Dyadic Representation and Legislative Behaviour Kelly Blidook Department of Political Science McGill University, Montreal August, 2007 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. © Copyright Kelly Blidook 2007 Acknowledgements Many people aided in both the conception and completion of this project. While it is not possible to recognize every form of contribution, those whose help was most direct are noted here. Those whose contributions were indirect will hopefully take as thanks enough that the work in the pages that follows would not be what it is without their comments, friendship or encouragement. Thank you to the many McGill University students who aided with the data collection and analysis. These people include Lori Young for coding, Jason Roy and Erin Penner for helping to make the data useable, and Marc-Andre Bodet who, on top of providing advice on the data analysis, conducted an interview in French and translated my abstract. Thank you also to those at the Library of Parliament who graciously shared both data and advice, including Cynthia Hoekstra, Denise Ledoux and Peter Nemcziak. Professor Jerome Black provided invaluable advice on my ethics proposal and on conducting MP interviews. Professors Elisabeth Gidengil and Richard Schultz both provided extensive advice for improving the dissertation as members of my committee, but were also exceptionally encouraging and aided tremendously in ensuring that the project progressed at each step. Finally, and most importantly, my supervisor, Professor Stuart Soroka, aided in virtually every way mentioned above, and far exceeded the call of duty in terms of time, attention, and dedication to this project. Thank you all. 1 Abstract This project seeks to answer two questions related to representative behaviour by MPs in Canada: 1.) What drives the legislative participation of individual representatives? and 2.) Are the actions of individual parliamentarians representative of those who elect them? Despite relatively strong institutional constraints – executive dominance and party discipline – upon individual parliamentary behaviour, there appears to be, based primarily upon Canada’s Single Member Plurality electoral system, an electoral incentive for individual representatives to gain personal recognition over and above depending upon their party’s profile. This incentive should accordingly increase participation and representative behaviour in policy venues that are conducive to individual representative behaviour. Here, the policy venue of focus is Private Members’ Business (PMB). It should especially be true for those MPs experiencing electoral pressure that their participation in PMB reflects the “electoral connection” (Mayhew 1974) between these MPs and their constituencies. MPs’ looking to bolster their electoral prospects should tend to take advantage of PMB for both advertising and position-taking opportunities. “Dyadic representation” – that is, MPs acting on behalf of their constituencies’ interests – should be the result. Using statistical analyses of legislative, electoral, MP and constituency data, as well as qualitative analyses of face-to-face interviews with MPs, strong evidence is provided that suggests MPs substantively represent constituency interests through PMB, though this varies by MP and by the action taken. The analyses suggest that MPs with greater electoral pressure are more likely to engage in the more symbolic PMB avenue of motions, rather than the more time-consuming and policy-focused avenue of bills. These results indicate rather convincingly that dyadic representation does occur, and much of it appears to be the result of an electoral connection. MPs engage in actions which they hope will gain recognition and result in electoral payoff. Further analyses suggest that MPs may also have a small policy impact, both by having legislation pass, and through influencing government policy actions. In short, the study suggests that MPs may have an important role both as individual representatives of their constituencies, and as “legislators” in the Canadian Parliament. 2 Sommaire Ce projet vise à répondre à deux questions se rapportant au comportement des élus de la Chambre des Communes à Ottawa. Tout d’abord, quels sont les facteurs qui influencent le travail législatif des élus ? Ensuite, est-ce que ce travail vise spécifiquement une représentation fidèle des électeurs de leurs circonscriptions ? Les parlementaires canadiens doivent négocier avec de fortes contraintes institutionnelles (domination de l’exécutif, discipline de parti) affectant leur champ d’action. Pourtant, certains facteurs, dont notamment le système électoral uninominal à un tour, offrent des incitatifs aux élus pour chercher des gains électoraux dans leurs comtés en allant au-delà de l’intérêt du parti. Conséquemment, ces incitatifs devraient pousser les parlementaires à augmenter leur participation et à se positionner stratégiquement sur des enjeux de politiques publiques qui leur semblent saillants. Ici, l’outil législatif privilégié est le projet de loi privé (PLP). Le parlementaire en situation d’incertitude électorale sera particulièrement porté à utiliser cette avenue que ce soit comme outil publicitaire ou encore comme moyen de prendre position sur des enjeux importants pour ses électeurs. C’est ce que David Mayhew (1974) a appelé la « connection électorale » entre élu et électeurs. Deux sources de données sont mises à profit. D’abord, de données couvrant l’activité législative, les élections ainsi que les caractéristiques des parlementaires et des circonscriptions fédérales sont utilisées dans le cadre d’une analyse statistique. Ensuite, des entrevues individuelles auprès de parlementaires complètent le portrait. L’analyse suggère que les parlementaires fédéraux expriment de façon importante les intérêts et préférences de leurs électeurs en utilisant les PLP. Il y a par contre une certaine variance entre députés dans leurs façons d’intervenir au Parlement. L’analyse suggère également que la pression électorale influence le comportement des élus puisque ceux représentant des comtés serrés utilisent davantage les PLP – forme plus symbolique de représentation – plutôt que d’opter pour le travail en commission qui exigerait trop de temps et de ressources pour la reconnaissance obtenue. Ces résultats indiquent de façon convaincante que la représentation dyadique existe et semble être intimement liée à la « connection électorale ». Les élus s’engagent bel et bien dans des actions visant la reconnaissance et les gains électoraux dans leurs 3 circonscriptions. Aussi, les députés ont un léger impact sur le choix des politiques publiques, à travers le processus législatif et leur influence sur la machine gouvernementale. En conclusion, cette étude suggère que les députés jouent un rôle important à la fois comme représentants de leurs électeurs et comme « législateurs » au Parlement canadien. 4 Contents 1. Representation and MPs in Canadian Parliament.................................6 Political Representation...............................................................................................9 The Canadian Context...............................................................................................17 Is there reason to expect individual legislative behaviour by MPs in Canada?...25 Data .............................................................................................................................33 Chapter Outline .........................................................................................................34 2. Dyadic Representation, the Electoral Connection, and Individual Legislative Behaviour in Canada.............................................................39 The Electoral Connection..........................................................................................39 Beyond the Electoral Connection: Personal Influence and Good Policy..............54 Summary.....................................................................................................................58 3. Legislation in the House: Government and Private Members’ Business ......................................................................................................60 How Private Members’ Business Works .................................................................60 Bills versus Motions ...................................................................................................69 Legislation in the House of Commons......................................................................72 Introducing Private Members’ Business..................................................................79 Passing Private Member’s Business.........................................................................87 Summary.....................................................................................................................93 4. Private Members' Business: Participation and Motivation ................95 Why might MPs participate in PMB?......................................................................97 Modeling PMB Participation..................................................................................100 Results .......................................................................................................................111 Summary...................................................................................................................124