PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Spacecraft Risk Analysis Applications Todd Paulos, Ph.D. JPL PRA Point of Contact PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Acknowledgement • Thanks to Caltech/JPL, NAS, Lockheed Martin, and Chester J. Everline for some of the material basics and inspiration over the years. • “Be quick, be quiet, and be on time” – Kelly Johnson • “I believe in the golden rule: he who has the gold makes the rules” – Ben Rich • “Do not go where the path may lead, go instead where there is no path and leave a trail” – Emerson 3 December 2019 2 jpl.nasa.gov About the Presenter 3 3 December 2019 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Topics • Risks of space activities • Risk management / risk-informed decision making • NASA’s perspective • Space program example of risk management • Questions 3 December 2019 4 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Risks and Statistics Frequency of Fatalities Due to Man-Caused Events 3 December 2019 5 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December In Memoriam • Theodore Freeman • Gregory Jarvis • Michael Anderson • Charles Basset • Christa McAuliffe • David Brown • Elliot See • Ronald McNair • Kalpana Chawla • Roger Chaffee • Ellison Onizuka • Laurel Clark • Virgil Grissom • Judith Resnik • Rick Husband • Edward White • Francis Scobee • William McCool • Clifton Williams • Michael Smith • Ilan Ramon • Michael J. Adams • Robert H. Lawrence 3 December 2019 6 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Risk Reality of the Space Industry • Space is a risky business • Whether it is admitted or not, when the button is pushed, the risk is assumed • Acknowledgment of risk within the industry seems to be a bathtub curve over time • Comparisons to aircraft safety levels are absurd • Launch risk at best 98% successful • Space robotic missions are also “risky” by nature, although not as risky as human crewed missions, there is some risk to human life • Launch risk / nuclear launch risk • Reentry risk • Backwards planetary protection 3 December 2019 7 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December NASA Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Process NPR 8000.4B Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements 3 December 2019 8 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) Process NASA Risk Management Handbook NASA/SP-2011-3422 (Nov. 2011) 3 December 2019 9 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Many Areas Where Risk is Managed at NASA • Public safety and health • Launch risk • Re-entry risk • Planetary Protection • Mission risks (e.g., flybys) • Worker safety • Human spaceflight activities • Assets including flight hardware 3 December 2019 10 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Risk Management Example Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Program • Initiated by NASA in 1994 • Reduce payload cost • .. to build a vehicle that takes days, not months, to turn around; dozens, not thousands, of people to operate; with launch costs that are a tenth of what they are now. Our goal is a reusable launch vehicle that will cut the cost of getting a pound of payload to orbit from $10,000 to $1,000 (D. Goldin, NASA administrator) • How to certify? • Develop technologies for next generation space boosters • Forced the team working this program to think of things differently; not just as a space program, but also as an airplane-type program with availability requirements 3 December 2019 11 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Risk Management Example X-33 and RLV Planning • X-33 was a technology demonstrator for the RLV program • Designed for quick turn arounds and aircraft-like operations • Concept of commercial launch services introduced need for commercial space ports • Availability of launch pad becomes an issue • Not all space ports are coastal • Posed issues for launch risks that needed to be identified and mitigated • First time reentry risk was considered • Commonplace today • Risks managed through design features and ConOps, while balancing availability, launch rate, reliability and risk • Aircraft concept of MMEL/MEL and airworthiness incorporated into design and ConOps decisions 3 December 2019 12 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December X-33 / Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Slide courtesy LMSW 3 December 2019 13 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Affordable Access to Space Slide courtesy LMSW 3 December 2019 14 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Space Launches by Year http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1598/1 3 December 2019 15 