Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 1986: 13/2-3 Civil Religion and the Integration of Society: A Theoretical Reflection and an Application Karel D obbelaere In the sociological literature, three social functions of religion are clearly spelled out: the integration of society, the motivation of role-players, and the provision of an integrative meaning system on the personal level (Wilson 1982, p. 33，pp. 49-52, p. 157). In this paper I will confine my discussion to the first function. According to Merton, The large, spaceless and timeless generalizations about “the integrative functions of religion” are largely, though not of course wholly, derived from observations in nonliterate societies- Not infrequently, the social scientist implicitly adopts the findings regarding such societies and goes on to expatiate upon the integrative functions of religion generally (1957，p. 28). He cites Davis and Moore and their study on stratification as an example: No society has become so completely secularized as to liquidate entirely the belief in transcendental ends and supernatural entities. Even in a secularized society some system must exist for the integration of ultimate values, for their ritualistic expression, and for the emotional adjustments required by disappointment, death, and disaster (1961, p. 474). Such authors, Merton states, neglect the possibly disintegrative conse­ quences of religion in “multi-religion societies,” and he questions the evidence that “‘nonreligious，people . • , less often subscribe to certain common ‘values and ends，than those devoted to religious doctrines” (1957 p. 29). Consequently, Merton suggests a possible opposition between religions and the societal value consensus in multi-religion societies. 128 Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 13/2—3 The Emergence of Religious Pluralism in the West In Europe, religious pluralism is an early consequence of functional differ­ entiation. This differentiation of religion, politics and economy began already in the Middle Ages, continued in science and education in the mid­ eighteenth century, and later affected the family. A differentiation of role systems and role-expectations developed between these different sub­ systems. In modern societies, political, religious, and economic institutions became increasingly specialized in their functions and promoted increasingly rational organizations. This process led to a sharp “segmentation of the several institutional domains，” and the institutional norms increasingly became functionally rational and autonomous within these separate institutional areas (Luckmann 1967，p. 95; see also Luckmann 1975). Consequently, the economy and the polity developed “secular” norms, which restricted the validity of the church’s norms increasingly to the specifically “religious sphere，” while its “global” claims were generally neutralized as mere rhetoric (Luckmann 1967，p. 95). This process of change has been called secularization. The development of multiple relations between institutionalized religion (churches) and other specialized institutions resulted in the emergence of new religious groups claiming “doctrinal” superiority and a higher degree of “purity” from “secular” involvements (Luckmann 1967，p. 81). Moreover, the emergence of a polity emancipated from “the sway of either religious institutions or religious rationales of political action” prevented the churches from calling upon the state to enforce their claims of allegiance. This de-monopolization of ecclesiastical traditions also furthered a pluralistic religious situation (Berger 1967, pp. 129-134). Religious Pluralism and the Emergence of Civil Religion In a functionally differentiated society, the religions making up the religious sub-system could no longer legitimate the societal system. But, in the eighteenth century, a complete differentiation of polity and religion was still impossible (Luhmann 1981，pp. 297-298). In 1761，confronted with this dilemma, Rousseau tried to solve it by enunciating the principles of a religion civile (Rousseau 1943, p. 431). Its simple dogmas were the existence of God, the life to come, the reward of the just and the punishment of evildoers, the sanctity of law, and the exclusion of religious intolerance (pp. 428-429). Such a religion should promote "sociability, without which no man can be either a good citizen or a faithful subject” (p. 427). D o b b e l a e r e ： Civil Religion and Integration 129 In 1967，Bellah took up this concept and linked it to the Durkheimian idea of the unity of religion and society (Bellah 1967 pp. 5 and 19). In America, according to Bellah, civil religion is a well-institutionalized religion existing “alongside of and rather dearly differentiated from the churches” (p .1).In his article, Bellah outlined the dogmas of American civil religion, which are akin to Rousseau’s notion (see also Greeley 1972, pp. 156-174). They are to be found in the inaugural addresses of the presidents of the United States and in the Declaration of Independence. Reference is made to God, the Almighty