The Influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan Upon History Frank B. Cook Bi-County Collaborative Franklin, MA Seminar on Teaching American History: Year 3 Dr. Peter Gibbon September 27, 2012 Cook 2 As students of history we clearly understand how the outcome of the American Civil War resonated through succeeding generations of Americans, most notably in the civil rights struggle of the second half of the 20th Century. Now, as we near the midpoint of the sesquicentennial of that event, it is similarly interesting to note how an inconspicuous United States naval captain, who played a relatively obscure role in that conflict, had a profound impact not only on America’s later rise to world power, but also on political and military leaders of other nations. Indeed it can be argued that his influence continues to be exerted even today. The naval officer in question is Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) who, in 1890, published the results of his extensive study of history, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. Mahan’s scholarly effort, in preparation for a teaching assignment at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, lead him to prepare an unprecedented account of “the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations” (Mahan, v-vi). His research revealed a correlation between a nation’s naval policy and their success, or ultimate failure, as a nation. Mahan clearly linked the importance of sea power and command of the seas to the commercial and military success of a nation. His primary example was Britain, a nation which understood these principles long before Mahan canonized them, who became the major maritime power for several centuries. In some respects it can be argued that like a good historian, Mahan recognized the importance of learning from the past in order to influence the future and was determined to see that his country and his navy learned these lessons. It is important to remember that Mahan’s thesis and subsequent book was initially designed to provide instruction on naval strategy to the next generation of officers serving in the United States Navy. Accordingly it can be argued that he did not realize the potential, revolutionary significance of his book. In addition, Mahan’s wartime experience, and the post- Cook 3 war positions he held, placed him in a unique position to assess the status and level of preparedness of America’s naval branch. The late 19th Century world witnessed numerous changes, a time when steam-powered, steel ships replaced wooden sailing vessels, all occurring against a background of growing nationalist fever. Of greater concern from a military viewpoint was the failure of the United States to develop and maintain a naval force equipped to respond to the challenges of the age. America’s post-war history has been characterized by the rapid demobilization of men and matériel following the cessation of hostilities, and the Civil War was no different. From a wartime naval force of 671 ships which had fought to preserve the Union, just 147 remained active a decade after Appomattox, many of which were no longer seaworthy. Similarly, active duty naval personnel declined from “about 58,000 officers and men in 1865 ... to a peacetime level of only 9,361” (Crowl, 469). British surveys conducted in both 1876 and 1881 omitted the United States from their tabulation of major naval nations, lists which included Brazil, Peru, and Egypt (Cole, 4). From a technological viewpoint the condition of America’s naval readiness was alarming. At a time when other nations were applying new technology to ship-building and armaments, the U.S. continued to prefer wooden ships and “smooth-bored, muzzle-loading cannons” (Crowl, 469). In 1885, the year Mahan began the research which eventually became The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, he described the U.S. Navy as a “Quaker navy” due to the propensity of the navy to carry “‘Quaker guns,’ simulated cannons made of blackened wood” (Zimmerman, 87). At this time, Mahan was the captain of the Wachusett, an unarmored holdover from the Civil War, powered by a combination of canvas sails and steam, whose armament boasted outdated guns. Mahan wryly noted how a visiting French naval officer informed him that the Cook 4 French Navy had formerly used such guns (Zimmerman, 85, 87). Zimmerman also records that the U.S. Navy “had even fewer armored vessels than largely land-locked Austria-Hungary” (87). In many respects it is remarkable that Mahan was able to become one of the pre-eminent maritime strategists in military history. Although a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he constantly found himself at odds with the naval establishment and was viewed as a loner and complainer. A devout Christian with an enhanced awareness of righteousness, Mahan was a “natural whistle-blower” perhaps most notably seen when he exposed corrupt practices at the Boston Navy Yard in 1875 and criticized the secretary of the navy for allowing such conditions to exist. He was subsequently removed from the Boston assignment and placed on half pay while awaiting reassignment, a process which took a year (Zimmerman, 85-6). Despite opposition from the American naval establishment - including the Naval Academy - and Congress, the Naval War College opened in 1885 and Mahan was assigned to join the faculty in the fall of 1886. However, upon arrival he was appointed acting president when the college’s founder, and Mahan’s mentor, Rear Admiral Stephen Luce, was re-assigned. The following year, Mahan’s search for a guest lecturer on the War of 1812 brought him in contact with a promising, young writer and politician, Theodore Roosevelt. Their friendship and commonality of belief that America “needed a big navy with large ships and a global reach” would change not only the nation’s naval policy, but also its foreign policy (Zimmerman, 92). Influence Upon the United States From his initial study Mahan, like Theodore Roosevelt, had concluded that the naval policy of the United States was a by-product of the War of 1812. Accordingly, the nation had Cook 5 developed a navy primarily comprised of small cruisers whose primary mission was the defense of America’s coast and the disruption of an enemy’s mercantile capability. Yet as he continued preparing his War College lectures, reinforced by his sea experiences, he realized that this approach did not match the results of his study on the influence of sea power on a nation’s prosperity. Mahan understood the necessity of a large navy to protect America’s coasts, yet also realized that such a fleet had to be comprised of battleships and heavy cruisers capable of conducting operations in foreign waters. To complement this offensive naval strategy, Mahan recognized the need for distant naval bases. Although an avowed anti-imperialist, Mahan now realized that this stance was incompatible with his new philosophy (Zimmerman, 93). Arguably, Roosevelt was Mahan’s greatest benefactor, who found in the naval captain a kindred spirit who prescribed to the centrality of a large, offensively-oriented fleet as the country’s preferred military defense system (Cole, 9). Throughout his political career, including service as President McKinley’s assistant secretary of the navy (1897-98) and later when he became president, Roosevelt consistently upheld Mahan’s philosophy relative to maritime policies. Roosevelt regularly consulted with him, even following the captain’s retirement. In addition to Roosevelt, Mahan’s writings influenced the policies followed by secretary of the navy Benjamin Franklin Tracy, and his successor, Hilary Herbert, who together served between 1889 and 1897. These two individuals, as policy makers, are credited with the development of the U.S. Navy as a global power at the end of the 19th Century. The influence of Mahan’s consultation is evident in the proposal Tracy made to President Benjamin Harrison calling for “the construction of twenty new armored battleships to be organized into two fleets.” The result was the Naval Act of 1890 in which Harrison requested eight, but received only three, battleships (Crowl, 471). Cook 6 Herbert served as secretary of the navy during President Grover Cleveland’s second term and came to that office as an unlikely supporter of Mahan. On an austerity drive, Herbert planned to close the Naval War College until he read Mahan’s sequel, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793 - 1812, published in 1892. Subsequently Herbert read Mahan’s original Influence of Sea Power book, in which he found supporting material for his later successful proposal to Congress for five battleships (Crowl, 471). In 1898, the United States Navy was ranked third in the world behind Britain and Germany (Zimmerman, 120) and by 1907 was second only to Britain (Cole, 4). Mahan’s influence resonated with several members of Congress, most notably Henry Cabot Lodge, the Republican senator from Massachusetts, who found that Mahan’s position coincided with his desire to see the United States become a global power. In First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power, career U.S. Foreign Service officer Warren Zimmerman identifies how Lodge effectively collaborated with Roosevelt and Mahan to press “for a larger navy, for the acquisition of Caribbean and Pacific bases, and for a war with Spain” (120). In 1939, U.S. Navy Captain William Puleston stated, “today, in the American Navy, every officer who prepares for or discusses war, follows the methods and invokes the ideas of Mahan” (Crowl, 475). Evidence of this is apparent in the adoption of the Orange Plan, the U.S.