Outwaite-3587-16.qxd 6/12/2007 5:32 PM Page 282 282 RATIONALITY, COMPLEXITY, COLLECTIVITY 16 Rationality and Rationalist Approaches in the Social Sciences David Henderson FRAMEWORK associated with rationalism (the claim that some truths were a priori knowable). But, Rationalism may be understood as the they hastened to add that whatever was so philosophical position asserting a certain dis- knowable would be something on the order tinctive epistemic status for certain classes of of definitional truths—claims that there claims—that asserts or supposes that there were necessarily true as a consequence of are a priori knowable truths. On this under- the character of, and relations between, the standing, one is a rationalist if one holds that ideas or concepts employed in those claims. there are certain necessary truths that can All unicorns are mammals—necessarily, be justifiably believed (and that would then since our idea of a unicorn is of a rather par- count as knowledge) independent of empiri- ticular horsey thing, and our idea/concept of cal evidence for their truth. This is a some- a horse is the idea of a particular sort of what minimalist understanding of rationalism mammal (or so the rather plausible story (although these days there are those who goes). Nothing would count as a horse, and would count themselves as rationalist merely thus as a unicorn, were it not a mammal. by virtue of embracing this much). But, they insisted, this of itself does not Rationalism has traditionally been under- guarantee that there are any unicorns, or stood as making a stronger claim. In the horses, in the world. For that, field work, or modern period, empiricist philosophers such trips through the country with one’s eyes as Locke and Hume sought to debunk what open, would be needed. they believed to be the pretensions of ratio- While one might know by reflection the nalist thinkers such as Descartes and relations between our own ideas, said Hume, Leibniz. The empiricists would have granted it is a wholly different question whether there there were some claims that satisfied the is, in fact, anything in the world satisfying rather minimal characterization just now those ideas or concepts. Matters of fact could Outwaite-3587-16.qxd 6/12/2007 5:32 PM Page 283 RATIONALITY AND RATIONALIST APPROACHES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 283 only be justifiably believed, could only be This picture was challenged by a line of known, empirically. In opposition, the ratio- thought developed by Kripke (1972), Putnam nalists insisted that there were at least some (1975a), and Burge (1979, 1992). They argued things beyond the creations of our own idea- that what made for, or constituted, the concepts craft that could be known a priori—they in play could include elements of the individ- insisted that one could know substantive ual’s social and physical environment—and truths about the world by reflection, without was thus not wholly internal to the individ- reliance on experiential evidence. Descartes, ual: thus the idea of an externalist seman- for example, thought that we could know tics). On this view, at least some elements of that we were non-material souls, that God the semantics of (at least some important) existed, and that material objects were concepts are not (or need not be) accessible (Euclidean) three-dimensional extended to agents employing those concepts. As a things. (Perhaps there should be a three- result, there could be claims whose truth are strikes rule applied to philosophies.) guaranteed by the semantics of the concepts In any case, were we to be fully faithful to featured in them, but which could not be the terms of this venerable debate, we would appreciated by those individuals merely by need to refine our characterization of ratio- their drawing on whatever makes for an indi- nalism: we would need to understand ratio- vidual’s possession of the relevant concepts. nalism as the view that there are certain Perhaps all a priori knowable truths are con- substantive claims that are both necessary and ceptual truths, it might then be said, but, if can justifiably be believed (and thus known) externalism is correct, not all conceptual independent of empirical evidence for their truths are a priori knowable (even by those truth—where a claim is substantive if it is not who count as conceptual adepts at a given ‘merely definitional’, or ‘analytic’ or guaran- time). Even more significantly, when con- teed by the content of its featured concepts. cepts (semantic entities, meanings, and the I mention the traditional and more robust like) come to be conceived as rather more understanding of rationalism only to explic- than ideas in individual heads, the suggestion itly lay it to the side. There are multiple that a priori truths might turn out to be con- reasons for focusing on the minimal under- ceptual truths does not seem as threatening to standing in this contribution. Several reasons their significance as was once readily