IS S U E 4 , 2 0 1 9 1 9 9 2 – 2 0 1 7 CONTENTS EDITORIAL 2 by Vasu Gounden FEATURES 3 Reflecting on the Role of Regional and International Interventions in Resolving the Post-coup Crisis in Sudan by Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu 14 Healing the Wounds of the Past: Peacebuilding Prospects for Zimbabwe by Darlington Tshuma 22 Ethnic Conflict under Ethnic Federalism: A Critical Appraisal by Biruk Shewadeg 29 Women and Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau by Clara Carvalho 37 Indigenous Community-based Natural Resources Management Mechanisms: The Qero System of Menz Guassa by Gashaw Ayferam Endaylalu 46 Communications Shutdowns: Conflict in Kashmir and Cameroon by Irene Dawa Cover photo: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) at Zam Zam camp outside El Fasher, Sudan. UN Photo/Tim McKulka conflict trends I 1 EDITORIAL BY VASU GOUNDEN “I think it’s a continuity of the system, since the heads dialogue on building new social compacts that address are the heads of the old system that was rejected by the the triple challenges. We are entering an era of growing population. Moreover, it’s empty political programmes, so authoritarianism in the name of stability. Right-wing here we talk about things that are unachievable with our leaders around the world, who thrive on exploiting the economy, it’s like selling dreams to little kids.”1 These are fears of their populations about a flood of migrants from the words of a young Algerian protester who was one of Africa because of instability, will find allies among leaders thousands of protesters who marched every Friday for nine in Africa who want to curb legitimate protests, and use the months to demand change. The protests forced the long- fact that instability will lead to a flood of refugees to other serving president of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to rescind parts of the world. This unholy alliance will have negative a plan to contest for a fifth term before he was eventually consequences for Africa and will roll back the gains made in forced to resign after 20 years in charge. advancing democracy and human rights. Similar street protests forced out the long-serving Chaotic, leaderless and misdirected street protests can Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, from power early in be counterproductive and have negative consequences. It is 2019. In Guinea, since October 2019, around one million also true that opportunistic forces from within and outside people protested in the capital city, Conakry, against the a country can hijack legitimate protests and exploit them embattled 81-year-old president, Alpha Conde, suspected for narrow ends. On the other hand, there is no doubt of wanting to run for a third term. It is now two years since that many countries in Africa are failing to meet the basic the long-standing president of Zimbabwe, the late Robert needs of their people, and people are taking to the streets Mugabe, was ousted from power by street protests. and engaging in legitimate protests to demand the basic It is important for us in Africa to understand what the services that they voted for. factors are that drive these street protests, and what the Africa’s leaders will not solve the continent’s possible outcomes and consequences are. There is no challenges by clamping down on legitimate protests. doubt that the root causes of these protests are the triple Africa’s challenges need confident and visionary leaders challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality. These who are willing to put the interests of their people factors are exacerbated by rising food and fuel prices, above self, group and political party. Africa needs a new which are usually the trigger that leads to street protests, national consciousness that is rooted in a pan-African which soon turn into political protests. consciousness. The year 2019 will be recorded as another However, the triple challenges and rising food and fuel year in which the people of Africa voted with their feet. prices have been prevalent in Africa for several decades, Let 2020 be a year in which Africa’s leaders lead with their so why are we now seeing such widespread and frequent hearts and minds, and turn the dreams of our youth into protests across Africa? The main factors driving these reality! phenomena are the sheer numbers of people who are now concentrated in urban areas and in possession of tools that give them unprecedented power to mobilise at Vasu Gounden is the Founder and Executive Director a massive level in a very short time. Governments are not of ACCORD. able to respond as fast, or to respond with minimum force. Consequently, casualties are high, and this has led to a cycle of conflict characterised by months of street protests. 