THE BLUE CAP JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL DUBLIN FUSILIERS ASSOCIATION VOL. 23. DECEMBER 2018 Reflections on 1918 Tom Burke On 11 November 1917, at a meeting between Ludendorff and a select group of his advisers in Mons where the British and Germans had clashed back in August 1914, it was decided to knock Britain out of the war before any American entry into the war with decisive numbers of boots on the ground.1 As 1918 opened, the Western, Italian, Salonica and Turkish fronts were each the scene of no large-scale offensives but of sporadic fighting characterised by repeated raids and counter-raids.2 In terms of the eastern front, the German defeat of Russia and her consequential withdrawal from the war, presented Ludendorff and his commanders with a window of opportunity to end the war in the west. One result of Russia’s defeat was the accumulation of munition stocks and the release of large numbers of German troops for an offensive in the west.3 One estimate of the number of German troops available for transfer from east to west was put at 900,000 men.4 According to Gary Sheffield, ‘in the spring of 1918 the Germans could deploy 192 divisions, while the French and British could only muster 156.’ 5 However, according to John Keegan, the Allies had superior stocks of war material. For example, 4,500 Allied aircraft against 3,670 German; 18,500 Allied artillery weapons against 14,000 Germans and 800 Allied tanks against ten German.6 Yet despite this imbalance in material, the combination of a feeling of military superiority, and, acting before the Allies could grow in strength through an American entry along with rising economic and domestic challenges in Germany, all combined to prompt Ludendorff to use the opportunity of that open window and attack the British as they had planned to do back in Mons on 11 November 1917 at a suitable date in the spring of 1918. Heading into 1918, the British Army on the western front was, as John Terraine noted, ‘at one of its lowest ebbs of the war.’ 7 Between January and November 1917, the BEF had suffered nearly 790,000 casualties, the majority associated with Passchendaele. Moreover, the British economy could spare no more men. 8 The manpower crisis in Britain and the paucity of reinforcements being sent to the BEF forced a reduction in the strength of the divisions from twelve battalions to nine and the wholesale disbandment of some 141 battalions.9 This occurred mainly in February 1918. 10 1 Holmes, Richard, The Western Front (London: BBC Worldwide Ltd, 1999).p.191. 2 Gilbert, Martin, The First World War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicoloson, 1994).p.393. 3 Stevenson, David, 1914 -1918. The History of the First World War (London Penguin Books, 2004).p.374. 4 Gilbert, Martin.p.387. ‘On 6 December 1917, while the Bolshevik and German negotiators at Brest-Litovsk were still negotiating the final terms of a ceasefire, The British Minister of National Service, Sir Auckland Geddes, warned the War Cabinet in London that as soon as the ceasefire was agreed, the Germans would be able to transfer 900,000 men to the Western Front.’ 5 Sheffield, Gary, Forgotten Victory. The First World War: Myths and Realities (London: Headline Book Publishing, 2001).p.223. 6 Keegan, John, The First World War (USA: First Vintage Books, 2000).p.393. 7 Terraine, John, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier (London: Cassell Military Publisher, 1963). p.390. 8 Stevenson, David.p.405. 9 Sheffield, Gary and and Bourne, John, Douglas Haig War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918 (London: Phoenix (Orion Books) UK, 2005). p.368. 10 Wylly, H.C, Neill’s Blue Caps 1914-1922, vol. III (Cork: Schull Books, 2000).p.99. Note. According to Wylly, ‘the number of battalions in a division was reduced from 13 to 10 and the number of battalions in each brigade from 4 to 3.’ 1 JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL DUBLIN FUSILIERS ASSOCIATION VOL.23. DECEMBER 2018. To add to their woes, in January 1918, through an agreement between Haig and Petain, the British front line was extended forty kilometres of previous French line southwards roughly between a point north of St. Quentin and a point south-west of Barisis (Barisis-aux-Bois) which lies south of the river Oise.11 The British line was 153 kilometres long in early January 1918, but as a result of this decision, by 4 February it had extended to almost 200 kilometres.12 The French handed over their line in a mediocre condition that required a lot of defensive work. Moreover, the BEF received no compensating increase in its fighting strength.13 In essence the BEF had to do more work and cover a longer line with the men they had available at the time in France. Haig’s Chief Intelligence Officer, Brigadier-General John Charteris summed up the situation on 26 January 1918; ‘So …we are confronted with a longer front line, reduced establishment to hold it, no hope of reinforcements and a German attack in greater strength than anything we have yet experienced. Not a cheerful prospect.’ 