Being, the Creator, the Supreme Judge and to Provi­ dence. “In these last two references,” according to Bellah, “a Biblical God of history who stands in judgment over the world is indicated” (p. 6). Although much is selectively derived from Christianity, this religion is clearly not itself Christian. Christ is never mentioned in these documents. The God of the civil religion is not only rather “U nitarian，” he is also on the austere side, much more related to order, law, and right than to salvation and love. Even though he is somewhat deist in cast, he is by no means simply a watchmaker God. He is actively interested and involved in history, with a special concern for America (p. 7). Indeed, “From the Pilgrims on America has been conceived by some as ‘God’s new Israel• .. God’s almost chosen people”’ (Hammond 1976, p. 171). In other words America is equated with Israel; it is the promised land. And “With the Civil War, a new theme of death, sacrifice, and rebirth enters the civil religion. It is symbolized in the life and death of Lincoln” (Bellah 1967，p. 10)，and later on, of Kennedy and Martin Luther King. This symbolism then found both physical and ritualistic expression, e.g. in national cemeteries and Memorial Day. Concluding his article Bellah writes: Behind the civil religion at every point lie Biblical archetypes: Exodus, Chosen People, Promised Land, New Jerusalem, Sacrifi­ cial Death and Rebirth. But it is also genuinely American and genuinely new. It has its own prophets and its own martyrs，its own sacred events and sacred places, its own solemn rituals and symbols. It is concerned that America be a society as perfectly in accord with the will of God as men can make it, and a light to all the nations (p. 18). According to Martin, it is the explicit separation of church from state that enables a pluralistic religion-in-general to buttress the higher level legitimations of American society. Indeed, since religion has been set free to move 130 Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 13/2 -3 downstream with the ebb and flow of subcultural change (here, he is referring to denominationalism), it is more likely to provide generalized legitimations of a more apparently modern kind. Such legitimations must, of course, not only be general but vague. They must be above specific denominations (see also Greeley 1972, pp. 156 and 158) and specific institutional arrangements, whether these be religious or secular (Martin 1978，p. 70). In fact, as Bellah mentions, American Civil Religion, “borrowed selectively from the religious traditions in such a way that the average American saw no conflict between the tw o ，，，an d as a result America was never anticlerical or militantly secular. Such an achievement is by no means to be taken for granted .. One needs only to think of France to see how differently things can go. The French Revolution was anticlerical to the core and attempted to set up an anti-Christian civil religion. Throughout modern French history, the chasm between traditional Catholic symbols and the symbolism of 1789 has been immense (Bellah 1967，p. 13). Martin explains the different evolution of America and France by referring to the different socio-cultural complex, categorized as “organic monopoly” (which is typical of Catholic countries like France), as against “individualis­ tic pluralism” (which is typical in Protestant countries like the U.S.A.): “The latin pattern contains enormous pressures toward separation of church and state，of Christianity and civil religion，simply on account of the immense split over religion per se” (Martin 1978，p. 71). Types of Civil Religion The notion of “civil religion” emerging with Rousseau and consistently applied by Bellah to the American situation—elaborating on Herberg’s conceptualization of “the American Way of Life” as “the operative faith of the American people” (Herberg 1955，p. 88)，i.e. its “operative religion”1 (Herberg 1967, p. 472; see also Greeley 1972，pp. 156-174)—has been extended to other countries to include quite different types of so-called civil religious systems. Not only France’s anti-Christian version of civil religion is referred to. Parsons mentions even Marxism as a “secular religion.” In his opinion Marxian socialism “was the most important alternative to the American version of the civil religion” (Parsons 1974，p. 207 and pp. 209­ 210). And in England, “the established church，” according to Martin, D o b b e l a e r e ： Civil Religion and Integration 131 “could provide the imposing west front of civic religion” （1978，pp. 70-71). It is clear from these few examples that civil religion is not always clearly differentiated either from the state or the church. And it is exactly the type of functional differentiation between civil religion, the state and the church, which allows Coleman to point out “several type-cases of the forms of civil religion” in the course of religious evolution (Coleman 1970，p. 73). In primitive and archaic religions there is little or no functional differentiation between society, religious organization and civil religion.