4 The Transcendence of Monologue "Transcendence" is an inheritance from Kant, who displaces tran­ scendent concepts, or the transcendent use of concepts, by writing of transcendental knowledge. Twentieth-century philosophers have, however, repeatedly modified the rhetoric of transcendence to suit their particular ends. Edmund Husserl "reduces" the transcendent and implicitly bases his phenomenology on an experiential, immanent monologue, while Martin Heidegger turns back toward a preexper­ iential, ontological transcendence. In consequence, phenomenology has wavered between epistemological and metaphysical projects. Husserl's phenomenological method primarily seeks to secure a field of absolute certainty by grounding its theses in the immanence of monadic consciousness, but Heidegger's ontology questions all as­ sumed philosophies of immanence, from Descartes to the neo-Kan­ tians, and points to the essential transcendence of Dasein. Jacques Derrida carries Heidegger's deconstructive project further and attempts to show that Husserl relies on an unexamined notion of monologue. La voix et le phenomene and De Ia grammatologie represent the crux of his project to deconstruct the monological "metaphysics of presence." From his analysis of Husserl to his readings of Rous­ seau, Derrida systematically shows that voice, monologue and au­ toaffection are infiltrated by writing and difference. Derrida questions the effort of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen to ground conscious­ ness in the supposedly pure presence of monologue or undifferen- The Transcendence of Monologue Bs tiated autoaffection. Analysis of Rousseau's Confessions further reveals the absence that haunts even the most intimate passion for immediacy. Heidegger' slater works implicitly restore the transcendent meaning of monologue. No longer the interiority of a subject, mono-logos be­ comes the ultimate reality of language. Heidegger's later philosophy grants special status to poetry, as an "authentic" response to the essence of language. In a sense, then, Heidegger strives to recover ancient origins by reclaiming a spiritual Logos as transcendent genius. Husser! and the Immanence of Consciousness The role of immanence in Husser!' s philosophic method may be understood in connection with Kant's distinction between the tran­ scendental and the transcendent. Explaining the character of tran­ scendental knowledge, Kant asserts, "Not every a priori cognition should be called transcendental, but rather only that through which we recognize that and how certain ideas (intuitions or concepts) are employed solely or are possible a priori" (A56/B8o). 1 Knowledge is "transcendental" when it concerns the possibility or modes of cog­ nition, our "manner of cognition [Erkenntnisart] of objects insofar as this should be possible a priori" (An/B25). The error of "transcendent use" involves a faulty application of concepts, which seeks to "step beyond [iiberschreiten]" the bounds of experience (A296/B352-53). In contrast to the transcendent use of concepts, then, immanent use "limits itself solely to possible experience" (A327/BJ83). Immanent use of reason refers to nature only through possible experience; tran­ scendent use of reason involves a "connection [Verkniipfung] of the objects of experience, which transcends [iibersteigt] all experience" (A845/B873) . Kant expresses his scorn for the transcendent use of principles by means of an image. Both transcendental and transcendent principles "transcend" experience; but while the former are grounded a priori, the latter deceptively pretend to ground themselves only by denying 'Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Raymund Schmidt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1956). I henceforth refer to the first (A) and second (B) editions. In English, see Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's, 1965). The use of an idea, not the idea itself, is immanent or transcendent (A643/B671). Translations are my own. 86 PHI LOSOPHY OF G EN IU S that they step beyond the evidence of experience. Transcendent prin­ ciples are those "that encourage us to tear down all those boundary­ posts and claim for ourselves a completely new ground, which no­ where recognizes demarcation" (A296/B352). The transcendent use of principles threatens rational boundaries and fraudulently annexes a new territory. 