United States General Accounting Office GAO Report to Congressional Requesters July 2000 DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS Comprehensive Strategy Needed to Improve Ship Cruise Missile Defense GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Contents Letter 3 Appendixes Appendix I: Planned Self-Defense Capabilities for Amphibious Transport Dock Ships 26 Appendix II: Current and Planned Ship Self-Defense Equipment 27 Appendix III: Completed, Ongoing, and Planned Improvements in Self-Defense Capability by Ship Class 41 Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense 51 Tables Table 1: Anti-ship Cruise Missile Threats 5 Table 2: Planned Equipment Additions or Improvements, as of June 2000 11 Table 3: Existing Cruise Missile Defense Capability by Ship Class, as of October 1998 13 Table 4: Projected Cruise Missile Defense Capability as of Program Objective Memorandum 2000, as of October 1998 13 Table 5: Availability Rates of Selected Ship Self-Defense Equipment 16 Figures Figure 1: U.S.S. Stark, 1987 6 Figure 2: Navy Layered Defense Concept 8 Figure 3: Total Ship Self-Defense Funding 20 Figure 4: Ship Self-Defense Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Funding 21 Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions Contents Abbreviations ACDS Advanced Combat Direction System AIEWS Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System AOE fast combat support ship CC&D Common Command and Decision CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability DOD Department of Defense ESSM Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile GMFCS Guided Missile Fire Control System GMLS Guided Missile Launching System HAS helicopter/aircraft/surface craft IRST Infrared Search and Track LHA Landing Helicopter Assault Ship LPD Amphibious Transport Dock Ship LSD Dock-Landing Ship MFR Multi-function Radar MPU Medium Pulse Repetition Upgrade NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSSMS NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System NULKA Offboard Active Decoy RAIDS Rapid Anti ship Cruise Missile Integrated Defense System RAM Rolling Airframe Missile RNSSMS Rearchitectured NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System SM Standard Missile SSDS Ship Self Defense System TISS Thermal Imaging Sensor System VSR Volume Search Radar Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions United States General Accounting Office National Security and Washington, D.C. 20548 International Affairs Division B-283202 Leter July 11, 2000 The Honorable Curt Weldon Chairman The Honorable Owen B. Pickett Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Military Research and Development Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy has shifted its focus from preparing for warfare on the open ocean to developing operational concepts and capabilities for conducting combat operations in the coastal waters of the world. However, the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles threatens the ability of Navy ships to operate and survive close to hostile shores. In response to this threat, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of ship self- defense requirements. Completed in fiscal year 1996, this study formally identified the capabilities needed by each ship class1 to defend against cruise missile threats in the near, mid-, and far term.2 Since then, the Navy has spent $3.8 billion to improve its ship self-defense capabilities against cruise missile attacks, and it plans to spend another $5.1 billion over the next 6 years. This report responds to your request that we (1) assess the Navy’s progress since 1996 in improving the self-defense capability of surface ships against cruise missiles and (2) evaluate Navy plans for meeting future anti-cruise missile self-defense requirements. Appendix I contains the specific information you requested on the planned defensive suite for the San Antonio class of amphibious ships now in development. 1The ship classes for which self-defense performance requirements were established include aircraft carriers (CV and CVN); Aegis cruisers and destroyers (CG-47 and DDG-51 classes); Spruance destroyers (DD-963 class); frigates (FFG); amphibious ships (LHA, LHD, LPD-17, and LSD 41/49); and fast combat support ships (AOE). 2The Navy study defined the near term as 1998-2005, the mid-term as 2006-2011, and the far term as 2012 and beyond. Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions B-283202 Results in Brief Although the Navy has made some progress in improving surface ship self- defense capabilities, most ships continue to have only limited capabilities against cruise missile threats. A Navy assessment of current surface ship self-defense capabilities conducted in 1998 concluded that only the 12 Whidbey Island and Harpers Ferry class amphibious ships have or will be equipped with defensive systems that can provide measurable improvement against near- and mid-term cruise missile threats. The assessment projected that none of the improvements the Navy plans to make in the future would provide any ship class a high level of self-defense capability against far-term threats. In projecting ship self-defense capability improvement, the assessment assumed, among other things, that all planned improvements would be developed and fielded as scheduled. We believe that the Navy assessment overstates the actual and projected capabilities of surface ships to protect themselves from cruise missiles because the models used in the assessment to determine capabilities include a number of optimistic assumptions that may not reflect the reality of normal fleet operations. Among these assumptions are perfect weather, uninterrupted equipment availability, and perfect crew and equipment performance at all times. Further, inadequate funding, maintenance, and repair parts support continue to limit the availability of existing self- defense equipment. Plans for meeting ship self-defense requirements are not promising because the Navy still does not have a comprehensive and consistent strategy for improving its capabilities. Previous plans have not included all affected ship classes, have not always established priorities among ship classes, have not consistently used a baseline from which to measure progress, and have not provided timelines for achieving the desired improvements. Although Navy leaders express concern about the vulnerability of surface ships, that concern may not be reflected in the budget for ship self-defense programs. From fiscal years 1997 to 2005, spending is relatively flat (fluctuating between $719 million and $1 billion) and associated research and development funding is projected to decline from about $517 million to about $218 million. This report contains a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive strategy for self-defense improvements for surface ships that clearly articulates priorities, establishes baselines, provides timelines, and defines resource requirements for achieving needed improvements. The Department has agreed with the recommendation and plans to request that the Navy Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions B-283202 develop a comprehensive strategy within 30 days after the release of the our report. Background The threat to surface ships from sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles is increasing. Nearly 70 nations have deployed sea- and land-launched cruise missiles, and 20 nations have air-launched cruise missiles. There are over 100 existing and projected missile varieties (including subsonic3 and supersonic,4 high and low altitude, and sea-skimming models) with ranges up to about 185 miles. Table 1 shows some of the current and projected missile threats. Table 1: Anti-ship Cruise Missile Threats Approximate Producing range in Missile type country miles Speed Existing and near-term threats (1999-2005) C801 China 25 Subsonic C802 China 65 Subsonic Enhanced Israel 75 Subsonic Harpoon Exocet France 45 Subsonic Moskit Russia 55−75 Supersonic China Uran Russia 80 Subsonic Yakhont Russia 185 Supersonic Novator Alpha Russia 125 Subsonic missile with supersonic terminal phase Projected mid- and far-term threats (2006 and beyond) C701 China 10 Subsonic Teseo 3 Italy 185 Subsonic Source: Defense Intelligence Agency and Office of Naval Intelligence. 3Subsonic is less than the speed of sound (i.e. around 742 miles per hour). 4Supersonic is greater than the speed of sound. Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions B-283202 Current anti-ship cruise missiles are faster, stealthier, and can fly at lower altitudes than the missiles that hit the U.S.S. Stark in 1987, killing 37 sailors (see fig. 1). The next generation of anti-ship cruise missiles—most of which are now expected to be fielded by 2007—will be equipped with advanced target seekers and stealthy design. These features will make them even more difficult to detect and defeat. Figure 1: U.S.S. Stark, 1987 Source: Department of Defense. Defeating modern cruise missiles involves three distinct phases: detection, control, and engagement. In the detection phase, sensors aboard ships and aircraft attempt to detect and track incoming cruise missiles. In the control Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-00-149 Defense Acquisitions B-283202 phase, ships’ computers and software identify and evaluate approaching threat missiles. In the engagement phase, threat missiles are further evaluated, prioritized, and assigned to an appropriate weapon system for destruction. Decoys or electronic countermeasures may be employed first, with missiles and guns fired against the threat missiles when they come within range. For operations involving a large number of ships, such