Analysis, Systematicity and the Transcendental in Hermann Cohen’s System of Critical Idealism by B Tyson Gofton A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Copyright 2013 by B Tyson Gofton Abstract Analysis, Systematicity and the Transcendental in Hermann Cohen’s System of Critical Idealism B Tyson Gofton Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2013 The dissertation provides a systematic, critical analysis of Hermann Cohen’s System of Critical Idealism. The first chapter establishes Cohen’s reading of the a priori of Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic as founding the possibility of intuition in mathematics, rather than the possibility of mathematics in intuition. The second chapter then investigates the problem of the unity of the transcendental object, or, more specifically, the conditions under which the intelligible predicates of the functions of judgment can be applied to an objective unity. Chapters three and four compare the idealist responses of Salomon Maimon and G.W.F. Hegel to the problem of objective unity. Both Maimon and Hegel attempt to provide a logic (and a manifold of reality) grounded in the Spinozistic principle of determinability. Ultimately, this leads to the conflation of the totality of intuition with the domain of the intelligible thereby reducing Kant’s infinite judgment to a positive assertion. Cohen, however, rejects this solution, and insists that the manifold of reality (or the real continuum of calculus) is the product of continuous thinking. Cohen’s principle of production implies an indeterminably determinable manifold, thus providing the intelligible foundations for the eventual set-theoretic foundation of arithmetic and analysis. The final chapter of the dissertation investigates the consequences of Cohen’s innova- tion for the prospects of systematic idealism as a framework within which normative, theoretical and aesthetic claims may be raised and justified. Since logic does not determine a priori the structure of the intelligible whole, Cohen cannot assume a convergence between natural and ethical representations. The free production of laws, Cohen argues, is the practice of jurispru- ii dence, or, the construction and reconstruction of assertoric statements (universal claims) with the aim of limiting contradictions. If, in the natural sciences, we call this aim truth, in ethics, we call it the good, guided by the idea of the end of humanity. iii Dedication To J.B., for all the good times. iv Acknowledgements I would like to thank the University of Toronto for supporting my project and my ex- tended time abroad. I would also like to thank the Centre for Jewish Studies at the University of Toronto for their support of my work. I benefited from the help and hospitality of the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin. My stay in Berlin was made possible through the financial support of the Deutsche Akademische Austausch Dienst. The department of philosophy and the department of Judaic studies at Yale University have provided invaluable financial support and opportu- nities for professional and intellectual development. I owe a special debt of gratitude to my directors, Robert Gibbs and Paul Franks. Paul Franks especially has supported me in too many ways to count. It takes many hands to complete a project of this scope, and to all those who helped in various ways, I offer my thanks. v Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Critical Idealism . 1 1.1.1 Hermann Cohen and the Marburg School . 1 1.1.2 Systematicity . 7 1.2 Traditional Epistemology and its Critics . 9 1.2.1 Substance and Accident . 9 1.2.2 Descartes’ Descriptive Skepticism . 11 1.2.3 Humean Skepticism . 14 1.3 Transcendental Epistemology . 17 1.3.1 Ontological Nihilism . 17 1.3.2 The Copernican Revolution . 20 1.3.3 Mathematics and the Continuum . 26 1.4 Post-Kantian Systematic Idealism . 31 1.4.1 Summary Outline . 36 I Analysis and the Transcendental 38 2 Formalism 39 2.1 The Apriority of the a priori . 43 2.1.1 The Fischer-Trendelenburg Dispute . 43 2.1.2 The Form of Sensibility . 48 2.1.3 Regressive Analysis . 49 2.1.4 The Formal Determinacy of Sinnlichkeit ................. 54 2.2 The Three Levels of the a priori ......................... 60 2.2.1 The Metaphysical a priori ........................ 62 2.2.2 The First Transcendental a priori .................... 64 2.2.3 The Second Transcendental a priori ................... 67 2.3 Experience . 73 3 The Transcendental 81 3.1 Transcendental Analysis . 82 3.1.1 The Deduction . 82 3.1.2 Cohen’s Interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction . 91 3.1.3 The Empirical Individual . 97 3.2 Transcendental Objectivity . 106 3.2.1 Objectivity . 106 3.2.2 Critical Metaphysics . 116 3.2.3 Transcendental Philosophy . 118 3.3 Transcendental Synthesis . 122 3.3.1 The Paradoxes of Determinacy . 