THOMISTIC PERSONALISM: CLARIFYING AND ADVANCING THE PROJECT MATTHEW SCHAEFFER A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY YORK UNIVERSITY TORONTO, ONTARIO JANUARY 2016 © MATTHEW SCHAEFFER, 2016 ABSTRACT Personalism is a reaction against two equally serious errors in the moral and political realms: placing ultimate importance on autonomy and self-interest (individualism), and placing ultimate importance on the glory of the collective (collectivism). Seeking a third way between these errors, personalists argue that a philosophical anthropology must be the guiding light. And they also argue that three claims are central to an accurate philosophical anthropology: (i) persons possess an inalienable dignity; (ii) the telos of persons is communion or love; and (iii) some dimensions of persons are inexhaustibly mysterious. At its core, personalism demands that all intrapersonal, interpersonal, and institutional activity must respect these three truths. Following philosophers such as Jacques Maritain, St. Wojtyla/John Paul II, and Fr. W. Norris Clarke, S.J., I believe that personalism must be grounded in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas. Thus, my dissertation is an attempt to clarify and advance the project of Thomistic personalism. In order to clarify the project, I identify three species of Thomistic personalism. The first grounds the main commitments of personalism in the metaphysics and other relevant work of St. Thomas; the second adds to the first by arguing that phenomenology must be integrated into the project; and the third adds to the second by arguing that St. Thomas‘s understanding of esse (i.e., the act of existing) must be completed creatively and placed at the heart of the project. With these species made clear, I advance the project in two main ways. First, I identify two norms which are internal to the project and show that both norms require the integration of phenomenology. Second, I acknowledge that Clarke‘s work on Thomistic personalism makes a compelling case for the primacy of esse, but I also note that his work has received some serious criticism. Thus, I modify and defend two fronts of Clarke‘s work: his claim that esse is ―thick‖ and essence is ―thin,‖ and his claim that receptivity is an ontological perfection. I conclude that Clarke‘s understanding of esse, with some alteration, remains highly plausible. Accordingly, the primacy of esse in Thomistic personalism is still a viable path. ii DEDICATION To Erin Schaeffer For all that only God, you, and I will know. For all that words cannot tell. For all that you are beyond what I deserve. For all that you are beyond attributes that can come and go. If in this earthly existence sacrifice for another is a proof of love, you have proved your love beyond all measure—and this dissertation, whatever its failings, whatever its inadequacies, for as long as it endures, will always carry the invisible marks of your courage and generosity. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to say a number of things here. First, I should note that Chapter 1 is a revised (and extended) version of my previously published article ―Thomistic Personalism: A Vocation for the Twenty-First Century,‖ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2012): 181–202; and Chapter 3 is a revised version of my previously published article ―The Thick-Esse/Thin-Essence View in Thomistic Personalism,‖ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2015): 223– 251. A paragraph or so of the latter also plays a role in my Introduction to this dissertation. I am grateful to the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly for permission to reuse this work. I would also like to express my thanks to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding support during the early stages of my dissertation research. Second, a number of people read and commented on portions of this dissertation at various stages of its development. For their reading and comments I thank David Clemenson, Fr. Robert A. Connor, Jeffrey Schaeffer, and three anonymous reviewers from the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. Indeed, one of the latter reviewers provided comments that were essential to the overall trajectory of the dissertation. I also thank Dcn. Douglas McManaman for our many conversations on Thomism and philosophy in general; these conversations were extremely helpful in the development of my understanding of Thomism. Third, apart from a single course, all of my undergraduate and graduate work in philosophy has taken place at York. I therefore owe a great deal to the Department of Philosophy at York, not to mention many of its professors. I am especially grateful to Professors Michael Giudice, Alice MacLachlan, and Robert Myers—all of whom served as members of my supervisory committee. I firmly believe that a graduate student‘s supervisory committee plays a significant role in determining whether a graduate student completes his