T F G M I P R T TheBlackwellOxford,MUWO0027-4909©911Original 2006 MuslimFethullah HartfordUKArticle Publishing World Gulen Seminary LtdMovement and Its Politics of Representation in FethullahTurkey Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey* Mucahit Bilici University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan Introduction amuel Huntington’s provocative assertion about the “clash of civilizations”1 has been a source of controversy not only for academics Sbut also for religious communities. Some radical Islamist groups have enthusiastically welcomed Huntington’s suggestion. In fact, this assertion has been finding more resonance since September 11, 2001. However, there are significant attempts on the part of some Islamic religious communities to challenge this theory through dialogue-oriented practices. The religious movement led by Fethullah Gülen in Turkey, for example, launched a civil societal foundation to challenge the discourse of conflict and introduced the idea of dialogue not only to the Turkish audience, but also to a global one. It was through this foundation that Fethullah Gülen and his community became part of the Turkish public agenda. This article aims to explore the nature of the Gülen movement and its politics of representation. The Gülen community is a significant case for students of contemporary Islam, for it is a successful example of a civil Islamic movement in the new global context. The bulk of this article is devoted to a critical elaboration of several constitutive elements of the identity of the Gülen movement. These elements include: (1) the constraints and opportunities created by “conservatism” in Turkey; (2) Turkish nationalism; (3) the implications of the central concept and root-paradigm of hizmet; (4) the legacy of Said Nursi; and (5) the celebration of the Ottoman state or the Turkish-Islamic past. Those are the several themes with which I will attempt to map out the formative forces that shaped the identity of Gülen movement. The second and concluding part dwells specifically on the Gülen community’s politics of representation. 1 T M W • V 96 • J 2006 From “Clash of Civilizations” to “Interreligious Dialogue” Before embarking upon a discussion of the cultural sources that shaped Gülen’s identity and politics, I shall start with a brief introduction to the type of activism that this movement strives to produce. An example of such activism is best illustrated in the following media coverage of an event organized by the Gülen community.2 After years of community building and as the leader of a large Islamic community, Gülen was gaining visibility in the media as the honorary president of The Journalists’ and Writers’ Foundation ( JWF). The initial meeting of the foundation took place in a hotel in Istanbul on June 29, 1994, with the participation of various public figures and celebrities including former government officials, journalists and artists. The occasion garnered much media coverage. A later publication of the foundation contextualized the event within a larger framework: While the communication facilities rapidly increased on one hand, some tried to flame up conflicts on the claim of ‘The Conflict of Civilizations.’ They exploited our richness of varieties as conflicting factors. We stopped applauding the beauties and the just. Then The Journalists’ and Writers’ Foundation made its launch at a meeting embracing the social diversities. The echo of the message calling for tolerance and dialogue was greater than expected. Our true will is the continuity of this positive start.3 Having made a positive start, the Foundation continued to organize meetings in which a large spectrum of elite people coming from different political, ideological and confessional backgrounds participated. What was stressed in these meetings has been summarized in the Foundation’s mission statement: The modern world will be shaped by systems and approaches which cherish universal values which consider affection, tolerance, understanding and unification as basics; which consider Man as a universe and cherish Him accordingly; which see life only as a race of merits; which prefer to overcome all hostilities, hatred and wrath by friendship, tolerance and reconciliation; which undertake the mission of delivering culture and knowledge for the benefit of humanity; which can create a balance between the individual and the society without sacrificing one for the other; which have a great vision without falling into the trap of utopias and without leaving realities aside; which believe in the merit of keeping determinant factors such as religion, language, and race free from any compulsory pressure; and which evaluate superiority as a sublimation to human merit. Where should our place be among those? 2 T F G M I P R T Ours is only a modest contribution but the peace of our hearts and consciences depend on it. — The Journalists’ and Writers’ Foundation4 At a time when debates on fundamentalism and radical Islamism dominated the public agenda, JWF was an attempt to construct a new image for Muslim identity. After a Ramadan dinner hosted at the Istanbul Hilton on January 27, 1997, the Foundation once again became the center of media attention. As described by the Foundation, this occasion focused on the “richness of diversity”: The Journalists’ and Writers’ Foundation succeeded in gathering the representatives of different social groups around a common table under its umbrella of ‘tolerance and affection.’ The gathering of men of arts and literature, politicians, journalists, the representatives of Vatican, the Orthodox Patriarchate and the Syriac Catholic Church gave an obvious message: ‘We are all on a common ground.’5 Several subsequent meetings continued in the creation of a new image for the Gülen movement and its members in Turkey. Muslim identity in general and the members of the community in particular were re-presented as the agents of tolerance and affection. Reverberations of these meetings found their most interesting form in a newspaper headline. An Istanbul-based paper with a large circulation covered the event and defined the Gülen community as “Fundamentalists of Tolerance.”6 As I will argue later in this article, this headline and other cultural products of the Gulen community’s activism constitute a form of resistance to the dominant image of the religious identity in Turkey and elsewhere. Given that Islam is mostly associated with lack of tolerance and fundamentalism, establishing an image that is associated with tolerance constitutes the very heart of Gülen’s activism. Conservatism as an Ideology of Sustainable Change From the attempts to save the Ottoman state to the processes that led to the formation of the Turkish Republic, the basic aim was to modernize the state and society. Among the three competing ideologies of the Tanzimat Period, namely “Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism,”7 it was Turkism that became dominant and was the only savior ideology. With the triumph of nationalism as the modernizing ideology, Ottomanism disappeared in a process accompanied by the demise of the Ottoman state, whereas Islamism persisted despite its subordination to Turkism. The bulk of the spectrum of contemporary Turkish political orientations can be explicated with reference to the various combinations of these two ideologies. Conservatism emerges, in this context, as the set of positions that have discursive immunity within 3 T M W • V 96 • J 2006 the range of combinations between Turkish nationalism and Islamism. Conservatism can be considered as “the immune zone” in Turkish politics and therefore is the regulatory framework according to which Islam(ism) and nationalism merge. Tanil Bora underlines the convertible and permissive character of nationalism, conservatism and Islamism as the three different “states” of the same “matter.”8 Unlike his treatment of conservatism as a distinct ideology, I argue that conservatism is primarily a strategy for generating legitimacy before the Turkish state. In other words, conservatism in Turkey functions as a corridor between Islamism and nationalism. Members of any of these two ideologies can find shelter in this corridor, where there is immunity thanks to a multiplicity of loyalties. Any of the loyalties, depending on the need, can be used as leverage to attain a formula for self-justification. As an amorphous position in terms of identification, conservatism in Turkey creates a vacuum of definiton and provides the security derived from ambiguity. Conservatism is pervasive in Turkey and it shapes state-society relations. The primacy of state over society in the Turkish case is not a consequence of “mere superiority” but a necessity of a mission waged by the state. I shall argue that this mission, the content of which varies from case (the Empire) to case (the Republic), is hizmet (rendering service); a term around which there is a sacred aura in Turkish culture. Hizmet is a form of legitimation that consists of a variety of activities. The mission of the state has changed over time. Çagdaßlaßma (modernization) replaced the Ottoman ideal of 3“la-yi Kelimetullah (that is, upholding God’s name and conquering new territories for the sake of Islam) as the form of hizmet. The concept of hizmet has additional avenues of circulation. Each and every military intervention in Turkey has been legitimized with reference to the “mission of protection” of Kemalist principles. Members of the Turkish nationalist (Ülkücü) movement in Turkey identify themselves as “mabed bekçisi” (the Guardians of