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December X-33 Highlights . Vertical launch, horizontal landing . Linear aerospike engines . Mach 15 flight . Demonstrate 7-day turnarounds on three consecutive flights . Demonstrate ability to perform a 2-day turnaround between two consecutive flights . Demonstrate a maximum of 50 personal performing turnaround for two flights . Landing at 3 different sites . Silurian Dry Lake Bed . Michael Army Airfield . Malmstrom Air Force Base 3 December 2019 16 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Kennedy Space Center 3 December 2019 17 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Vandenberg AFB Launch Trajectories https://www.planetary.org/blogs/guest-blogs/jason-davis/3450.html 3 December 2019 18 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Office of Commercial Space Transportation • Established in 1984 as part of the Department of Transportation under Office of the Secretary of Transportation • Many Administrations, such as OST, NHTSA, FAA, FRA • In Nov 1995, AST was transferred to the FAA • X-33 brought an urgency to OCST to develop requirements for commercial launch programs • Who indemnifies a launch? 3 December 2019 19 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Expected Casualty (Ec) History • Public Law 81-60 • In 1949, Congress enacted PL 81-60, Guided Missiles-Joint Long Range Proving Ground • Authorized the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a joint proving ground at the present-day Eastern Range location. The law, however, only authorized the establishment of a range. • Contained within the language of legislative history is the requirement for safe operation of the range • “From a safety standpoint [test flights of missiles] will be no more dangerous than conventional airplanes flying overhead” • Language was intended to decrease public fears at the time missile testing was in its infancy, and was not intended to set future standards • Safety is one component of Range Safety Policy for both the Air Forces East Coast and West Coast test ranges • Outdated EWR 127-1, Range Safety Requirement, 31 Oct 1997 • Replaced with AFSPCMAN 91-710 (2004, updates as recent as 2013) 3 December 2019 20 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Range Safety Guidance • AFSPCMAN 91-710 • Replaced EWR 127-1 • FAA/OCST • AC 431.35-1 Expected Casualty Calculations for Commercial Space Launch and Reentry Missions (Aug. 30, 2000) • Legal language • 14 CFR 415, 431 and 435 Launch and Reentry Risk • On X-33, some aspects of range safety were new, and guidance wasn’t black and white • Worked with the OCST and Range Safety Officer to help develop launch and reentry requirements • Expected Casualty (Ec) analysis for reentry 3 December 2019 21 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Range Safety • Range safety is the responsibility of a Range Safety Officer/Mission Flight Control Officer • Military controlled • Lots of planning and analysis behind every launch • Range safety data package includes • Vehicle design information • Vehicle failure information • Flight corridor/trajectory analysis both nominal and off-nominal • Debris analysis • Ec analysis • Other analyses • Tend to err on the side of caution • Most vehicles flown on a test range have a flight termination system as part of the design in case flight corridor is exceeded or even communication is lost 3 December 2019 22 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Risk Numerical Requirement • Numerical risk criteria for both public and worker safety • “From a safety standpoint [test flights of missiles] will be no more dangerous than conventional airplanes flying overhead” • 30E-6 requirement has been the standard for decades • Ec was typically done for launch risk only until 1990s • X-33 first program known to me to have to look at the reentry (mid 1990s) • Launch risk went to 29E-6 • Reentry risk to 1E-6 • X-38 late 1990s • Woomera Test Facility emulated the practices of EWR guidance • How is this risk estimated? 3 December 2019 23 jpl.nasa.gov PSAM 2019 Topical, Stockholm, Sweden, 2-3 December Ec is Complicated • During launch • Explosive events from on pad through orbit insertion • Loss of lift events • Reduced / loss of thrust events • Range exceedance (self destruct loss of lift, loss of thrust) • ACTA, Inc. seems to be the Ec pioneer in terms of the consequence modeling • Re-entry vehicles with X-33/X-38 failure modes • CFIT • Loss of control • Loss of control with breakup • Splitting a lot of failure modes into 5 second intervals made for some interesting challenges • FTS scenarios • Stardust looked at reentry, but not Ec • End states were loss of sample, sample compromised, and spacecraft burnup 3 December