter 1: Defending Moral Perception 1.0 Introduction I make a distinction between general and topical epistemology and introduce moral epistemology. 1.1 Motivations for Moral Epistemology Moral epistemology is important because it is important to us that our moral beliefs are true and yet there are unique concerns about the epistemic status of moral beliefs. 1.2 My View My thesis is that at least some moral knowledge is perceptual. I make a distinction between perceiving and perceiving as and argue that the latter is necessary for moral perception. I show that there are two senses of ‘moral experience’ and ‘moral perception’, and I indicate which of each is relevant for my thesis. I distinguish my view from related views in the contemporary literature. 1.3 Motivation for My View The thesis that at least some moral knowledge is perceptual (A) is faithful to the phenomenology of moral experience, (B) provides a satisfactory solution to moral skepticism, (C) has strengths over rationalist accounts of moral epistemology, and (D) provides a prima facie defense of reflective equilibrium. 1.4 Assumptions and the Argument I assume that (A) we have moral beliefs (i.e. non-cognitivism is false), (B) perception is at least sometimes sufficient for knowledge (i.e. perceptual knowledge skepticism is false), and (C) there are objective moral facts (i.e. moral realism is true). The central argument of the work is as follows: moral perception occurs and since perception is generally a source of knowledge, at least some moral knowledge is perceptual. Chapter 2: Moral Perceptual Experience 2.0 Introduction The goal of this chapter is to show that the internal constraints on perception are met in putative cases of moral perception. v 2.1 Perceptual Experience I draw a distinction between perception and perceptual experience, and I provide examples of modern and contemporary philosophers who claim that the latter is necessary for the former. For this reason, I stipulate that the internal constraint on perceiving that X is F just is having a perceptual experience as if X is F. 2.2 Moral Perceptual Experience I offer an argument by analogy to show that moral perceptual experiences are possible. Putative cases of moral perceptual experience are like our everyday perceptual experiences in that they produce immediate belief (with moral content), they essentially include qualia, and they are given to the subject. 2.3.0 Objections to the Possibility of Moral Perceptual Experience In this section I entertain various ways of objecting to the argument by analogy presented in §2.2. 2.3.1 No High Order Representation One might object to the argument from analogy in §2.2 by denying that perceptual experiences can represent any high order properties, and since moral properties are high order properties, moral perceptual experiences are impossible. I show that the central motivation for this objection—a view known as content externalism—either fails to support the objection or else is impotent to show that one cannot have perceptual moral knowledge. 2.3.2 No Moral Representation One might object to the argument from analogy in §2.2 by denying that putative moral perceptual experiences are relevantly similar to the paradigm cases. The crucial difference is that there is no way that moral properties look, and looking some way or other is a necessary condition for representation. I show that this argument commits the fallacy of equivocation on the word ‘look’. 2.4.0 Moral Representation I set the stage for an argument for the conclusion that perceptual experiences can represent moral properties by noting that several contemporary philosophers allow that other normative properties such as belonging, good and bad are representable in experience. 2.4.1 Discovering the Content of Perceptual Experience I canvas several contemporary methodologies for determining the content of a perceptual experience, and I show that either the vi procedure allows for moral content or else shows that perceptual content that P is not necessary for perceptual knowledge that P. 2.4.2 An Argument for Moral Content I provide a positive argument for the conclusion that at least some perceptual experiences represent moral properties. Since background conditions often affect the phenomenology of an experience, and this change in phenomenology is often accounted for by positing a change in content, I conclude that since background moral beliefs can affect the phenomenology of a perceptual experience, this provides a reason to think that perceptual experiences can represent moral properties. Chapter 3: Moral Perception 3.0 Introduction The goal of this chapter is to show that the external constraints on perception are met in putative cases of moral perception. 3.1 External Constraints on Perception There are two external constraints on perception: S perceives that X is F only if (i) X is F (the factive condition) and (ii) S’s perceptual experience as if X is F is appropriately caused (the causal condition). 3.2.0 Causation and Perception I assume that the factive condition on perception is met in putative cases of moral perception. In the following sections I shall argue that the causal condition is met regardless of whether or not moral properties turn out to be secondary natural properties, non-secondary natural properties, or non-natural properties. 3.2.1 Moral Properties as Secondary Natural Properties If moral properties are secondary properties, there is no principled objection to thinking that putative cases of moral perception meet the causal condition. However, this view of moral properties is plagued by a relativity that