A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Potrafke, Niklas; Roesel, Felix Working Paper A banana republic? The effects of inconsistencies in the counting of votes on voting behavior ifo Working Paper, No. 276 Provided in Cooperation with: Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Suggested Citation: Potrafke, Niklas; Roesel, Felix (2018) : A banana republic? The effects of inconsistencies in the counting of votes on voting behavior, ifo Working Paper, No. 276, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/191281 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. 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The effects of inconsistencies in the counting of votes on voting behavior Niklas Potrafke, Felix Roesel Impressum: ifo Working Papers Publisher and distributor: ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany Telephone +49(0)89 9224 0, Telefax +49(0)89 985369, email [email protected] www.cesifo-group.de An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded from the ifo website: www.cesifo-group.de ifo Working Paper No. 276 A banana republic? The effects of inconsistencies in the counting of votes on voting behavior Abstract We examine whether local inconsistencies in the counting of votes influence voting behavior. We exploit the case of the second ballot of the 2016 presidential election in Austria. The ballot needed to be repeated because postal votes were counted care- lessly in individual electoral districts (“scandal districts”). We use a difference-in- differences approach comparing election outcomes from the regular and the repeated round. The results do not show that voter turnout and postal voting declined significantly in scandal districts. Quite the contrary, voter turnout and postal voting increased slightly by about 1 percentage point in scandal districts compared to non- scandal districts. Postal votes in scandal districts also were counted with some greater care in the repeated ballot. We employ micro-level survey data indicating that voters in scandal districts blamed the federal constitutional court for ordering a second election, but did not seem to blame local authorities. JEL code: D72, D02, Z18, P16 Keywords: Elections, trust, political scandals, administrative malpractice, counting of votes, voter turnout, populism, natural experiment Niklas Potrafke Felix Roesel* ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research Economic Research at the University of Munich, at the University of Munich University of Munich Dresden Branch Poschingerstr. 5 Einsteinstr. 3 81679 Munich, Germany 01069 Dresden, Germany Phone: + 49 89 9224 1319 Phone: + 49 351 26476 28 [email protected] [email protected] This paper has been accepted for publication in Public Choice. * Corresponding author. 1. Introduction Voters in western democracies usually benefit from established political institutions. Elections are free, secret and balanced (one man, one vote). Standards for the counting of votes once the polls are closed are crystal-clear so as to avoid any concerns regarding manipulation. Many supervisory, control and transparency rules ensure that votes are counted publicly and correctly. In contrast to dictatorships, voters in democracies usually trust the government to count votes completely and accurately (for an exception see Fund and von Spakovsky 2012). However, myriad famous examples exist of inconsistencies in the counting of votes (which does not necessarily imply manipulation) were an issue. A prominent example is the 2000 US presidential election recount in Florida where a margin of 537 votes saved the second term of President George W. Bush. Inconsistencies in the counting of votes may have dramatic consequences. In developing countries, electoral fraud and irregularities in the counting of votes are hot topics and often trigger large-scale civil unrest. In the former socialist part of Germany, citizens document inconsistencies and outright fraud in the counting of votes in the (undemocratic) local election in May 1989, which provoked a rapidly growing protest movement culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall and the German reunification in 1989/1990 (see, e.g., Fricke 1999). However, the expected electoral consequences of inconsistent vote counting in well-established democracies are more ambiguous from a theoretical point of view. On the one hand, inconsistencies might reduce voter turnout rates if voters no longer trust election authorities (on the relationship of trust and voter turnout, see Citrin 1974; Knack 1992; Hetherington 1999; Cox 2003; Carrerras and İrepoğlu 2013). On the other hand, revelations of ballot-counting inconsistencies may increase voter turnout if voters feel even more comfortable with authorities that are now under tight supervision by the media and upper tiers of government wanting to avoid new electoral irregularities. For example, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) and Spiller 2 (2013) explain that third-party supervision may well be more effective than permanent oversight by one agent only. Therefore, voters might be even more inclined to cast their votes in districts with strictly supervised election authorities. Identifying the net effects of eroded trust and new confidence because of supervision therefore is an empirical question. We estimate the causal effect of inconsistencies in the counting of votes on local voting behavior in established democracies. Regional differences in irregularities regarding the second ballot of the 2016 Austrian presidential election supply an excellent natural experiment for investigating whether inconsistencies in the counting of votes influence voting behavior in established Western democracies. The presidential election needed to be repeated because irregularities surfaced in the counting of postal votes in individual electoral districts. Even if administrative malpractice arguably were minor, they resulted in a court-ordered second election. The sloppy counting of votes broadly was considered to be scandalous; we therefore label districts with inconsistencies as “scandal districts”. In the end, the constitutional court did not confirm widespread ballot manipulation, but such manipulation was possible in at least 12 % of all Austrian electoral districts. Public discourse portrayed citizens’ perceptions of the irregularities to be rather severe: around one-third of the voters were convinced of electoral manipulation.1 The Austrian media and even the Austrian Chancellor, Christian Kern, described Austria as seeming like a “banana republic”.2 We employ macro-level and micro-level survey data, and estimate difference-in-differences models to investigate whether voting behavior changed in the Austrian presidential election’s second ballot in scandal districts where inconsistencies in the counting of postal votes were alleged. We distinguish between scandal districts that were subject to the summons of the 1 Section 6.3 includes survey information on voters’ attitudes toward the repeated elections and the scandal. 2 See, e.g., the comment of Anneliese Rohrer in the newspaper Die Presse, 18 June 2016, or the interview with Chancellor Christian Kern in OE24.at, 11 June 2016, http://www.oe24.at/oesterreich/politik/Christian-Kern-Wir- haben-eine-Chance-vergeben/239273674. 3 constitutional court (20 districts; see Figure 1), and scandal districts where inconsistencies in the counting of votes ultimately were confirmed by the court (14 districts). In the 2016 Austrian presidential election, balloting took place in a total of 117 districts. Clearly, citizens across the entire country may have been disenchanted by the irregularities in vote counting. We estimate however, local average treatment effects because no counterfactual exists to Austria as a whole. We therefore ask whether citizens in districts with inconsistencies responded differently to inconsistent postal vote counting than citizens in non-scandal districts. The results show that postal voting declined nationwide in the election’s second round. However, the results do not suggest that voter turnout and postal voting fell in scandal districts. We find quite the contrary: voter turnout and postal voting increased slightly by around