Finding purpose: United States strategic military organizations from 1882-1947 by Scott Alan Moseman B.A., Morningside College, 1996 M.S., Joint Military Intelligence College, 2003 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2021 Abstract United States strategic military intelligence organizations have had to adapt to several external and internal factors in finding their raison d’etre. Military intelligence reflects the society it serves as seen in the manner it handled intelligence used by military commanders and policymakers. This subject provides insight to the thought processes of the American government and citizens for which military intelligence professionals worked. The Office of Naval Intelligence’s and Military Intelligence Division’s search for purpose is directly influenced by the trends occurring around them in each era of the period. Historians can observe these principles in American history through a study of these organizations. But there is a relatively small and incomplete historiography of strategic military intelligence organizations stretching from their infancy to the beginning of the Cold War. Much of the scholarship fails to account for how they relate to American society. What were the missions of U.S. strategic military intelligence between 1882 and 1947? From 1882 to 1947, strategic military intelligence organizations struggled to define their missions; the American public, government and military leaders, and intelligence professionals had competing ideas of what strategic military intelligence should be and do. By the time of the post-World War II creation of the modern national security establishment, these actors had learned the place for the armed forces’ own intelligence offices was often in operational intelligence, as part of a broad national intelligence community. Finding purpose: United States strategic military organizations from 1882-1947 by Scott Alan Moseman B.S., Kansas State University, 2010 M.S., University of Kansas, 2012 A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2021 Approved by: Major Professor Dr. Mark Parillo Copyright © Scott Alan Moseman 2021. Abstract United States strategic military intelligence organizations have had to adapt to several external and internal factors in finding their raison d’etre. Military intelligence reflects the society it serves as seen in the manner it handled intelligence used by military commanders and policymakers. This subject provides insight to the thought processes of the American government and citizens for which military intelligence professionals worked. The Office of Naval Intelligence’s and Military Intelligence Division’s search for purpose is directly influenced by the trends occurring around them in each era of the period. Historians can observe these principles in American history through a study of these organizations. But there is a relatively small and incomplete historiography of strategic military intelligence organizations stretching from their infancy to the beginning of the Cold War. Much of the scholarship fails to account for how they relate to American society. What were the missions of U.S. strategic military intelligence between 1882 and 1947? From 1882 to 1947, strategic military intelligence organizations struggled to define their missions; the American public, government and military leaders, and intelligence professionals had competing ideas of what strategic military intelligence should be and do. By the time of the post-World War II creation of the modern national security establishment, these actors had learned the place for the armed forces’ own intelligence offices was often in operational intelligence, as part of a broad national intelligence community. Table of Contents Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... vii Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... xi Notes on Terminology .................................................................................................................. xii Introduction ................................................................................................................................... xv Chapter 1 - 1882-1885: Emergence of ONI and MID .................................................................... 1 Chapter 2 - 1885-1895: Growing Pains of ONI and MID ............................................................ 30 Chapter 3 - 1895-1900: Operational Tests for ONI and MID ...................................................... 67 Chapter 4 - 1900-1915: The Nadir of ONI and MID .................................................................. 105 Chapter 5 - 1915-1919: The Resuscitation of ONI and MID ..................................................... 154 Chapter 6 - 1919-1929: ONI and MID Navigate the Rapids ...................................................... 200 Chapter 7 - 1929-1939: Storm on ONI and MID’s Horizon ....................................................... 246 Chapter 8 - 1939-1941: ONI and MID’s Inability to Warn ........................................................ 281 Chapter 9 - 1941-1945: ONI and MID Sidelined Again ............................................................. 329 Chapter 10: CIA Subordinates ONI and MID ............................................................................ 369 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 388 vi Acknowledgements Writing a dissertation was just as hard as I thought it would be, but the personal and professional rewards were well worth the investment. I could not have done it without many helpful guides and supporters along the way. I am so glad that Kansas State University took a chance on this washed-up sailor and accepted me ashore after my Navy retirement. Foremost at K-State, I extend my thanks to Dr. Mark Parillo and the committee for their experienced direction. Dr. Parillo once told me that writing a dissertation is a long and lonely road, with only a few checkpoints to know where the writer stands. Thanks for being there every step of the way. I send my appreciation to Dr. Brent Maner for giving me pause to think about how to divide this huge project, both my chapters and topics. Dr. Andrew Orr was exceptionally kind in reviewing my prospectus and offering advice. His pointers on where to look for cultural and political sources was greatly beneficial. Thanks, Dr. David Graff, for the look over of the manuscript for all the simple errors I missed during the drafting processes and your mentorship while I was your teaching assistant. Dr. Donald Mrozek examined the embryonic ideas for this research in his class HIST983 American Ways of War. As usual, Dr. Mrozek was prompt and thorough in putting much red ink on my class paper, but he improved my writing skills tremendously. I want to give a huge shout-out to the Department Chair Dr. Michael Krysko and Office Manager Mrs. Melissa Janulis for making the administrative and bureaucratic hurdles—from graduate teaching to travel awards—that much easier. My research would not have been possible without the generous support of the History Department awards program. I want to thank the Colonel Peter Cullen Military History Scholarship program, Robin Higham Military History Graduate Student Research and Travel Fund, Florence Hamscher Graduate Student Travel Award program, and James C. Carey vii Research and Travel Award program for funding my many trips to the Washington D.C. region for archival research. I knew tackling such daunting organizational subjects as the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Military Intelligence Division (MID), would require reaching out to the command historians at ONI and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) for assistance. ONI’s command historian Dr. Randy Goguen provided me sage advice on sources and how to interpret key players in the organization’s history. By pointing me in the right direction for the microfiche copy of The U.S. Naval Administrative Histories of World War II at the United States Naval Academy (USNA), it saved a lot of misery in obtaining such a rare book item. Mr. Michael Bigelow from INSCOM was more than helpful in providing source trails— primary and secondary—to follow because he had been there before. Mr. Bigelow rescued me from a lot of effort by supplying a copy of the extended edition of Colonel Bruce W. Bidwell’s History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1941 and the also the George W. Auxier Historical Manuscript File. Much thanks to both historians! I visited the Marine Corps History Division on Marine Corps Base Quantico just days before COVID-19 ended air travel and I am so glad I did. Historian Annette Amerman forwarded numerous documents by e-mail and prepped archival material for my visit. And, although I did not find a great number of leads and sources on U.S. Marine Corps strategic intelligence in their archives, she helped me confirm one fact: there is not much on the subject.