2 Enemy of adventure, Kant clings to his island of pure reason and warns against false hopes aroused by the illusion of new lands. In his lecture at a Kant Festival in 1924, Husserl directly acknowl­ edges his debt: during the development of phenomenology, Husserl has recognized "a manifest, essential relationship between this phe­ nomenology and the transcendental philosophy of Kant." 3 He dis­ cusses "metaphysical transcendence" and finds a similarity between the Kantian "transcendental attitude" and the "natural attitude" spo­ ken of by phenomenology (ibid. , 248, 254). Husserl neglects to men­ tion his equal debt to Kant's conception of the transcendent, which phenomenological method will attempt to "bracket out."4 In his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Husser) uses the words "transcendent" and "immanent" 2This anarchic rejection of property rights is especially distasteful to Kant, who describes his own work by means of the fi gure of colonization: "We have now not merely traveled through the territory of pure understanding, and carefully observed every part of it, but have also measured it across, and determined the place of every thing on it. But this territory is an island, and enclosed by nature itself in unchangeable boundaries. It is the territory of truth (an enticing name), surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the real place of illusion, where many a fog-bank and many a quickly melting iceberg give the appearance of new lands, which ceaselessly deceive the fa­ natical sea-traveler with empty hopes, and involve him in adventures, which he can neither desist from nor bring to an end" (A235-36/B294-95). ' Edmund Husserl, " Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie," in Husserl­ iana: Erste Philosophie 1923 /24, ed. Rudolf Boehm (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 230. 40n occasions other than the Kant Festival, Husserl denies the full est acknowledg­ ments by observing that Kant never took possession of the promised land of phenom­ enology, though he was the first to sight it. See Edmund Husserl, ldeen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und Phiinomenologische Philosophie, ed. Karl Schuhmann (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), sec. 62. In citing ldeen below I note the page numbers in the 1950 edition, which the English edition retains: Edmund Husser!, Ideas Pertain ing to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 2 vols., trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982). Compare Die Krisis der Europiiischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phiinomenologie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), sec. 26-27. For a more detailed exposition of the relationship between Husserl's phenomenology and Kant's transcendental philosophy, see !so Kern's Husser/ und Kant (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964); and Walter Hoeres' Kritik der transzendentalph ilosophischen Erkenntnis­ theorie (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1969). The Transcendence of Monologue to describe different types of perceptions, or intentional acts.5 Rather than speak of "outer" and "inner" perception, Husser! cautiously notes two modes of directedness. Immanently directed acts "have as their essence, that their intentional objects, if they exist at all, belong to the same stream of experience as they themselves. That is therefore always the case, e.g., where an act is related to another act (a cogitatio to a cogitatio) of the same I" (Ideen 68). The intentional objects of an immanently directed act belong to the same experiential unity as the intentional act, for "consciousness and its object form an individual unity, produced purely through experiences [Erlebnisse]" (ibid.). Im­ manent acts constitute a unity of perceiver and perceived, as when a speaker asserts, "I speak." How far this realm of immanence extends is a difficult problem of Husserlian phenomenology. Thus the delimi­ tation of transcendent acts, as those which exceed immanence, is equally problematic: "intentional experiences for which that is not the case are transcendentally directed; as, e.g., for all acts directed to essences, or to intentional experiences of other I' s with other streams of experience; and equally for all acts directed to things" (Ideen 68). "Transcendence" and "immanence" characterize two kinds of inten­ tional acts or modes of "givenness" to consciousness (Ideen 77). 6 While Husser! does at times discuss the "transcendence of the thing," his distinction is essentially epistemological rather than ontological. Husserl's later discussion of transcendence and immanence em­ phasizes the certainty of the immanent and the doubtfulness of the transcendent perception. Immanence is the foundation of Husserl's phenomenology, because "every immanent perception necessarily guarantees the existence of its object" (Ideen 85). Husserl's discussion of immanent perception leads, however, to the transcendental ego. 5Here words associated with "intentionality" are used in the technical sense, referring to the directedness by which consciousness constitutes, or "intends," an object. 6] .-P. Sartre's "Une idee fondamentale de Ia phenomenologie de Husserl: L'inten­ tionalite," in Situations 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1947),