A NEW CHANCE FOR HAITI? 18 November 2004 ICG Latin America/Caribbean Report N°10 Port-au-Prince/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE ARISTIDE DISENCHANTMENT........................................................................ 3 A. HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS ..........................................................................................................3 B. THE 1990 ELECTION .............................................................................................................3 C. THE 1991 COUP ....................................................................................................................4 D. THE RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER ......................................................................4 E. ARISTIDE: TEN YEARS AFTER...............................................................................................6 III. THE 2004 CRISIS........................................................................................................... 7 A. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE 2000 ELECTIONS ..................................................................7 B. THE POLITICAL CRISIS FOLLOWING THE 2000 ELECTIONS ....................................................8 C. THE ARMED INSURGENCY OF FEBRUARY 2004 ...................................................................9 IV. A FRAGILE POLITICAL TRANSITION ............................................................... 11 A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LATORTUE GOVERNMENT ............................................................11 B. AN ENDANGERED ELECTORAL PROCESS .............................................................................13 V. THE SECURITY VACUUM: A COUNTRY ON THE EDGE .............................. 14 A. THE 30 SEPTEMBER RIOTS AND AFTERMATH .................................................................14 B. THE FORMER MILITARY......................................................................................................16 C. CRIMINALITY AND DRUG TRAFFICKING ..............................................................................17 D. INDECISIVE INTERNATIONAL TROOPS..................................................................................17 E. THE NEED FOR DISARMAMENT ...........................................................................................18 VI. CRUMBLED INSTITUTIONS ................................................................................... 20 A. THE HAITIAN NATIONAL POLICE ........................................................................................20 B. THE ARMY DEBATE ............................................................................................................20 C. THE JUSTICE SYSTEM..........................................................................................................21 1. Persecution of Fanmi Lavalas?................................................................................21 2. Impunity...................................................................................................................22 D. THE WASHINGTON DONORS CONFERENCE ........................................................................23 E. AN ECOLOGICAL TIME BOMB .............................................................................................23 VII. LEARNING LESSONS................................................................................................ 24 A. MINUSTAH ......................................................................................................................24 B. DONORS..............................................................................................................................24 VIII. THE WAY FORWARD ............................................................................................... 25 A. RETHINKING THE TRANSITION ............................................................................................25 B. RETHINKING RECONCILIATION............................................................................................26 IX. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 27 APPENDICES A. MAP OF HAITI .....................................................................................................................28 B. GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................................................29 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................30 D. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON LATIN AMERICA ............................................................31 E. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................32 ICG Latin America/Caribbean Report N°10 18 November 2004 A NEW CHANCE FOR HAITI? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Nine months after an armed uprising and international because it and MINUSTAH have not tackled pressure forced President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to disarmament of illegal armed groups, Haiti is resign, the security situation in Haiti is worsening. drifting towards anarchy. The transitional The UN Mission, established on 1 June 2004, has government has failed to establish its authority in deployed only two thirds of its authorised force and most of the provinces where former military are failed to disarm armed supporters of the disgraced acting unlawfully as security providers. At the same leader and members of the equally disgraced disbanded time, armed Aristide supporters are asserting control army. If international intervention is not to fail for of most of the capital's poor neighbourhoods and are the second time in a decade and Haiti to become a increasing attacks on police and civilian targets. failed state haemorrhaging refugees to the U.S., it is essential to start a serious disarmament process and a At least 80 Haitians -- including eleven police officers more inclusive political process that aims at building (three beheaded) -- have been killed in unrest and a national consensus, not merely holding promised often violent pro-Aristide protests that began on 30 but increasingly at risk 2005 elections. September, the anniversary of the 1991 coup d'état. Most were shot in heavily populated Port-au-Prince In a year that was supposed to have been dominated slums where armed groups battled with the Haitian by celebrations marking the bicentenary of their National Police, who have been accused of summarily victory over slavery and colonisation, Haitians have executing young men in the Aristide strongholds. had to contend with political violence, an abrupt change of government, and humanitarian crises resulting Although the U.S.-led international force was in a from two tropical storms. In early 2004, after several strong position to disarm and demobilise rebel and years of fruitless diplomatic efforts to bridge political pro-Aristide forces when it entered, very little was polarisation, Haiti was again convulsed by political done. MINUSTAH has failed to implement the violence. Pressured particularly by France and the primary aspect of its mandate, to stabilise Haiti, U.S., Aristide left the country on 29 February. His fall and its inaction has allowed the former military to led to a dangerous reconfiguration of a fragile political consolidate, making it more difficult to confront them landscape, including the alarming re-emergence of in the future. With fewer than 3,000 demoralised, the former military and their civilian allies who had poorly equipped and poorly trained members, the led a successful coup against him in 1991. police lack the capacity to restore order. It is urgent to increase the number of UN peacekeepers to the The UN Security Council authorised rapid dispatch level set by the Security Council and to toughen their of a Multinational Interim Force to stabilise the strategy for dealing with illegal armed groups. country and a follow-on peacekeeping mission, MINUSTAH. However, only two thirds of the The transitional government lacks a political base prescribed force has deployed, leaving a security and appears increasingly fragile. The transition vacuum that has had disastrous consequences. A process is at stake, and urgent corrections are needed transitional government of technocrats led by former to bolster it. These include a broader political UN functionary Gérard Latortue as prime minister agreement, acceleration of the process to constitute was quickly installed but it has been hampered by an impartial police force and judiciary, and lack of a comprehensive political agreement. Mainly A New Chance for Haiti? ICG Latin America/Caribbean Report Nº10, 18 November 2004 Page ii immediate disbursement of pledged funds for visible stability for free and fair elections in 2005, and reconstruction and recovery projects. above all: Also essential is a broad national consultative process (a) accelerate recruitment and training of the to set out the priorities, objectives and timetable for Haitian National Police (HNP), including the transition and steer the transitional government's recruitment of women; policy until an elected successor takes office. Ideally (b) improve screening mechanisms, with this would start with local and departmental international help, to