program. I was fortunate. All of my committee members were intellectually and motivationally supportive; they consistently offered pertinent comments, and they never ceased to help me move ahead. I am very thankful for this. Professor Giudice, I should note, was my supervisor. And I think it is fair to say that his excellent guidance and consistent willingness to help were decisive factors in my ability to produce this work. Even if we have not always seen eye to eye philosophically, there is no doubt in my mind that I have learned a great deal from him about how to do philosophy well. Fourth, beyond my supervisory committee, I would also like to thank the other three members of my Oral Examining Committee: Professor Mark Cauchi (Internal Member), Professor Esteve Morera (Chair), and Professor John Thorp (External Examiner). Fifth, many people deserve to be recognized who provided support on a much deeper level. In particular I would like to thank my children—Anna, Clare, and Mary—who fill my life with beauty and joy. I owe my wife, Erin, more than words can say, so I will not try. And a similar point applies to my parents: Ross and Donna Schaeffer. I thank you, Mom and Dad, for all that you have done and all that you are. For all the others who have helped in some way, especially my family and friends, I am so grateful for your support. Finally, I thank the Holy Trinity. Philosophers love the truth. May we find the truth we love, and may this truth we love remind us of the Truth we were made to love, that is, Love Itself. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Title Page (i) Abstract (ii) Dedication (iii) Acknowledgements (iv) Table of Contents (v–vi) Introduction (1–11) 1. Thomistic Personalism: A Vocation for the Twenty-First Century (12–56) 1. Introduction 2. Personalism 3. Weak and Moderate Thomistic Personalism 4. Strong Thomistic Personalism: Metaphysics 5. Strong Thomistic Personalism: Metaethics 6. Strong Thomistic Personalism: From Metaphysics and Metaethics to Personalism 7. Thomistic Personalism: A Vocation and Collaborative Task 2. Phenomenology in Thomistic Personalism (57–103) 1. Introduction 2. The Status of Phenomenology in Contemporary Thomistic Personalism 3. The Nature of Phenomenology 4. The Possible Roles of Phenomenology in Thomistic Personalism 5. The Investigative and Communicative Norms 6. The Investigative Norm and Phenomenology 7. The Communicative Norm and Phenomenology 8. The Tasks of Phenomenology in the Role of Organic Complementarity 3. The Thick-Esse/Thin-Essence View in Thomistic Personalism (104–139) 1. Introduction 2. The Unifying Role of Thick-Esse/Thin-Essence in Clarke‘s Thomistic Personalism 3. Three Objections to Clarke‘s Thick-Esse/Thin-Essence View 4. Three Replies (After a Modification) 5. An Argument (or Case) for the Thick-Esse/Thin-Essence View 6. Conclusion 4. Receptivity in Thomistic Personalism (140–183) 1. Introduction 2. Clarke on Receptivity 3. Two Problems and a Proposal 4. Penetration into the Act of Existing 5. Replies to Three Objections v 6. The Boundaries of Thomistic Personalism 7. Receptivity and Christianity 8. Conclusion Conclusion (184–188) Bibliography (189–199) vi INTRODUCTION [I]t is rather in the plural—of personalisms—that we should speak. In the face of unwieldy and partially inhuman conceptions of civilization, our immediate aim is to define the primary points of agreement upon which a civilization devoted to the human person can be constructed. —Emmanuel Mounier, A Personalist Manifesto1 Thomistic personalism is an emerging practical philosophy that seeks to synthesize the work of twentieth-century personalists with the philosophical work of St. Thomas Aquinas. Accordingly, its reach extends into moral, political, and legal philosophy; and its objectives are the same as every other serious practical philosophy: (i) to acquire the truth about practical philosophy insofar as this is possible, and (ii) to help human persons act in accordance with this truth.2 It is a practical philosophy—devoted to the dignity, mystery, and communional telos of the person— that is ever mindful of the concrete errors of individualism and collectivism (at both the moral and political levels), along with the need to ground practical philosophy in the truths of metaphysics (a need often rejected or forgotten today).3 In this introduction, I will (i) provide an overview of the dissertation; (ii) explain its importance; (iii) comment on its philosophical method and scope; and (iv) summarize its main theses. The title of this dissertation—Thomistic Personalism: Clarifying and Advancing the Project—explains well the content of the four chapters which constitute the dissertation. Speaking generally the first chapter clarifies Thomistic personalism, while the following three advance the project towards its most plausible form. 1 Emmanuel Mounier, A Personalist Manifesto, trans. the monks of St. John‘s Abbey (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1938), 2.