sup- have to do with the state of play in contem- posed. The empiricist idea that a priori truths porary philosophy. might be limited to conceptual truths no longer First, the idea of a truth that is guaranteed lends itself to the deflationary rephrasing, by the semantics of its elements no longer ‘mere conceptual truths’. seems to be what it used to be—and the Second, perhaps influenced by such con- changes have significantly complicated the siderations, those with avowedly rationalist philosophical landscape. A central develop- inclinations have comes to think largely in ment has come with the advent of what is terms of conceptual truths without feeling termed ‘externalist semantics’. Up until the insignificant (for example, Bealer, 1987; 1970s, almost all thought about the meaning Chalmers, 1998, 2002a, 2002b; Jackson, family (ideas, meanings, intensions, con- 1998; Peacocke, 1992). Conceptual truths cepts, semantics) supposed that these things pack some punch, at least if contemporary were settled by what went on inside a given understandings are roughly correct. individual. While such things as meanings or Now that conceptual truths have come to be concepts might be abstract entities, whether a thought of as ‘more muscular’ or substantive given individual entertained or deployed a as a class, the fan of a priori knowledge has given meaning or concept in a given stretch come to face a new challenge: to explain how of thinking was thought to depend on what it can be that those who are relatively profi- occurred within the skin (or perhaps head) of cient with the concept have, by virtue of that that individual.1 conceptual competence, access to powerful Outwaite-3587-16.qxd 6/12/2007 5:32 PM Page 284 284 RATIONALITY, COMPLEXITY, COLLECTIVITY elements of that semantics. This has been a putative a priori truth—that actions have matter of identifying a component of the rational antecedents and explanations, or semantics of the concept that are accessible at something along this line—would both least to those who count as ‘possessors’ of the inform and constrain work in the social concepts involved.2 But, we will not now sciences. It would inform a kind of explana- detail the lines of the contemporary debate tory practice—and one apparently ‘on the over the epistemology of the a priori. cheap’. After all, one would not have to These philosophical preliminaries do develop well-evidenced generalizations or serve to indicate why it is that contemporary descriptive theories of cognition; one would rationalists do not seem much concerned not need empirical theories of human cogni- with what their modern ancestors would have tion that underwrite the explanatory practice thought crucial—why they commonly are in question. Instead, one’s own normative not much concerned to show that there are a principles of reasoning would supposedly priori knowable truths that are not ‘merely turn the trick of informing and supporting conceptual truths’. They also serve to explain explanations. One’s own normative principles to my readers why my discussion of ‘ratio- or reasoning competence, representing or nalist approaches to the social sciences’ will tracking support relations between contents, focus on positions regarding the subjects of would structure explanations underwritten by social-scientific thought (on positions the very concepts of action and reasons. Such regarding beliefs, thought, actions, and the normative principles would also be constrain- like) that might be thought to be conceptual ing (again a priori constraining)—normative in their foundation. principles would need to figure in explana- In connection with the social sciences, the tion, thereby limiting the kind and character central matter on which a priori truths have of explanation one could employ in the been sought or sensed by those with rationalist human sciences. Such, in outline, is the inclinations has been the role of rationality in central rationalist approach to the social the explanation of action. Put starkly and sciences. In all variations of this generic overly simply, it is said to be a priori that approach, some significant degree of rational- finding one’s subjects to have beliefs and ity in belief, desire and action is thought to be desires that makes their actions rational a priori conceptually guaranteed. explains their actions, while failing to do so leaves their action unintelligible and unex- plained. This is said to follow from the con- THE RATIONALIST BRIEF cept of an action—which is said to involve the idea of a behavior engendered by rea- Why embrace some variant on the basic line sons. The concept of a reason is said to of thought sketched above? In surveying the involve the idea of a contentful state that rationalist case, one can begin by reflecting bears a (normatively approvable, i.e., ratio- on the everyday practice of explaining an nal) support relation to some other contentful action by attributing reasons to the agent state (that for which it is a reason).