131 II Systematic Idealism 141 4 The Logic of Reality 142 4.1 Logic of Reality . 143 4.1.1 Maimonian Skepticism . 143 4.1.2 The Principle of Reality . 152 4.1.3 The Principle of Determinability . 160 4.2 Logic of Totality . 165 4.2.1 The Principle of Limitation . 167 4.2.2 The Principle of Intelligible Totality . 176 4.3 Logic of Anticipation . 177 4.3.1 The Table of Judgments . 178 4.3.2 Platonism . 190 5 The Manifold of Reality 198 5.1 The Real Manifold . 199 5.1.1 Infinitesimals . 199 5.1.2 The Manifold of Limitations . 205 5.2 Origin and Continuity . 215 5.2.1 Reality and the Infinitesimal . 215 5.2.2 Origin, Reality and the Rational Manifold . 227 5.3 Problematic Determinacy . 231 vii 5.3.1 The Principle of Production . 231 5.3.2 Production and Determinacy . 236 5.3.3 NSA and the Infinitesimal . 241 6 Logic, Truth and Revelation 246 6.1 Logic and System . 247 6.1.1 Skepticism and Spinozism . 249 6.1.2 The Logic of Purity (Unity) . 256 6.1.3 The Character of System (Truth) . 265 6.2 Ethics, Revelation and Religion . 276 6.2.1 Ethics and Eternity . 276 6.2.2 Aesthetics and the infinite (The Good) . 286 6.2.3 Revelation and Transcendental Idealism . 293 6.2.4 Revelation and Critical Idealism . 302 6.3 Conclusions . 318 6.3.1 Post-Cohenian Idealism . 318 Abbreviations 320 Bibliography 322 viii List of Figures 4.1 Aristotle’s Wheel . 148 4.2 Aristotle’s Wheel, Finitely . 149 List of Tables 4.1 Kant’s Table of Judgments . 179 4.2 Cohen’s Table of Judgments . 189 4.3 Kant’s Table of Categories . 189 4.4 Two Systems of Logical Principles . 197 Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Critical Idealism 1.1.1 Hermann Cohen and the Marburg School The object of this study is Hermann Cohen’s philosophical system: the System of Critical Ide- alism.1 Specifically, we are interested in (a) the so-called “analytic” interpretation of Kant’s Critical Project that forms the foundation of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, and the implications of this interpretation for (b) the “transcendental” approach that is typical of post- Kantian systematic idealism and for (c) the programme of a systematic philosophy in the post- Kantian tradition. These are the three aspects around which this study is oriented: analysis, systematicity and the transcendental. Hermann Cohen (1840-1918) was the chief architect of the Marburg School of Neo- Kantianism, which was perhaps the most influential philosophical school in Germany, if not continental Europe, in the second half of the nineteenth century. Broadly speaking, Hermann 1The System of Critical Idealism consists of three completed works: Logic of Pure Knowledge (Cohen 1902b), Ethics of Pure Will (Cohen 1907), and Aesthetic of Pure Feeling (Cohen 1912). Additionally, Cohen planned, but never completed, a fourth book on psychology, the capstone of the system. Some commentators also urge that we consider Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism (Cohen 1919) (Cohen 1995) as an appendix to the system. I think, however, that Cohen is explicit enough to rule out including the Religion in a system defined above all through a prohibition on metaphysical commitment. 1 Chapter 1. Introduction 2 Cohen’s System of Critical Idealism is part of the philosophical movement originating in Ger- many as an immediate response to Kant’s critical philosophy, a movement generally referred to as ‘German Idealism’. The movement spread beyond German academic circles, and to vary- ing degrees still survives today, especially in continental Europe. The purpose of this study, however, is not to examine the rise (and fall) of neo-Kantianism or the Marburg school in Wil- helmine Germany, nor even to trace the historical development of a particular line of thought from its antecendents (Plato, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Trendelenburg) through to its philo- sophical consequences (Rosenzweig, Cassirer, Benjamin, Adorno, Habermas).2 While Neo- Kantianism’s importance in the history of philosophy, and especially its place mediating be- tween contemporary analytic and continental schools of thought, is widely underestimated, this study is directed towards a very different task.3 Here, I propose a critical examination of Co- hen’s philosophical system as an articulation of the programme of what I will call systematic idealism. That is, I will interpret Cohen’s system of critical idealism as a response to a specific set of philosophical problems arising from Kant’s proposed revision to traditional epistemol- ogy, and the subsequent worry that Kant’s solution is inadequate or incomplete. While Cohen’s system of idealism shares many similarities to earlier manifestations of post-Kantian idealism, the origin and motivation for these concerns is quite different from the more familiar projects of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.