1 Africanews (2019) ‘Young Algerians Call Out Dinosaur Elite The world, and Africa, is entering a dangerous era – Ahead of Divisive Polls’, Available at: <https://www.africanews. one in which there will be little room to mediate between com/2019/12/10/young-algerians-call-out-dinosaur-elite-ahead-of- street protesters and their leaders to find new spaces for divisive-polls/> [Accessed 11 December 2019]. 2 I conflict trends UN PHOTO/TIM MCKULKA PHOTO/TIM UN REFLECTING ON THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS IN RESOLVING THE POST-COUP CRISIS IN SUDAN BY CLAYTON HAZVINEI VHUMBUNU Introduction power for almost 30 years, making him one of the longest- The overthrow of Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir from the serving presidents on the continent. Following his ousting presidency of Sudan by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on 11 April 2019, internal political players and stakeholders – on 11 April 2019, following several months of protests and mainly the ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) and civil uprisings by Sudanese citizens, resulted in a prolonged a coalition of protesters and opposition groups, led by the governance and political crisis. Al-Bashir, who was a SAF lieutenant general, came to power in June 1989, through a military coup d’état staged against Sadiq al-Mahdi, who Above: Omar Hassan al-Bashir was president of Sudan for was the then-prime minister of Sudan. Al-Bashir had been in 30 years. conflict trends I 3 22° 24° 26° 28° 30° 32° 34° 36° 38° 40° Administrative Lake boundary L Nasser EGY P T Halaib SAUDI 22° SUDAN i ARAB I A 22° b Wadi Halfa Semna West b y Selima Oasis Kumma i Salala L I B YA d O Lake a 0 100 200 300 km N u b i a n i Muhammad Qol d Nubia a n 0 100 200 mi W SUDAN 20° Laqiya Arba'in Desert 20° D Port Sudan NORTHERN Kerma Abu Hamed The boundaries and names shown e RED SEA Suakin and the designations used on this map Dongola e Nukheila u il do not imply official endorsement or s a N e acceptance by the United Nations. t a Karima NILE e l Tokar P d r El'Atrun a Old Dongola Merowe Haiya 18 y 18 ° b Karora R ° t A l h E * Final boundary between the e us Atbara Republic of Sudan and the Republic of b h D e s k Ed Damer J a l South Sudan has not yet been g i determined. r a Gadamai wa N M S o l l lu Meroë A e e u t ** Final status of the Abyei area is not i H b di D b E d e a a yet determined. J u r a W b a A W A Shendi z o 16° Q KASSALA E RIT R E A 16° NORTHERN Abu 'Uruq KHARTOUM Omdurman Halfa al Gadida Asmara DARFUR Khartoum Kassala NORTHERN EL C H A D Miski KORDOFAN GEZIRA Sodiri i d a m H Wad Medani GEDAREF Umm Badr r 14° a Teke 14° D Gedaref zē Al Fasher Sennar El Geneina El Obeid ETHI OPI A WESTERN Kosti Singa En Nahud Rabak D DARFUR WHITE SENNAR in d National capital e Dilling NILE r T'anaState (wilayah) capital 12° Abu Zabad Ed Damazin 12° Nyala Julud SOUTHERN Hayk'Town Renk A Al Fula bay Major airport Ed Da'ein KORDOFAN BLUE NILE (Bl Internationalue boundary e N Tullus Nuba Mts. l Famaka SOUTHERN Muglad i Undeterminedi boundary* Kologi N l Kadugli e Buram te ) DARFUR i State (wilayah) boundary Talodi h W B Paloich Abyei region** a bay 10° h Ā Main Road 10° Radom r Diffra e l'Arab Road Abyei CENTRAL Malakal Track Kafia Kingi Bentiu AFRICAN Lol Railroad S O U TH SUDAN REPUBLIC So 22 24 26 28 30 32 ba 34 40 ° ° ° ° ° ° t ° 36° 38° ° Map No. 4458 Rev.2 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support March 2012 Cartographic Section UN PHOTO/LAURA JARRIEL PHOTO/LAURA UN Alliance for Freedom and Change/Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) in Sudan – failed to speedily agree and settle on an effective transitional governance authority. However, following different forms of interventions from regional and international actors and players, the TMC and FFC finally signed the Political Agreement on Establishing the Structures and Institutions of the Transitional Period between the Transitional Military Council and the Declaration of Freedom and Change Forces, on 17 July 2019. Subsequently, on 17 August 2019, the TMC and FFC signed the Constitutional Charter for the 2019 Transitional Period – widely referred to as the Constitutional Declaration – which replaced the Transitional Constitution of Sudan of 2005. This Constitutional Charter is set to be in force for a 39-month transitional period. The new prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, was sworn in on 21 August 2019.