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The access to the contents of this doctoral thesis it is limited to the acceptance of the use conditions set by the following Creative Commons license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/?lang=en Attitudes towards corruption and their consequences on political behavior Sofia Breitenstein Gomis PhD Thesis Politics, Policies and International Relations Department of Political Science and Public Law July 2020 Supervisors: Dr. Eva Anduiza Perea Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Dr. Jordi Muñoz Mendoza Universitat de Barcelona Para Joan, nuestra hija y las/los que están por venir Table of contents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................... 8 ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. 12 FIGURES AND TABLES ............................................................................................... 15 FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ 15 TABLES .......................................................................................................................... 17 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 19 1.1 THE PUZZLE.............................................................................................................. 20 1.2 EXISTING EXPLANATIONS ............................................................................................ 25 1.2.1 The ignorant voter ........................................................................................ 25 1.2.2 The indifferent voter ..................................................................................... 28 1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT: THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL VOTER ......................................... 33 1.4 CONTRIBUTION TO THE TRADEOFF ARGUMENT ................................................................ 36 1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN ..................................................................................................... 39 1.5.1 The Spanish case ........................................................................................... 39 1.5.2 Data and methods ........................................................................................ 44 1.6 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION .................................................................................... 50 CHAPTER 2 SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS ................................................................... 52 2.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 52 2.2 SOCIAL DESIRABILITY IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS CORRUPT POLITICIANS .................................... 54 2.3 THE TRADEOFF ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... 55 2.4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS .............................................................. 56 2.5 RESULTS: SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS ............................................................................... 60 2.6 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: TRADEOFF ARGUMENT .................................................................. 62 2.7 RESULTS: TRADEOFF ARGUMENT................................................................................... 63 2.8 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................... 65 CHAPTER 3 TRADEOFFS AND CORRUPTION............................................................. 66 3.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 66 3.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ......................................................................................... 67 3.3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY ................................................................................................. 71 3.3.1 Design and wording of the experiment ......................................................... 74 3.4 RESULTS .................................................................................................................. 78 3.5 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................... 82 CHAPTER 4 REASSESSING THE COMPETENCE CORRUPTION TRADEOFF ............... 84 4.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 84 4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ........................................................................................ 87 4.2.1 Outcome accountability versus procedural accountability ........................... 87 4.2.2 The mechanism: malfeasance, politicians’ traits, and voting decisions ....... 90 4.3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY ................................................................................................. 94 4.4 RESULTS .................................................................................................................. 99 4.4.1 Average treatment effects ............................................................................ 99 4.4.2 Mediation analysis ...................................................................................... 102 4.5 CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................ 107 CHAPTER 5 WHO CARES? INDIVIDUAL HETEROGENEITY IN THE PUNISHMENT OF CORRUPTION ........................................................................................................ 109 5.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 109 5.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................................... 112 5.2.1 Gender ........................................................................................................ 112 5.2.2 Political sophistication ................................................................................ 114 5.2.3 Age .............................................................................................................. 117 5.3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY ............................................................................................... 120 5.4 RESULTS ................................................................................................................ 122 5.5 CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................ 129 CHAPTER 6 WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER ONE? CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ALTERNATIVE CANDIDATES ........................................................................................................ 131 6.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 131 6.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................................... 133 6.3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY ............................................................................................... 135 6.4 RESULTS ................................................................................................................ 137 6.5 CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................ 139 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................... 141 7.1 OVERVIEW OF MAIN FINDINGS ................................................................................... 141 7.2 IMPLICATIONS OF MAIN FINDINGS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY .................................................. 146 7.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS ........................................................ 149 7.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................................ 151 APPENDICES ............................................................................................................ 152 APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 2 ................................................... 152 APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3 .................................................... 155 B.1 Robustness check of relative weight hypothesis ............................................ 156 B.2 Robustness check of the conditional punishment hypothesis ........................ 158 B.3 Conditional punishment of gender, education and management experience161 B.4 Conditional punishment disentangling corruption accusations ..................... 162 B.5 Further robustness checks ............................................................................. 163 B.6 Difference with other studies using conjoint experiments ............................. 171 B.7 Questionnaire ................................................................................................ 173 APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 4 .................................................... 176