14 Charteris presentation of the BEF in late January 1918 was an exact description of the challenges that faced the 1st and 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers serving on the western front going into 1918. They had more to do with fewer men and less reinforcement. Facing them was a growingly active enemy, determined and willing to fight. On 21 March 1918, the German attack in greater strength than anything they had experienced that General Charteris feared became a reality. The 1st and 2nd RDF in the 48th Brigade of the 16th (Irish) Division were almost destroyed as a result. As a fighting unit, the 16th (Irish) Division never recovered. Between 21 March and 31 March 1918, the Dublins along with the other battalions in the Irish Division bravely fought a rear-guard action between the villages of Epehy and Le Hamel, about fifty kilometres. However, the few survivors of the two RDF battalions were the seed from which both battalions grew back. Having re-grouped, trained and brought back up to strength over the summer months of 1918 south of St. Omer, in separate new divisions, they took part in the great offensive operations throughout the autumn that eventually pushed the Germans out of France and Flanders. In a sad irony of history, in the later days of the war, particularly in mid to late October 1918, the 2nd RDF fought over ground at Le Cateau where a very few of the Old Toughs had fought back in August 1914. They ended up back where they started. In Palestine, 1918 began in the cold and wet hills north of Jerusalem for the men in the 6th and 7th RDF in the 10th (Irish) Division. After his successful operations in Jerusalem and Jaffa, Sir Edmund Allenby, on 29 December, issued to his corps commanders, an outline of his intentions regarding future dispositions. 15 His intention was to move on from Jerusalem and push the Turks across the River Jordan eastwards and eventually on Amman in what was then referred to as Trans-Jordan. However, he believed that that no further progress northward was possible for the time being until his lines of communication via rail and road had improved to permit the accumulation of supplies and stores in the forward area. 16 The winter rains had hindered this work. Throughout January and February 1918, progress was made in roadmaking in the hills north of Jerusalem. A great lateral line of communication north of the Jaffa- Jerusalem road had begun by the complete reconstruction of the track running north from Amwas through Beit Sira; the latter being a Palestinian village located twenty-two kilometres west of Ramallah. This work had been done under the orders of the Chief Engineer of XX Corps, Brigadier - General R. L. Waller, mainly by Egyptian labour and that of other units put at his disposal by GHQ. From there it turned off eastward into a metalled road up the Wadi Sad to Ain Arik, another Palestinian village about eight kilometres west of Ramallah. The metalled road was made by the 10th (Irish) Division and was named Irish Road. 17 11 Stevenson, David.p.404. See also Edmonds, Brigadier-General Sir James E, Official History of the Great War 1914-1918 Military Operations France and Belgium, 1918. The German March Offensive and Its Preliminaries., vol. 1 (London: The Imperial War Museum, 1934). p.21 and Sketch 1. 12 Sheffield, Gary and and Bourne, John.p.371. Footnote 3. 13 Stevenson, David.Pp.404-405. 14 Terraine, John.p.390. 15 Becke, A F and Falls, C, Official History of the Great War Military Operations Egypt and Palestine from June 1917 to the End of the War. (London: The Imperial War Museum, July 1930). Vol. II. Part 1. p.301. 16 Ibid. Vol. II. Part 1. p.303. 17 Ibid. Vol. II. Part 1. p.303. 2 JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL DUBLIN FUSILIERS ASSOCIATION VOL.23. DECEMBER 2018. Both the 6th and 7th RDF battalions supplied working parties in the construction of Irish Road throughout January and February.18 With an improvement in the roads, operations began in the Jordan Valley in late February 1918. The British 60th and 53rd Divisions advanced eastward, capturing Jericho between 19 and 21 February and also driving the Turks across the river Jordan. 19 By the end of February 1918, the British line in Palestine essentially ran from near Ramallah to Jericho.20 It was also in February that the British War Office decided to despatch large numbers of Indian troops to Palestine.