Private Property Rights: An Indispensable Moral Foundation of Society by Ayokunle Olanrewaju Ogunshola A thesis presented to the University Of Waterloo in fulfilment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2014 © Ayokunle Olanrewaju Ogunshola 2014 Author’s Declaration I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. ii Abstract The philosophic justifications of private property reach back to the ancient world. Aristotle regarded secure possessions as necessary for successful social functioning, and Cicero understood government’s function to be the protection of private property. Renaissance and Enlightenment thinkers Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and John Locke argued vigorously for the importance of private property rights in human life. The work of late twentieth-century analytical philosophers John Rawls and Robert Nozick brought property rights to the fore of philosophical discussion. In the field of global development, private property rights have come under critical re- examination in recent decades. It is increasingly understood that institutions guaranteeing the security of private property are a necessary ingredient for economic growth and social well-being in underdeveloped nations. Institutions are being established in accordance with consequentialist justifications of private property. In this thesis, after defining general moral rights and briefly discussing this current trend in favour of consequentialist understandings of private property, I will examine the two dominant schools of private property justification in philosophy: the consequentialist and the deontological, with an especial focus on consequentialist John Stuart Mill and deontologist John Locke. I end the thesis by examining, and simultaneously arguing for the power and enduring relevance of, the oldest philosophical justification of private property: the eudaimonist school led by Aristotle. iii Acknowledgements My nearly four years in the philosophy department at Waterloo have been an immensely valuable experience. I was finally able to act on a long-held desire for the philosophical life. My undisguised enthusiasm must have been a source of discomfort for my professors, as it has been for many other people in my life, and I want to thank each of them for their patience. In particular, I want to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Brian Orend, whose warmth, extraordinary self-confidence, and high sense of professionalism enabled him to guide a peculiar student through the presentation of an unpopular viewpoint. Brian had also been a generous advocate for my efforts since my time in the post-degree program, ensuring several successes which could have been otherwise. I also want to thank profusely the other members of my thesis committee, Drs. Mathieu Doucet and Greg Andres, for accepting to serve on the committee, given their very busy schedules and at such short notice. Other members of the philosophy department have been very supportive. I must not fail to mention the always very valuable advice that Dr. Patricia Marino gave me over my four years in the department. Without the benefit of her penetrating insight and strong support, I might not have attained the MA, as well as at least one other laurel. I am also indebted to Dr. Shannon Dea, who counseled that I was sufficiently prepared to apply to the graduate program. Other special thanks go to Drs. Paul Thagard, Dave DeVidi, John Turri, Nicholas Ray, and Paul Simard-Smith. I cannot forget also the support and insight of Debbie Dietrich, who, along with Vicki Brett, made the Philosophy department function. iv My office-mates, Jim Jordan and Darlene Drecun, were as good as one could hope for. The environment they created was unfailingly cordial and gracious. I also enjoyed my time in the Philosophy Graduate Students Association. I had memorable philosophical and friendly conversations with other graduate students. Finally, Sophia Huh was of incalculable value to me during my time at Waterloo, the university and the area. Thank you, Sophia. v Table of Contents CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION............................................................................................ 1 1. Defining Rights and Property Rights; and Discussing the Recent Trend Regarding Consequentialist Understandings of Private Property Rights. ........................................................ 1 1.1 What is a Right? ............................................................................................................... 4 1.1.1 A Brief History of the Concept ................................................................................. 5 1.1.2 More Recent Thinkers............................................................................................... 6 1.1.3 Hohfeld’s Typology of Rights .................................................................................. 8 1.1.4. Negative vs. Positive Rights ................................................................................... 10 1.1.5. Are Rights Reasons or Properties? ......................................................................... 11 1.2 Property Rights ............................................................................................................... 14 1.2.1 Why Private? ........................................................................................................... 16 1.3 On the Recent Trend Regarding Consequentialist Justifications of Property Rights .... 18 1.3.1. Contemporary Hypotheses Regarding Property Rights. ......................................... 21 CHAPTER TWO .......................................................................................................................... 26 2. The Consequentialist Approach to Private Property Rights .................................................. 26 2.1 What is Consequentialism? ............................................................................................ 26 2.2 Mill’s View of Human Nature ....................................................................................... 27 2.3 Ultimate End and Standard of Value.............................................................................. 31 2.4 Right Action ................................................................................................................... 34 2.4.1 Utility Principle as basis for moral quantification and calculation ......................... 35 2.4.2 Bentham’s Strict Pleasure-Pain Standard Rejected for Hedonistic Paradox .......... 38 2.4.3 Theory of Motives to Moral Action ........................................................................ 40 2.4.4 Internal Sanctions of Duty as Stronger Motive than External Associations ........... 41 vi 2.4.5 Duty to the General Happiness as Standard of Pleasure. ........................................ 43 2.4.6 Justice as Moral Right and Duty of Perfect Obligation .......................................... 44 2.5 State of Nature Conditions ............................................................................................. 45 2.6 Original Acquisition of Property .................................................................................... 47 2.7 Establishment of the Property Right .............................................................................. 47 2.8 Justifications of Private Property Rights ........................................................................ 48 2.8.1 General Traditional Argument for Utility ............................................................... 49 2.9 Objections to the Utilitarian-Consequentialist Justification of Property Rights. ........... 53 2.9.1 Contra Hedonism .................................................................................................... 53 2.9.2 Contra Theoretical Utilitarianism ........................................................................... 57 CHAPTER THREE ...................................................................................................................... 62 3. The Deontological Approach to Private Property Rights ...................................................... 62 3.1 Locke’s View of Human Nature .................................................................................... 64 3.2 Ultimate End or Value.................................................................................................... 66 3.3 Standard of Value ........................................................................................................... 68 3.4 Right Action ................................................................................................................... 70 3.5 State of Nature Conditions ............................................................................................. 75 3.6 Original Acquisition of Property .................................................................................... 77 3.7 Establishment of Property Right .................................................................................... 77 3.8 Justifications of Private Property Rights ........................................................................ 79 3.9 Major Objections to Locke and the Deontological Approach........................................ 81 3.9.1 Proudhon’s Objections to the Labor Theory ..........................................................